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   Abstract  
 
                                                                    
My aim in the written thesis is to scrutinize a particular stage in the process of image 
making by means of ideas generated by psychoanalytic theory, in particular Lacan’s concept of 
the gaze. I propose a three stage model of image making: 1) planning, 2) absorption or ‘un-
thought’, and 3) judging; they are seen together as a spiral process. My primary interest is the 
second stage, both in my studio practice and in the written thesis. In the studio this can be seen 
in the conjunction between passages emphasizing energy, for instance passages emphasizing a 
‘re-invigoration’ of the figure by means of an investigation into mark making and cartoon 
elements, and passages emphasizing form and colour. 
 
In the written work, by using Lacan’s concept of the gaze as template, then employing 
ideas such as ‘figure’ and ‘dissimulation’ within the libidinal economy (Lyotard), syncretistic 
scanning and the ability of the primary processes to learn and develop (Ehrenzweig), and the 
matrixial gaze (Lichtenberg-Ettinger), I aim to illuminate the ‘un-thought’ stage of image 
making by means of a consideration of libidinal as well as semiotic processes. By including 
aspects of schizoanalysis (Deleuze and Guattari), I ‘re-contextualize’ Lacan’s concepts of ‘lack’ 
and the empty signifier and retain his other ideas relating to his (late) concept of the gaze. 
Schizoanalysis, in providing an extended concept of the unconscious, aids in re-considering 
Lacan’s concept of the gaze within the context of the process of image making.  
 
Working from this basis I propose a grouping of (existing) ideas that I term the libidinal 
gaze, brought together for the purpose of reflecting on the un-thought stage in the process of 
image making. In doing so, I consider both concepts of perception as influenced by the 
processes and energy of the unconscious, and concepts of the unconscious as reflected through 
post-Freudian and post-Lacanian psychoanalytic thought. 
  
 
6
 
 
List of Illustrations                           
 
 
 
Introduction:                                                                                                                      page        
 
In.1     Silver, Paxson, acrylic on board, 4.5’ x 4’, 2002.                                                    29  
 
In.2     Silver (detail).                                                                                                            30 
 
In.3     The Visit, Paxson, acrylic on board, 4.4’x 4’, 2003.                                                  31 
 
 
Chapter One:  
 
1.1 Joseph Beuys, (Hirsh),Verso, pencil on paper, 49.8 x 37.7 cm.                                     
(no date), Sammlung Marx, from catalogue ‘Joseph Beuys,                                                              
The Secret Block for a Secret Person in Ireland’. Berlin: Hamburger                               
Bahnhof, 1996, plate 197.                                                                                         
78 
 
 
Chapter Two: 
 
2.1 Joseph Beuys, Aus: Warmephysiologie, pencil on paper,  
            20.8 x 14.6cm.,1959, Sammlung Marx, from catalogue ‘Joseph                           
            Beuys, The Secret Block for a Secret Person in Ireland’,                     
            plate 247.                                                                                                                    105  
   
2.2  Cy Twombly, Bay of Naples, (large detail), oil, crayon and                              
                                     pencil on canvas, 240 x 300cm, 1961, Kirk Varnedoe from  
             catalogue ‘Cy Twombly, a Retrospective’. New York: Museum   
             of  Modern Art, 1994, plate 55.                                                                                109 
 
2.3  Cy Twombly, Bay of Naples (close-up detail), Kirk Varnedoe,  
  
 
7
              from catalogue ‘Cy Twombly, a Retrospective’, plate 54.                                        110                   
 
                                                                                                                                  page 
               
2.4 A. Artaud,  Portrait of Paule Thevenin, graphite and wax  
             crayon on paper, 1947; from ‘Antonin Artaud – Works on Paper’,  
             ed. M. Rowell. New York: Museum of Modern Art, 1996.                                     117   
           
 2.5    M. Duchamp The Large Glass, 1915-1923,  
            from ‘The Writings of  Marcel Duchamp’, ed. M. Sanouillet and E. Peterson, DaCapo  
            paperback, 2002; reprint: New York: Salt Seller, Oxford                                                                   
           University Press, 1973.                                                                                              122                    
 
                                                                                                                                                                          
   2.6 B. Newman, Onement, oil on canvas, 38x30 inches, 1949; 
             from catalogue: ‘Barnett Newman’, ed. Ann Temkin,  
            Philadelphia Museum of Art. London: Tate Publishing,  
            2002, plate 34.                                                                                                           123                    
 
 
Chapter Three:                                                                                                
 
3.1 Joseph Beuys, Kadmon, pencil with traces of coloured ink 
            or watercolour on creased paper, 29.5 x 28 cm overall  
            irregular, 1948-49, Ann Temkin and Bernice Rose, from 
            catalogue ‘Thinking is Form, The Drawings of Joseph 
            Beuys’. New York: Thames and Hudson in association with  
            Philadelphia Museum of Art and The Museum of Modern 
            Art, 1993, Plate 13.                                                                                                      170 
 
 
Chapter Four: 
 
4.1    Alberto Giacommeti, Head, oil on canvas, 27 3/4” x 15 3/8”, 
         1954, ed. Sir John Rothenstein, from catalogue ‘Alberto Giacometti,  
        The Masters 48’. Paulton nr Bristol: Knowledge Publications,  
  
 
8
        Purnell and Sons Ltd, 1966, plate XIV.                                                                          185 
                                                               
                                                                                                                                                                         
                                                                                                                                               page 
4.2  Bracha Lichtenberg Ettinger, Eurydice, No. 2, (size and  
media not provided), 1992-94, from catalogue ‘Artworking 
1985 – 1999’, Palais des Beaux-Arts, Brussels. Ghent-Amsterdam:     
Ludion, 2000, page 79.                                                                                               187 
                                          
 
 
Appendix One:   ………………………………………………………….     226 
 
Ap.1  Two Figures with Watcher (Blue), 6’ x 5’, acrylic paint on board,  
           2003.                     227
  
 
Ap. 2  Untitled (Nickel Azo Yellow), 6’ x 5’, acrylic paint on board,  
            2004.                      228 
 
Ap. 3  Untitled (Chromium Oxide Green), 4.5’ x 4’, acrylic paint on  
            board, 2003.                    229 
 
Ap. 4  Two Figures Pale at Dawn (Unbleached Titanium), 4.5’ x 4’,  
          acrylic paint on board, 2004.                   230 
 
Ap. 5  Untitled (Small Pink), 2.5 x 4’, acrylic paint on board, 2003.               231 
 
            
Ap. 6  Cinnamon Synergy, 4.5’ x 4’, acrylic paint on board, 2004.              232
  
 
Ap. 7  The Weight of the Dream (Lavender), 6’ x 5’, acrylic paint  
           on board, 2004.                   233 
 
Ap. 8  Missed Encounter (Sea-green), 6’ x 5’, acrylic paint on board,  
  
 
9
          2004.                      234 
 
Ap. 9  Untitled (Green Gold), 4.5 ‘ x 4’, acrylic paint on board, 2004.   235 
                                                                                                                                                                         
                                                                                                                                   page 
 
Ap. 10  Untitled (Cobalt Teal), 4.5’ x 4’, acrylic paint on board, 2004.  236 
 
Ap. 11  Teacher in Blue Robe, Late in the Afternoon, (Violet), 3.5’ x 4’,  
acrylic paint on board, 2004.                                               237 
 
Ap. 12  Installation Photo One                                                   238 
 
 Ap. 13  Installation Photo Two       239 
 
Ap. 14  Installation Photo Three       240 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
10
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abbreviations – Books and Articles 
   (See full Bibliography at end of thesis) 
 
 
 
Rhetoric : Barthes, R., “Rhetoric of the Image”, Image, Music and Text. London: Fontana 
Press, 1977. 
 
Wisdom :  Barthes, R., “The Wisdom of Art”, Calligram, ed. N. Bryson. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1988. 
 
Anti-Oedipus  :  Deleuze, G. and Guattari, F., Anti-Oedipus, Capitalism and Schizophrenia. 
London: The Athlone Press, 1984. 
 
Hidden Order  :  Ehrenzweig, A., The Hidden Order of Art, A Study in the Psychology of 
Artistic Imagination. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967. 
 
Interpretation:  Freud, S., The Interpretation of Dreams, trans. Joyce Crick. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1999. 
 
Unconscious:  Freud, S., “The Unconscious”, 1915, Standard Edition of the Complete 
Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, ed. J. Strachey.  London: Hogarth Press, 1957. 
 
Seminar II  :  Lacan, J., Book II, The Ego in Freud’s Theory and in the Technique of 
Psychoanalysis, 1954-1955,  ed. J-A Miller. London: W.W. Norton & Co., 1991. 
 
Seminar III  : Lacan, J., Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book III, (1955-56), ed. J.-A. Alain Miller. 
London: Routledge, 1993. 
 
Seminar XI  :  Lacan,  J., Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis (1964), ed. J.-A. 
Miller. London: Vintage, 1998. 
  
 
11
 
Encore: Lacan, J., The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XX , Encore 1972-1973, ed. Jacques-
Alain Miller, London: Vintage, 1998.  
 
Wit(h)nessing  : Lichtenberg Ettinger, B. “Wit(h)nessing Trauma and the Gaze”, The 
Fascinating Faces of Flanders, ed. P. Vandenbroeck. Antwerp: Hessenhuis, 1998. 
 
Matrixial : Lichtenberg Ettinger, B., The Matrixial Gaze. Leeds: Feminist Arts and Histories 
Network, Department of Fine Art, the University of Leeds, 1995. 
 
Dream-work : J.-F. Lyotard, “The Dream-Work Does Not Think”, The Lyotard Reader, ed. A. 
Benjamin. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1989. 
 
Beyond :  J.-F. Lyotard, “Beyond Representation”, The Lyotard Reader, ed. A. Benjamin. 
Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1989. 
 
Tensor :  J.-F. Lyotard, “The Tensor”, The Lyotard Reader, ed. A. Benjamin. Oxford: 
Blackwell Publishers, 1989. 
 
Newman :  J.-F.Lyotard, “Newman: the Instant”, The Lyotard Reader, ed. A. Benjamin.  
Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1989. 
 
Approach :  J-F. Lyotard, “The Psychoanalytic Approach to Artistic and Literary Expression”, 
Toward the Post-Modern, eds. R. Harvey and M.S. Roberts.  Amherst, New York: Humanity 
Books, 1999. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
12
 
 
 
 
 
        
 
                           TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                               Page  
 
 
Title Page  ……………………………………………………………..                      1 
 
Dedication  …………………………………………………………….             2 
 
Declaration  ……………………………………………………………              3 
 
Acknowledgements  …………………………………………………..               4 
 
Abstract  ……………………………………………………………….               5 
 
List of Illustrations ……………………………………………………               6 
 
Abbreviations – Books and Articles     ………………………………               9 
 
Table of Contents  ……………………………………………………..              11 
 
Prologue: ‘Hospital Story’  ……………………………………………             15  
The Prologue, as a piece of creative writing, sets the stage for the direction of enquiry pursued in the thesis. This is 
a different mode of attention than the more analytical one employed primarily in the development of the argument 
of the thesis. The Hospital Story exemplifies a more-open-to-taking-chances orientation, one where ‘making a stab 
in the dark’ can be legitimate, where an ‘approximation’ of, and elucidation of, feelings, is important, and where the 
use of intuition is emphasized. The analytical mode, on the other hand, collects, organizes and develops ideas in a 
more logical manner, emphasizing planning, organization and judgement.   
                                                                                         
Introduction  ……………………………………………………………             18 
The Introduction, as a rational plan, sets the stage for the development of the argument in the thesis. A ‘model of 
image making’ is described, including three ‘stages’, the planning, the ‘un-thought’ or absorbed, and the judging 
stages. From this model, the thetic question is developed. The thetic question is put into a context of both theory 
and practice. The theory being used, and reasons for its use, are outlined. 
 
Section 1: Overall aim of  the written thesis   …………………………….……               21 
Section 2: A three-stage model: the process of image making     ………………………..              23 
  
 
13
2.1     The model  
              2.2     Exemplifying stage two, the ‘un-thought’ stage 
              2.3     Context  (historical)  
Section 3: Thetic question       ……………………………………………………………..             38 
Section 4:  Notes on Methodology        ……………………………………………………             43 
                             Section 5  Background concepts         …………………………………………………..                 
44 
 5.1   Freud’s concept of the dream-work                                                                                   
 5.2   Lacan’s principles of the three ‘orders’                                                                              
5.3   Need, demand and desire                                                                                                 
5.4   Lack    
               5.5   Subject      
               Section 6    Overview of the development of the thetic argument …………………           59
                                                                                                                
Chapter 1: Unconscious – ‘Origin’  …………………………………..               63 
Chapter One considers one aspect of Lacan’s concept of the gaze, his ideas concerning the basis and origin of the 
unconscious. The specific ideas he develops are lack and its generation of desire. Some aspects of Lyotard’s 
contestations of, and extensions to, Lacan’s concepts are considered.  
 
Section 1: Preview of Lacan’s concept of the  gaze  …………………..………………..                65 
Section 2:  Basis of the unconscious    …………………………………………………..                 67    
2.1  Lack  
2.1.1 Phallic lack  
2.1.2 Implications for Lacan  
2.1.3 Implications for the studio  
2.1.4 Anterior lack  
2.2  Desire  
2.2.1 Circling of desire  
2.2.2 Desire of the ‘Other’  
2.2.3 Full and empty images  
2..3  Caveat    
Section 3: Lyotard    …………………………………………………………………….                       
 80 
3.1 Libido or lack as basis of the unconscious? 
3.2  Libidinal energy and art works 
3.3  Laxity and art making    
Section 4:  Summary  and implications  …………………………………………………                  
 85 
Section 5:  Next Chapter  ………………..…………………………………………….                    
   86 
                                                                                                                
  
 
14
Chapter 2 Unconscious – ‘Content’  ……………………………………              
  88  
Chapter Two considers a second aspect of Lacan’s concept of the gaze, the ‘content’ of the unconscious, including 
signifiers and the ‘Other’ in connection with their relevance for the un-thought stage of image making. Lyotard, as 
well as Deleuze and Guattari, provide critiques of, and extensions to, Lacan’s ideas. 
 
Section 1:  Unconscious as ‘the unrealized’        ………………………………………….               
   91 
1.1  Signifier   
1.1.1 Perception and the relevance of ‘the story’ – the experiential point of view 
1.1.2 Memory – the linguistic point of view  
1.1.3 Unconscious structured like a language   
1.1.4  Signifiers and dreams   
1.1.5 The unrealized    
1.1.6 Signifiers  and meaning , the chain of signifiers 
1.1.7 Signifiers and the un-thought  stage 
1.1.8 Truth and knowledge 
1.1.9 Communication and the ‘wall’  
1.1.10 Caveats  - signifiers. 
1.2  Subject matter’ of the unconscious       
1.2.1  Individual ‘censored chapters’   
 1.2.2  The concept of the ‘Other’  
1.2.2.1    Where speech is constituted 
1.2.2.2    As praxis    
1.2.2.3    As cause 
1.2.2.4    Caveat – Other’. 
Section 2: Contestations and extensions ………………………………………………………              120 
 2.1 Lyotard   
2.1.1 Figure and dissimulation   
 2.2 Deleuze and Guattari in ‘Anti-Oedipus’  
2.2.1 Lack 
2.2.2 Desire and the ‘body without organs’ 
2.2.3  Signifiers and libido    
2.2.4  Libido: qualitative and quantitative 
2.2.5 Extensions: the ‘real’    
Section 3:  Summary and implications     …………………….…………………………           133        
Section 4:  Next chapter  …………………………………………………………………           138 
          
Chapter 3: Unconscious – ‘Processes’:…………………………...……         139 
Chapter Three includes a consideration of a third aspect of the unconscious as part of Lacan’s concept of the gaze, 
which is the ‘processes’ he sees operating in this arena. Lacan’s view of the ‘primary processes’ and ‘appearance’ 
  
 
15
of the unconscious are discussed. Ehrenzweig’s and Lyotard’s relevant notions about unconscious processes are 
discussed and related to Lacan’s ideas and to the un-thought stage of image making. 
 
Section 1: Dreams and other processes   ………………………………………………..             141 
1.1 Dream-work 
1.2 Word-presentations, thing-presentations and cathexis    
1.3  ‘Appearance’ of unconscious material    
1.3.1 The stain     
1.3.2 The gap and impediment   
1.3.3 The subject: the gap and aphanisis   
Section 2:  Lyotard – libidinal economy  ………………………………………………..            150 
2.1   Desire, dissimulation and dream-work    
2.2   Desire and art making with caveat   
Section 3: Ehrenzweig    …………………………………………………………………            155 
 3.1 Perception, the libido and the unconscious    
 3.2 Basic terminology  
  3.3 Unconscious: scanning and structure   
  3.4 The basis of the unconscious, and ‘intuition’ 
  3.5 Unconscious processes and art making   
3.6  Processing perceptual information 
3.7  Re-appearance of processed information    
3.8  Exemplification    
Section 4: Summary and implications for the un-thought stage   …………………………       170 
Section 5: Next Chapter    …………………………………………………………………       175 
 
Chapter 4: The Gaze  ……………………………………………………….  176 
Chapter Four includes a consideration of Lacan’s concept of the gaze as an overall concept, particularly as it relates 
to the second (un-thought) stage of the process of image making. B. Lichtenberg Ettinger’s relevant contestations 
and extensions of Lacan’s ideas are discussed, including her notion of the matrixial gaze as an ‘additional pathway’ 
of the libido. 
 
 Section  1: Lacan’s concept of the gaze     …………………………………………………      178 
1.1 The gaze as objet a.  
1.2 The gaze as gaze of the painting    
1.3 The gaze as process    
1.4  Implications   
Section 2: ‘Extending’ Lacan’s  concept of the gaze – B. Lichtenberg Ettinger         ………..   186                                         
2.1 Another (side to the) story 
 2.1.1 Ettinger and Lacan 
2.1.2 Matrixial model  
2.1.3 Matrixial model and art    
2.1.4  Matrixial model and the un-thought stage of image making  
  
 
16
Section 3:  Implications         ..……………………………………………….……………         199 
Section 4: Next chapter   ……………………………………………….…………………..        200 
                                                                                       
Chapter 5: The Libidinal Gaze  ………………………………………..       201 
Chapter Five summarizes, relates and extends the ideas presented in this thesis, emphasizing their relationship to 
each other and to the illumination of the second (un-thought) stage of image making. In this way I am able to put 
forward a speculative contribution to ideas about the process of image making by means of a notion termed the 
‘libidinal gaze’ in the context of art practice. 
  
Section 1:  Introduction    ……..………………………………………………………….        203 
Section 2:  Summary of thetic argument………………………..…………………………       204 
Section 3:  The ‘libidinal gaze ‘   …………………………………………………………        212 
3.1  Definition of the libidinal gaze 
3.2  Characteristics of the libidinal gaze  
3.3  Implications of the  libidinal gaze in connection with the un-thought stage 
 Section 4:  Disadvantages and advantages      ……………………………………………         220                                              
  Section 5:  Reflections on my practice      ………………………………………………..         221 
  
              
Appendix One : Documentation of the Practice Section of the Thesis …..   226  
 
Bibliography    ……………………………………………………………        241 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
17
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
________________________________________PROLOGUE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
18
 
 
Prologue:    Hospital story 
   
The hospital….we are occupying part of a hospital, an old hospital, whose upper floor  is 
no longer in use… haunted corridors, endless empty ward rooms, window after (dirty) window 
stretching into the distance….footsteps, echoing laughter, a group of us spread out in this huge 
unused space…(and yet not completely unused since the ground floor is busy, life (and death) 
going on as usual, preoccupation, quiet voices, people in and out).  My colleagues wander off in 
diverse directions, looking for who knows what…. 
 
The other one died a perfect death.  Is there a ‘perfect’ death?   Age 96, clear in mind.  
Not alone.  She said he looked so peaceful…but where to send his remains?  His remains:  that 
which remains when life has departed, spirit gone…no movement…no mental murmur. 
 
The image of spreading out in the hospital, different people in different directions, 
different people at different speeds, different aims and objectives – some people wandering 
slowly and poking in all the corners, some people striding out in a wider search for something so 
far missing.  Some people breaking boundaries, climbing into unused beds, opening cupboards, 
rummaging in the closed drawers of desks no longer used, but containing detritus, once 
important keys, files, written notes…some people…some…  
 
The other one died a perfect death …  where is he?  where is he gone?  gone elsewhere?  
else?  – where?   I won’t know  (while I am alive). 
 
I go into the room which was the largest ward, huge windows down each side, a long 
empty room: I hang my three big paintings on the blank end wall, and back way off to see them 
from a distance. When I heard about people building fires and cooking food, when I heard about 
people climbing into disused beds, I felt outraged, I felt somehow the overall sanctity of the 
space, and of the permission to use the space, had been violated. Almost as though I myself had 
been somehow violated… equating me with the space, equating me with the hospital space…my 
permissions for myself, and the permissions somewhat ambiguously granted to our group for the 
use of the hospital space………somehow as though an unknown, or uncontrollable, some 
uncontrollable parts of me, were doing things over which I had no control, or about which I had 
no awareness.   Like when I have flu or a headache, when it has occurred to me that there are 
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little bits of me running around in back of, behind, my consciousness applying these pains or 
these illnesses…but which seem to me at the time to be induced by outside influences. 
 
Where is he gone?  I won’t know….  But he, this He, is with us still, age 86.  Hurt, 
injured (broken?) in mind and body, his well-spring wounded, his life force bent.   WHY?  Love, 
anger, frustration alternate…in him and in me.  
 
What are these bits of me, what is this skin of blindness, what is this …what is this wall, 
this sheet of hidden-ness behind which things are happening (in my mind and body) of which I 
am not conscious.  What I am conscious of is the end result, the runny nose, the sore throat, the 
headache, the anger and frustration … what I don’t seem to be aware of is the coming on, the 
cause, the onset, the mental process that results in these end products.  Why is my consciousness 
limited, why is it blinded to these aspects of my well-being that could perhaps be better dealt 
with if I were conscious at the onset stage, at the causative stage. 
 
The other one died a perfect death… 
 
I think of the hospital, with all of my fellow artists pushing out in all directions to 
explore… all these feet walking along all these corridors, all these eyes peering into all these 
corners and disused spaces…   It makes me think of what must be happening under the layer of 
consciousness, under this surface, this subjectile, this tableau (no not tableau), this impediment 
to consciousness. As I think these words, I become more aware of my whole body, I become 
more aware, as though there were many (internal) feet, many eyes, increasing my awareness and 
consciousness; (my) physicality is becoming more evident to my conscious state of mind. In 
order to feel the edges of consciousness, in order, for instance, to feel this slightly increased 
awareness of physicality, it is necessary to… not dilute my attention, but… not divert my 
attention…but to spread it out, to spread out my attention rather than focus my attention. Rather 
like dropping marbles out of a bag – the marbles go in all directions…one can keep one’s mind 
on the place where the marbles first hit the ground, or one can diverge and spread one’s 
attention to encompass all the spreading out mass of the marbles as they roll. 
                                             
Walking back down the street, the dog just behind me came up alongside under my left 
hand – wrong dog – he went on ahead.  
 
To catch those thoughts that are shimmering around that subjectile surface … the answer 
whenever I have fears is…. (a  way forward?  a way out??)…  combine how I’m feeling, the 
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physicality, the body, and how I’m thinking, in rationality. The preverbal semiotic, the reflection 
and refraction of pre-verbal experiences, bodily experiences, sensations, and their irruption into 
our conscious life, our writing, our painting … is this what stretches boundaries, and allows us 
to be innovative?     
 
Another dog did the same thing – again wrong dog.  The third dog came up under my 
left hand, it was Pepper…and as he was also going ahead, I wanted to control him, asked him to 
come to heel… 
 
The ‘skin’ or support  on which a drawing is laid down, can be seen as a metaphor for 
the skin of the repressed, the unconscious – beating it, poking it, burning holes in it….trying to 
allow  into –into what -- into -- allowing us to see into a series or a group of feelings, thoughts, 
emotions which for one reason or another we don’t allow ourselves to access in normal day to 
day experience, partly because of the convenience of having a limited consciousness, but partly 
because of the strength of the trauma or pleasure that might override the social conventions we 
have been taught are so necessary to our survival…are necessary to our survival….  Why then 
would anyone want to pierce the skin and deal with some of those sensations?   Why  would 
anyone want to do that? ….. these mysteries. 
 
He, this he, the one with us still.  The delicate connection between life and body, the 
differences…body as host and recipient, body as performer of growth and function, the receiver 
and temporary maintainer of life.   
 
Why would anyone want to? Mysteries. Dealing with mysteries… wanting to know 
more, wanting to have more control, wanting to understand better. Wanting to get a more 
complete picture of oneself and one’s fellows. Wanting to have at one’s disposal energies and 
forces which are not always at one’s fingertips – and yet could that be dicing with death, could 
that be dealing with forces that are stronger than we might suppose?  So there are the fear 
particles coming in, the fear of the unknown, the fear of the possibly uncontrollable…the fear of 
falling back into that subsumation with the maternal, which we had to pull ourselves out of with 
so much pain … so much pain, but possibly also so much pride and pleasure. 
 
 The visit…stress, helplessness, loss of control, unpleasantness, guilt, shame, (where is 
death?) …which is his? which is mine?  (don’t claim more than I need to…)   …  leave (me)     
leave in peace. 
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Remember the marbles – dropping a handful of marbles, the marbles go in all directions.  
One can keep one’s mind on the place where the marbles first hit the ground, or one can spread 
one’s attention to encompass all the marbles as they roll out from the point of impact … both at 
once?   
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The Introduction sets the stage for the development of the argument of the thesis. A 
‘model of image making’ is described, including three ‘stages’, the planning, the ‘un-thought’, 
and the judging stages. From this model, the thetic question is developed. The thetic question is 
put into a context of both theory and practice. The theory being used, and reasons for its use, are 
stated and there is a summary of some basic theoretical concepts. There is an overview of the 
thesis, chapter by chapter. 
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Introduction: The ‘Un-thought’ Stage of Image Making and the Gaze    
 
 
‘The most graceful moments in the covenant between art and theory occur when 
theoretical elements, only indirectly or partly intended for particular works of art, and visual 
elements which refuse theory, collide.  In doing so, they may transform the borderlines between 
the two domains so that art is momentarily touched by theory while theory takes on a new 
meaning from the encounter with art.’1 
 
 
Section 1:  Overall aim of the written thesis 
 
The major claim of this thesis is that there is an absorbed or ‘un-thought’ aspect of image 
making, which can be better articulated and understood as ‘agency’ and ‘cause’ of image 
making.2 In this way I aim to avoid a ‘descriptive’ discourse concerning maker and object, and 
concentrate instead on the process itself. As an artist, a maker of images, I am closely involved 
in further development of understanding about this ‘absorbed process’, through experience in 
my studio practice.3 Such an aspect is indefinable in exactitude; it is fluid in differences among 
artists and often within an artist’s practice. It is difficult to pinpoint, and difficult to articulate. 
Nevertheless it is an area which has been addressed theoretically, albeit tangentially. I believe 
that theory and practice can be brought together to extend understanding of this particular aspect 
of image making. However at the same time it is important to note that, while I bracket and 
juxtapose various elements of psychoanalytic theory, I am not claiming to extend psycho-
analytic theory per se. Instead I am a practicing artist, and my primary interest here is 
illuminating certain aspects of image making by means of a combination of the ideas used in the 
present work. 
   
 
                                                          
1 Bracha Lichtenberg Ettinger, “Woman – Other – Thing; a Matrixial Touch”, from exhibition catalogue, Matrix  
Borderlines  (Oxford, Museum of Modern Art, 1993), 11. 
2 In this thesis ‘image making’ is used in place of the more generally used term ‘painting’ because I wish to include 
drawing. However I do not mean to include photography and other modes of image making. 
3 A term used by Bracha Lichtenberg Ettinger, The Matrixial Gaze  (Leeds, Feminist Arts and Histories Network, 
Department of Fine Art, The University of Leeds, 1995), 22. 
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In this Introduction a specific methodology of making images is described, setting up a 
‘model of image making’.4  This particular process is chosen because it is one with which I am 
personally acquainted; it is also one that contains particular reference to an absorbed, or un-
thought, element, which opens out the process for discussion in relation to the application of 
theory.  It is a process that intrigues me and is basic to my practice. On the other hand, it is not a 
process which is individual to my practice, nor is it the only process I use within my practice.  
 
After developing the model of image making, there is a brief consideration of a historical 
context for the process being modelled, and a thetic question is developed from the descriptive 
terms used in the model. The model thus becomes one part of the criteria for the choice of 
theoretical considerations. This thetic question results in a way forward for research. A 
particular aspect of psychoanalytic theory, Jacques Lacan’s concept of the ‘gaze’, is chosen to 
provide a foundation and context for the development of the thesis. The concept of the gaze is 
extended and elaborated by means of the ideas of several post-Freudian and post-Lacanian 
writers. From the point of view of image making, I consider the borderlines between un-thought 
processes and rational thinking, leading to ideas of the interconnection and interaction of the 
influence of un-thought processes on image making. There is a summary of several background 
concepts useful to the understanding of the argument of the thesis. This is followed by a 
summary of the argument of the thesis. 
 
My aim for the thesis is three-fold: 1) to combine certain Lacanian and post-Lacanian 
ideas of the gaze and the unconscious, incorporating also understanding gained in my studio 
practice, 2) to contribute in this way to thought concerning certain aspects of the process of 
image making in art practice, and 3) to make available new ideas for use in pursuing and 
contextualizing my own practice as well as others. 
 
The Prologue is included as an introduction to a state of mind involving reflection on 
aspects of the borderlines of the ‘appearing’ unconscious by the (wondering) conscious mind. It 
is an example of the function of creative writing as opposed to the analytical writing that 
comprises the majority of this written thesis. There is a sense in which ‘I’, as the author of this 
‘Hospital’ writing, am performing the subject, ‘me’, as a compendium of individuated cultural 
aspects.  This is staged in the ‘Hospital’ piece by foregrounding personal issues and 
significances, both experiential and ‘thoughtful’. In a similar sense it is possible to argue that I, 
                                                          
4 There are other examples of the process of making images, for instance process orientated, rule based. 
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in my role as image maker, am also performing the subject, in a spatial manner.5 The absorbed 
and un-thought stage of image making is seen to be pivotal in this matter. This notion of the ‘un-
thought stage’ retains fluid boundaries, with cultural and linguistic influences, but keeps them at 
least somewhat within the arena of the individual subject who is making art. It is necessary, I 
believe, to keep concepts of such boundaries and borderlines fluid, even permeable, while not 
losing sight of them altogether. 
 
First a word about my use of the word ‘image’, as in ‘image making’. In this thesis, 
‘image’ is used within the fine art tradition, as historically the word ‘painting’ has been used, in 
the sense of a visual imitation or representation of a person, thing or idea, with the attribute of 
being recognizable in some way to some number of people, by means of drawing or painting. 
An image can be ‘new’, new in certain contexts, or already accepted culturally. Aspects of 
images can go further, in being equivalent (in some ways) to ‘signifiers’ in Lacan’s sense of that 
word. This will be discussed more fully in later chapters, but it does indicate my means of 
discussing what I call the layers of resonance and complication that can be implied by this word 
‘image’. From another point of view, in this thesis ‘image making’ is used in place of the more 
generally used term ‘painting’ because I wish to include drawing. However I do not mean to 
include photography and other modes of image making. 
 
 
Section 2:  A three-stage model: the process of image making  
 
2.1   The model      
 
             In the beginning, there is an urge to make, a longing, a desire.6 
 
For myself as a visual artist, this ‘longing’ sets in motion a set of procedures which I 
hereafter term a ‘process of image making’. To describe the particular process of image making 
referred to in this thesis, I use a ‘model’ that includes three stages. The first stage of image 
making is the planning that is required for making an image, whether a sketchbook and pencil 
are picked up, or a large board is obtained and prepared as the support for an oil painting. The 
availability of time requires planning. The  ‘subject’ of the image may be considered. Planning 
                                                          
5 Others have referred to the performative aspect of the visual arts, for instance H.M. Sayre, The Object of 
Performance (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1989), and J-F Lyotard, Toward the Postmodern (New York, 
Humanity Books/Prometheus Press, 1999). 
6 It should be noted that throughout the thesis I occasionally include a section in italic print, providing an arena for 
self-reflexive ‘wondering’ that originates within my studio practice, and introducing the following section of 
theory/discourse.   
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involves conscious thought. In this case, planning comprises a formative ‘mode of attention’ to a 
problem of how to proceed with the image making enterprise, in that one is formulating the 
problem and formulating a programme of procedure in a mental ‘pre-viewing’.  
 
The second stage in the process of image making is the ‘absorption’ stage, the no-longer-
self-conscious part of the making process. I refer to it as the ‘un-thought’ stage because there is 
no apparent (conscious, rational) thought process taking place. While it is ‘un-thought’, in that 
rational thinking is not involved, that is not to say there are no mental processes in operation. 
This is difficult to put into words because from my point of view it is in some way 
‘unspeakable’, indescribable, even un-observable, although some aspects may be ‘inferred’. In 
attempting to describe this mode of attention I think of various other concepts of unconscious 
processes, for instance Freud’s concept of the dream-work, in that he ‘inferred’ his ideas about 
the unconscious (partly from) a close observation of dreams. In the un-thought stage, perception 
is included, because looking as well as other senses are involved. I consider that some mode of 
attention (mental process) is present even though it is non-reflexive, meaning not a conscious 
rational thought process. It is a focus, to the extent of my no longer being conscious of myself, 
or of anything other than the process in which I am engaged.  It is a ‘being-absorbed’, being 
wholly occupied. It is all of these, with no consciousness-of-self or consciousness-of-process-as-
it-goes-on: I am not aware of conscious planning nor of conscious direction of the manipulation 
of materials or images. At this moment, conscious and rational control are superseded by other 
forces within the psyche; it appears to me later to have been ‘unconscious’. Sometimes it 
happens that I am aware of emotions, even while not ‘thinking’. In a sense, I am reflecting (or 
refracting) something somewhere in my mind. The time involved in this ‘stage two’ may be 
seconds or minutes. The resulting marks may or may not have much to do with whatever ideas I 
had in the planning stage. In fact at first glance they may not make any sense at all. The 
important point here is that I regard the un-thought stage in the light of being an agency of 
image making. As such I see it as an absence of rational thought but not of mental processing. 
There is further discussion of this un-thought stage in the ‘exemplification’ Section (2.2) below. 
It is this stage of the process of image making that I wish to illuminate further. 
 
Then comes the third stage. Normal self-consciousness returns. I look at what I’ve done. 
I judge. My ‘judgement’ at this time may see the results as being anything from disastrous, 
through banal, to eloquent and interesting. This stage of judgement can also slip back into stage 
one and stage two for ‘editing’, re-touching, adjustment. Sometimes (often) the third stage 
contains excessive amounts of subjective emotional investment, positive or negative, with little 
objective judgement or awareness for some period of time. The quality of attention in this third 
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stage, while similar to stage one in being conscious and utilizing words and images, is distinct 
from stage one in that the ‘mode of attention’ is reflexive, rather than formative, emphasizing a 
focus with major reference to the past, what has (just) been done rather than what is to be done, 
judgemental rather than planning. This stage is one which includes a mode of thinking that 
involves aesthetic judgement (is there an energy, an excitement, about the mark?), an evaluation 
of how ‘close’ I have come to what I had planned (in stage one), and a third and intertwined 
judgement concerning whether the marks made can ‘stand’ on their own, based on training and 
experience. This latter judgement, for instance, may allow ‘accidents’ to remain if they are 
judged to have a potential for further development, or contribute in some way to the overall 
drawing/painting. In fact, the operations of mark making (un-thought stage) are inveigled in 
amongst these sometimes practically instantaneous planning and judging stages, albeit these 
latter may be foreclosed while the actual marking takes place. Thus, while the judgement can 
swing around, and, at least initially, is not always very objective, there is a ‘conscious’ 
judgement stage after the un-thought stage. 
 
This whole process is a spiral, or iterative, process insofar as I can then return to the 
planning stage and go through the cycle of three stages again on the material produced thus far. 
In other words, the model of image making as a whole can be seen as a complex of related 
modes of attention circling and spiralling around each other as the making proceeds, depending 
on the density of the project and the solidity of the effort/motivation and even the overall time 
frame. In a big painting, these three stages can be reiterated a great many times, in a spiral effect 
where one stage works on, or with, the results of the previous stage. In a small ‘idea sketch’ it 
might be ‘finished’ the first or second time around, or the three stages may happen a number of 
times very quickly. 
 
In this model of process, affect (emotion), ranging from minimal to strongly felt, may 
also be involved, whether the making of the marks is done in certain intense moods, or 
seemingly more neutral ones.7 Ideas are evolved in image format. An attempt is made not to 
involve words, so that the images evolve from seemingly random marks into a form of their 
own, not ‘governed’ by language, perhaps, in the linguists’ sense of the word, but emerging in 
the sense of becoming, for instance, what Roland Barthes terms a ‘system of signs’.8 It seems to 
                                                          
7As conceptualised to have been the case in Abstract Expressionism, for instance, Robert Motherwell, “The Modern 
Painter’s World” in Dyn, Vol 1 #6 (NY, November, 1944), 8-14, as collected in Art in Theory 1900-1990, eds. 
Harrison and Wood (Oxford, Blackwell, 1992), 636, says: ‘The function of the artist is to express reality as felt.  In 
saying this, we must remember that ideas modify feelings. … By feeling is meant the response of the “body-and-
mind” as a whole to the events of reality.’ 
8 R. Barthes, “Rhetoric of the Image”, in Image, Music and Text (London, Fontana Press, 1977), 32-51. 
Etymologically, the word image comes from the root imitari, or to copy. Can images as analogical representations 
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me in the studio that, language or not, this process of making images is one of having 
conversations with myself, one part of me with another part of me. It is a conversation between 
my conscious mind and some other part of my mind, which ‘invents’ new forms and juxtaposes 
ideas in a new way. It is a one-sided conversation only insofar as one side is conscious and 
rational, while the other side is not. These are conversations that involve images as a major 
component, rather than words. It is a conversation that can involve ‘questions’ as well as 
‘statements’. As a painter, this type of conversation is an important aspect of my ‘research’ for 
paintings, in terms both of eliciting, and of developing, images. Sometimes the ‘conversation’ 
seems to happen without conscious interference, in the absorbed stage; sometimes it is more 
rational, involving also the planning and judging stages.  
  
In this thesis the primary focus is on stage two, the un-thought stage. This is because to 
me it seems to be of great importance, but at the same time the least well understood of the three 
stages. It is important to me as an artist because it is this stage that is often the basis for 
surprising and interesting results. It is important to me theoretically because I see that my own 
personal experience is unlikely to provide a basis for better understanding this un-thought stage, 
due to the very fact of the mysteriousness and inaccessibility (to the conscious mind) of this 
aspect of making images. So I look for assistance from those who work professionally in this 
arena. One discourse that makes attempts to articulate and give signification to what I describe 
(albeit often indirectly) is psychoanalytic theory, which I consider to be relevant because the 
‘un-thought’ nature of the process can be related for instance to various concepts of the 
unconscious. Its propositions can be relevant as ‘supporting evidence’ for the un-thought and 
invisible aspects of the process of image making I have described. For instance Freud’s idea of 
the dream-work in psychoanalytic theory is pertinent to developing my understanding since it 
directly considers the relationship of pictorial and linguistic signs with each other, with 
perception and with various un-thought processes (i.e. not conscious and rational) happening in 
                                                                                                                                                                                                     
(the ‘copy’), he asks, ‘produce true systems of signs and not merely agglutinations of symbols?’ He points out that 
on the one hand an image is seen to be an ‘extremely rudimentary system in comparison with language…’. And on 
the other hand, an image is seen as complex and resonant to the point that ‘the intelligible is reputed antipathetic to 
lived experience’ and the signification of an image ‘cannot exhaust the image’s ineffable richness’ (p. 32). After an 
analysis of a Panzani Italian food advertisement, he proposes that all images are polysemous; he says: a ‘floating 
chain’ of signifieds is implied, which often needs to be ‘fixed’ by context, title, media, etc. He proposes that there 
are three sorts of language-type communications. One is a ‘true’ language, being doubly articulated, for instance 
word language (which can reflect upon itself). There is an agglutination’ of symbols, as in strictly ‘analogous’ 
languages, such as a language of gestures, for instance, or the ‘language of bees’. However, the image and its 
symbols he sees as resulting from (in part) various condensations and displacements.  Barthes says: ‘…in the total 
system of the image, the structural functions are [there but] polarized: on the one hand there is a sort of 
paradigmatic condensation at the level of connotators (that is, broadly speaking, of the symbols), which are strong 
signs, scattered, “reified”; on the other hand a syntagmatic “flow” at the level of the denotational…’ (I understand 
that he refers in the latter case to the Freudian idea of displacement.) Thus he concludes that while images are not 
language(s) as such, they can be seen as ‘systems of signs’. 
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the unconscious mind.9 Furthermore some of these ideas present me with a useful historical 
context for my own work, as well as providing a context for other work being made today. But 
before I discuss the context for my work, I will outline a few practical details of stage two of 
this model of studio practice to indicate why I use it as a model. 
 
2.2   Exemplifying stage two, the ‘un-thought’ stage     
 
 There is an energy in me, which is often covered over. Attempting to consider this 
energy in order to describe it causes it to shift ‘out of sight’.  Remembering back to this energy 
afterwards in an attempt to describe it causes it to become dim, whereas I experience it as 
strong and pervading my whole body. If I feel it while drawing or making music, for instance, I 
can feel it from head to foot. I believe it is akin to sexual energy, but it lacks that particularity of 
arousal; it is a strong but more neutral effervescence. This energy does not involve words or 
pictures in my mind, it is not related to thinking or knowing; it is just energy and the feeling of 
energy. Perhaps this begins to explain why it is so hard to encompass it, encapsulate it or tie it 
down in words. My wondering concerns the nature of this energy, in the sense of how to 
articulate and ponder about it as an ‘effervescence’ (an object?) when in fact it seems to be 
closely related to the very means of production for my image making. 
 
In terms of exemplifying the un-thought stage of the process of image making by means 
of my drawing practice, I make, eradicate, and re-inscribe what can be described as ‘lines of 
desire’.10 They are lines of desire insofar as they are made wordlessly, ‘automatically’, 
sometimes with emotion (affect) within the making of the marks themselves. As these lines are 
made, eradicated (also a ‘mark’ making, random, affect-ful operation) and re-inscribed, I am, as 
the maker, in an unthought mental state. It is absorbed and energetic, but not logical and rational 
and conscious. As discussed in the previous section, it is a mode of attention that is non-
reflexive in terms of analytical thinking. What seems in hindsight to happen in this absorbed 
stage is that self-conscious-doing is absent, as such, but I am doing and something appears in 
front of me: a compendium of what look to be random marks and erasures, several blobs of 
paint, a particular detail, or the like. There is an accompanying level or layer of excitement, a 
sort of ‘lit-up’ feeling, even one of surprise, especially when it’s going well. As this stage 
                                                          
9 S. Freud, Interpretation of Dreams, trans. Joyce Crick (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1999), especially        
Chapter 6, ‘The Dream-Work’. See the review of relevant aspects of the dream-work in Section 5.1 below. 
10 This was suggested to me by an exhibition and catalogue by Liverpool Art School and Oldham Art Gallery and 
Museum touring exhibition, ‘Lines of Desire’, 1998, curators: Jagit Chuhan, Kim Merrington and Alnoor Mitha. 
This ‘international drawing exhibition’ made a  positive impression on me because of its divergent energies, ideas 
and methodologies, as well as an overall ‘joie de vivre’. It was a show whose declared intention was to encompass 
both a literal and a metaphorical meaning, exploring the boundaries between the human body and the creative 
potential of mark making. 
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alternates with the other two stages, what appears is sometimes beyond what my conscious mind 
could have, or would have, worked out by means of conscious reasoning.11 Sometimes what 
appears is much better than what I could have done ‘rationally’, than what I was planning or 
thinking: more interesting, more unusual, more distinctive, or more original. This is what elicits 
the fascination. It is obviously quite subjective, in that is it me doing the marking. But there is a 
strange feeling of not knowing who-in-me or what part of me has done this thing. This idea was 
elaborated in a recent talk at the Tate Modern, given by the New York painter, David Reed, who 
spoke about his painting practice, which he described as having ‘no reference to atmosphere or 
nature’.12 He stated that he was interested in a radical combination of thought and process, and 
related this to Barnett Newman’s way of working.  Reed’s comment was that he needs to feel 
‘in’ the mark as he is making it, and then ‘outside’ the mark to see what he is doing. He 
remarked that this resulted in what felt like a ‘psychological split’, which was quite 
uncomfortable: a double consciousness, a switching back and forth between a subjective and an 
objective state of mind. I find this description very similar to my feeling of moving in and out of 
‘thinking’ and ‘un-thought’ mental states. Having been ‘submerged’ in this process of ‘un-
thought-ness’, then the two surrounding ‘thought-ful’ stages, the planning and judging stages, 
begin to influence the marks, at least to some degree, into recognisable forms or symbols, most 
often (in my work) as human figures. In my painting ‘Silver’ (detail, Illustration In.2), the early 
marks are sometimes semi-obliterated, but often remain as foundations for final, more 
descriptive marks. In terms of the ‘language’ of painting, I employ a process which 
allows/encourages transgression and transformation of compositional elements. In my painting 
‘Silver’ (Illustration In.1) the ‘active’ image is inscribed within a notional rectangle that is then 
‘over-ridden’ by the lower black mark on the right. The mark-making and the dialogue with the 
process influence the images that evolve. My interest in these figures and symbols is partly an 
‘interpretive’ one, but a strong interest for me is the ‘representation’ of figures and symbols by 
means of particular marks that have been made ‘purposively’, but not for the purpose of 
delineating that precise figure or symbol. In other words there is a clear distanciation between 
the making of the marks, and the emergence of a particular figure suggested by these marks after 
they have been made.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
11 See  Illustrations In.1, In.2 and In.3 of examples of my work which relate to the un-thought stage. 
12 David Reed, ‘Painting Present’ series of lectures, Tate Modern, London, 29 October, 2002. 
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ILLUSTRATION  In.1 
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ILLUSTRATION In.2 
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ILLUSTRATION             In.3  
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To this end, having made these ‘purposive’ marks as foundation, or rather palimpsest, 
my conscious interest becomes attached to hints of (emerging) figures, their attitudes and 
interaction(s) or lack of interaction. There is an encouragement to make a few more marks, for 
instance in order to clarify the image minimally, to see how it works with other images in the 
drawing/painting. Images in my work are understood as metaphors for interactions, or 
relationships, between people as seen on an affective or ‘energetic’ level. It is to effect these 
metaphors that I work with a combination of mark-making and elements of form and colour. I 
make ‘minimally’ clarifying marks, because I want always to maintain a fluidity of meaning and 
a somewhat ambiguous manifestation of images.13 In ‘Silver, detail’, one can see how 
‘minimally’ clarifying the marks can be and yet still create the effect in the overall painting of 
two figures interacting. To some degree, the history of the process of mark making is indicated 
and retained in the painting, which adds another dimension to the image, such that not only is 
the dimension of space indicated but also the dimension of time. Notions of borderlines and 
boundaries play a part in the work from a number of points of view. For instance, borderlines 
evolve between figures that are indicated by marks but are not ‘enclosed’ in mimetic outlines. 
There are also borderlines existing between marks still seen purely as marks, and marks that 
have evolved into recognisable figures. For me it is not of interest to become ‘mimetic’ in image 
making. Instead the idea is to end with a drawing that, by means of the use of somewhat 
ambiguous marks and of unusual juxtaposition and conjunction of marks and images can 
suggest not only a number of possible meanings, but can denote and/or connote energy and 
affect, and can also indicate a ‘history’ of development of the drawing/painting. These 
‘suggestions’ can arise from marks, images, colour, form and/or material, as well as their 
interactions. The process of enhancement of emerging images becomes primarily related both to 
the planning and the judgement stages, but even here the ‘un-thought’ stage can play a part. 
 
 My interest in, or obsession with, non-closure and even fragmentation ensures that the 
drawing remains sketchy and ambiguous. I’m not sure I can (or even wish to) produce a 
conscious reason for this. There are several reasons I have articulated in the past. One is that the 
distortion that results from non-closure encourages viewers (and me as viewer) to find their own 
‘meanings’. Another is that my interest is to avoid ‘over-use’ of the ‘edit’ and ‘closure’ 
functions which the conscious mind can so easily slip into. This is because it seems to me that 
                                                          
13 ‘Ambiguous’ has two definitions: one is that of having two or more possible meanings; the other is that of being 
uncertain, unclear, or indefinite. I wish to incorporate both meanings because both have a relationship to the non-
closed aspect of image making being considered here. See also the discussion in Chapter Five. 
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the imposition of detailed consideration and closure can remove any relationship to ambiguity, 
and so to the mystery of the resonances of the image, which is explicitly to do with the 
qualitative impact on the image of the ‘un-thought-ness’ involved. For me, as I discuss 
throughout the thesis, the carefully edited piece of work becomes more of a considered 
articulation; in this way it becomes more an ‘answer’, than a ‘question’, which is not my 
intention in making images. A third reason for my interest in non-closure has to do with 
foregrounding the manner in which the image is rendered such that there is a revitalizing of the 
conventional or recognized aspect of the human figure and of the painting as image. For me a 
key idea is that of ‘effect’ (as Barthes terms it) rather than of ‘representation’.14 In other words, I 
am stressing the perceptually ‘particular’ quality of the image in itself, rather than the 
conventional recognition of its general subject matter, or ‘content’, as a painting or drawing. 
 
However, a danger with non-closure, as with formal abstraction, is that one basis for 
communication between artist and viewer becomes blurred, in that the artwork is not obviously 
symbolic and ‘meaning-ful’ as such. The viewer may ‘give up’ looking, since the desire for 
understanding in conventional form is frustrated. As I see it, this is another arena of ‘borderlines 
and boundaries’: some viewers are more able to put aside a need for rational understanding of 
what they are seeing, and content to be aware of the more ‘experiential’ or ‘affect-ful’ aspects of 
a piece of work.  
 
These considerations coalesce to a degree in reflecting on the related ideas of 
‘representation’, ‘meaning’ and ‘expression’. For me, ‘representation’ (for instance figures in a 
painting) can emerge from un-thought mark making as a result of the three interactive stages in 
the model of image making. ‘Meaning’ emerges as I attach significance to these representations, 
for instance by means of a mental ‘story line’. If necessary or desired, these story lines can be 
communicated in discourse, such that meaning becomes successful articulation, dissemination 
and reception of semantic structures in some form. Within the painting I have the choice of 
making this story line to some degree obvious or leaving it in a state of non-closure. 
‘Expression’, the more problematic of these terms from the point of view of articulating a 
description, arises as a result of underlying, associated affect and emotion. The reason it is 
problematic is that I feel that what I am trying to articulate is a ‘more than personal’ element. By 
‘more than personal’ I mean not just my personal angst or anger, for instance, but something 
that is not consciously acknowledged or controlled (thus not ‘Expressionist’). This is difficult to 
                                                          
14 R. Barthes,  “The Wisdom of Art”, in Calligram, ed. N. Bryson  (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1988), 
173-4. In this article considering the work of Cy Twombly, Barthes refers to ‘effect’ as  ‘… not a rhetorical trick; it 
is a veritable category of sensations, which is defined by this paradox: the unbreakable unity of the impression (of 
the ‘message’) and the complexity of its causes or elements. The generality…is nevertheless irreducible.’   
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articulate from the (limited) point of view of my self-observation. On the other hand expression 
obviously emerges on a ‘personal’ basis. One way of understanding expression is that it implies 
an outward movement of an inward state of combined mental and visceral attributes. As this 
writing develops I refer to this inward state as the ‘real’, so the un-thought stage becomes an 
outward movement of the ‘real’, seen as combining both personal and transpersonal aspects, as 
well as both conscious and unconscious elements. This is one of the key concepts being 
considered in this thesis, in the sense that my concern is how and whether the un-thought stage 
contributes to, associates with, helps to define, and/or enhances this ‘outward movement’ in 
image making. 
 
2.3   Context          
     
In terms of a historical context, Surrealism in the 1920’s and ‘30’s provides a fitting 
background for this model of the process of image making. Some Surrealists were interested in 
the writings of Sigmund Freud, for instance as manifested in written form through contestations 
between Georges Bataille and Andre Breton. This included and supported a concern with the 
workings of the mind and especially the ‘discovery’ of an aspect of the mind, the unconscious, 
which has a driving power to which we are subject, but of which we are unaware. They said: 
‘Surrealism is not a new means of expression […] it is a means of total liberation of the mind’.15 
One way they saw to accomplish this was to ‘bypass’ the conscious mind, using for instance the 
techniques of automatic drawing and writing.   
 
A Manifesto written jointly by Breton and Aragon, explains that the Surrealist project 
was ‘trying to use painting to open up a bridge to the unconscious’, such that ‘trans-personal or 
impersonal realities might be expressed through the painter’.16 However it is well to keep in 
mind that, as D. Lomas articulates, the surrealist hopes for the unconscious in this matter did not 
wholly accord with the Freudian model: on the one hand ‘the doctrine of ‘pure’ psychic 
automatism holds out the promise of a certain plenitude, that by tuning in to the unconscious 
one could listen to its ‘unadulterated speech’, while on the other hand:  
                                                          
15 Sarane Alexandrian, Surrealist Art  (London, Thames and Hudson, 1970), 50 includes this quote from the 
‘Declaration of 27 January, 1925’, Manifesto of the Surrealist movement. H. Foster, Compulsive Beauty, (October 
Books, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1995), 209: ‘Breton hoped that the surreal would become the real, that 
surrealism would overcome this opposition with liberatory effects for all.’  
16 Julian Bell, What is Painting? Representation and Modern Art (London, Thames and Hudson, 1999), 161, 163. 
In  these pages he  explains what he sees as important in this context. 
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Freud, at least when in a cautious frame of mind, speaks of the unconscious as an inference made 
from the gap or omissions in conscious discourse, or from the roundabout form in which unconscious 
wishes manifest in dreams or symptoms, but not as something that is knowable in itself.17  
 
In other words, says Lomas, a search for the ‘discourse’ of the unconscious is in 
opposition to (at least most of) Freudian theory; it is in fact an impossibility.18   
 
Nevertheless, it seems to me there is a valid and interesting way forward for 
investigation, involving the idea of trying to identify a basis for understanding. In other words, 
in terms of the above statement that ‘trans-personal or impersonal realities might be expressed 
through the painter’ by way of ‘by-passing’ the conscious mind, such a basis might in the 
                                                          
17 D. Lomas, The Haunted Self, (New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 2000), 9.   
18 There is a particular trajectory of Surrealism within the work of Georges Bataille, who was involved with 
Surrealist notions while being somewhat removed from the ‘central’ group led by Breton. Within a series of articles 
published in ‘October’ magazine, Issue 36 (Spring, 1986), there are three articles in which Bataille considers the 
idea of ‘un-knowing’ in a way that is related to the present thesis. He says that there is un-knowing with regard to 
death, such that un-knowing is a state of mind rather than a ‘state of knowing’ (p. 82). Hereafter all page numbers 
refer to ‘October’, op.cit). He is not arguing against the use of discourse, but he is arguing against the idea that 
discourse should be considered the only mode of ‘knowing’, thus against the idea that rationalism can be seen to 
define what is ‘real’. Bataille means by the experience of  ‘un-knowing’: ‘it is wholly detached from concern with 
the future, it is wholly detached from the hold exerted by the possible threat of suffering, it is now only play.’ (p. 
95.). It becomes, therefore, in one sense a sort of philosophy of negation of the total importance of knowing in a 
rational sense. This is pursuant to his view that we are enslaved by knowledge, that without it our contact with each 
other would be only play: ‘play in which my thinking, the working of my thought, dissolves’ (p. 87).  
I understand Bataille’s notion of un-knowing to relate to the un-thought stage I am proposing, as a ‘mode of 
attention’. I see ‘un-thought’ to be functioning outside of rationality as such, but that both rational and un-thought, 
or sense and non-sense, are vital to human existence. It is the relationship of these to image making that forms the 
heart of my thesis. It is what I understand Bataille to be considering. 
Bataille proposes that the major paradox within Surrealism is that: ‘Surrealism cannot speak. If it speaks it betrays 
itself [in that one ‘speaks’ from rational ‘knowledge’]. But on the other hand if it does not speak, it abdicates its 
responsibilities. Others will then speak for it, and destroy the intransigence it sought to maintain’ (p. 25, my 
addition). I believe that, in using the theory and especially the practical experience of psychoanalytic practice as a 
discursive ‘model’, the probability (in trying to ‘speak’ for surrealism) of ‘destroying its intransigence’, becomes 
reduced (in proportion, of course, to the validity of the articulated observations and theories). This ‘risk of 
destroying its intransigence’ becomes less in that although psychoanalytic practice is, in fact, a claim by rationalism 
to define/articulate what is real, there is a distanciation and a non-hermeneutic approach, which I believe gives what 
the surrealists term the ‘real’ room for existence as a phenomenon co-existing with rationalism. The classic 
example of an attempt to avoid the paradox and pitfalls of gaining information from the unconscious by means of 
discourse is the methodology of ‘free association’. I am proposing that image making, in its resonances, expressions 
and ambiguities, may play the same role in some circumstances, albeit for different (for instance exploratory rather 
than ‘healing’) emphasis/purpose.  
This leaves Bataille, as well as myself, with a paradox: ‘I have’, he says, ‘in assuming the posture of un-knowing, 
returned to the categories of knowledge’ (by knowing about the state of un-knowing) (p. 84). He proposes that ‘One 
can move indefinitely between the two positions; neither one has greater validity than the other.’ (p. 84). He is 
speaking of being outside or ‘beneath’ the reflexive aspect of language, simultaneously to operating on the platform 
of knowledge and language. As I articulate the process of image making, I am attempting to consider (in reflexive 
language) an ‘alien-to-language’ or ‘un-thought’ process that I see as part of my three-stage model. In Bataille’s 
writing I see his struggle with this same problem. I see also a congruence with stage two in that, as he speaks of 
thought as being abdicated, so too do I leave language/reflexion behind in the making of the image. Without 
language, where then is rational knowledge? Yet here I am writing a thesis about it. This is paradox indeed. And he 
throws down a further gauntlet. Perhaps, Bataille goes on to say, ‘thought cannot conceive that un-knowing might 
be the greater game’. (p. 87). And so it is for me – the challenge of giving an account of what he refers to as a 
‘greater game’, in spite of the logic that says knowing or articulating the ‘un-knowing’ discursively is to remain 
within the paradox of attempting to represent the impossible, the un-representable. 
  
 
39
present decade have a firmer foundation based on theories of both the conscious and the 
unconscious that have been proposed over the last 80 years.19 This can result in a better basis for 
understanding and discussing these hopes of the Manifesto, both in our experience and our 
representations in art, that do not conform to recognition of ‘mimetic’ forms, the fully 
‘enclosed’ image, the repetition of ‘conventional wisdom’. For instance, this seems to me to be 
what Jacque Lacan’s theory can offer, at least as a basis, indirectly and by ‘extension’ (of his 
largely linguistically-based observations), in his exposition and development of Freudian 
psychoanalytic theory. This was perhaps partially influenced by his own long-term involvement 
with surrealist discussion groups and soirees in the 1930’s.20 I am referring especially to two of 
Lacan’s ideas. One is his concept of the ‘gaze’ as an introduction to the concept of the 
unconscious as an important (over-riding) influence on perception.21 The other is his idea of 
‘gap’ as the ‘locus’ of the (unplanned and ‘surprising’) appearance of what can be thought of as 
material from the unconscious un-edited by the conscious mind (jokes, symptoms and the 
like).22  
 
 
Section 3:   Thetic Question 
 
My aim in this section is to develop a thetic question, using as a basis the points and 
questions raised above. In short, the thetic question arises from a desire to elucidate the ‘un-
thought’ aspect of the making of images. This is a guiding focus. A secondary focus is: what is 
the accompanying ‘affect’, or emotion of excitement and motivation to do with painting? Is this 
also relevant to the process of image making? This refers back to the Prologue, where there are 
textual references to the unconscious ‘appearing’ in the conscious mind, as well as the subject 
being ‘performed’ by the unconscious.       
 
Before proceeding with the question itself, I want to consider the related  question of 
how the process of making in this stage two can be distinguished from the resulting image. This 
is a relevant question since, by definition, it is not possible to observe consciously the ‘un-
thought process’ of stage two; it must be understood in the main as implied by its product, the 
resulting ‘image’. On the one hand there is a combination of unobservable processes that result 
in marks on paper. On the other hand there is the physically present ‘stand-alone image’. The 
                                                          
19 For instance, as I consider, throughout the thesis, notions of J.-F. Lyotard, A. Ehrenzweig, B. Lichtenberg 
Ettinger and G. Deleuze and F. Guattari. 
20 E. Roudinesco, Jacques Lacan, (Cambridge/Oxford, Polity Press/Blackwell Publishers Ltd., 1999 (1993)). See 
especially Chapters 12 and 13, where she speaks of the history of surrealist ideas in the 1930’s.   
21 Lacan’s concept of the gaze is discussed in more detail in Chapter One, Section 1 and in Chapter Four, Section 1. 
22 Lacan’s notion of the gap is discussed in more detail in Chapter Three. 
  
 
40
question is this: what can be learned about a non-observable process of mind from the resulting 
marks on paper?  In my view there are two ways of learning about the non-observable process. 
Both involve learning by implication. The first is elucidated by means of ‘psychoanalysing’, or 
analysing by some other means, the stand-alone resultant image. The second is by identifying 
and extending ideas of ‘processes’ similar to the image making process, so that, by extension 
theory may become relevant to image making. Because I am interested in better understanding 
the underlying structure, the forces and energies at work in this un-thought stage itself, this rules 
out the ‘analysing the resultant image’ option. There would, in any case, be a number of 
complications here, among which would be the resulting requirements to analyse a great many 
‘resultant images’, the relationship of the image to the maker of the image, and the discounting 
of the subjective bias of the person analysing. For these reasons I have chosen the second 
option, that of identifying, picking apart, and re-grouping existing theory that is particularly 
relevant to this un-thought stage of image making due to consideration of related phenomena.  
 
The next step is to identify a particular theoretical vehicle for this investigation. My 
choice is psychoanalytic theory. This is for several reasons. The concepts of the ‘subjective’ and 
the ‘unconscious’ are ideas that have been considered in depth in psychoanalytic theory. 
‘Unobservable processes’ of the unconscious have been studied by theoreticians in the case of 
both dreams and symptoms, based on considerable experience in practice. The ‘dream-work’ as 
theorized by Freud is a phenomenon closely related to, and in my view possible to be extended 
to, the arena of image making, in that images can ‘arise’ in both cases without conscious or 
rational control.23 Theoretically this ‘allows’ the un-thought stage, as un-thought process and 
agency, to be included among these un-observable processes, even though the surrounding 
stages of image making are conscious and ‘rational’. The primary theoretical source could 
therefore be the work of Sigmund Freud. In fact a more relevant choice for this particular topic 
is the work of Jacques Lacan. This is because he not only studied, practiced, and exposited 
Freudian theory in great depth, but he also had the advantage, from my point of view, of being 
familiar with the primary work of Ferdinand de Saussure and other developments in the realm of 
the symbolic in general and linguistic theory in particular.24 Another reason for choosing 
Lacanian theory is that the other writers whose work is included in this investigation are 
grounded in Lacan’s and/or Freud’s theories. This maintains a unified context for the application 
of certain aspects of psychoanalytic theory to image making and its ‘subjective’ enterprise in 
this thesis. 
                                                          
23 While it is true that for Freud both unconscious and pre-conscious are ‘unobservable’ and the operative 
difference is repression, I leave this differentiation to be considered as the thesis progresses. 
24 F. Saussure, Course in General Linguistics, ed. C. Bally (London, Duckworth, 1983).   
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Lacan’s theory is broad, complex and oriented towards the psychoanalytic practice of the 
‘talking cure’.  In order substantially to narrow and focus this theory to aspects particularly 
relevant to the second stage of image making, I have chosen to concentrate on specific elements 
of his concept of ‘the gaze’.25 This also helps to focus the wide angle lens of my thetic question, 
insofar as the concept of the gaze considers the interaction between the concept of the 
unconscious and that of perception. 
 
As a result, my thetic question is: ‘Can Lacan’s concept of the gaze elucidate the ‘un-
thought’ stage of image making?’ 
 
As we shall see in the development of the thesis, Lacan’s concept of the ‘gaze’ refers to 
the complex interaction and relationship between visual, symbolic, and unconscious matters, 
here applied to aspects of making images. What Lacan refers to as the ‘gaze’ (which I ‘extend’ 
as the thesis progresses, by means of other writers’ ideas) may reflect us back to ourselves, often 
having been refracted by passing obliquely from one ‘medium’, or level, of the psyche to 
another of a different ‘density’. This ‘gaze’ can be reflected and refracted further by interactions 
with affect. Although the theory can be quite complicated in articulation, the basic premise of 
this thesis is that, by means of the idea of the gaze, a number of related ideas concerning the 
unconscious are considered in the light of their various contributions to the enrichment of the 
understanding of image making.  
 
A question can be raised at this point concerning why am I considering the un-thought 
stage as a function of the unconscious rather than of the pre-conscious. My answer is based, as 
is Anton Ehrenzweig’s as seen in Chapter Three, on the idea that what is seen to be emerging 
from the un-thought stage can be seen to ‘fit’ with psychoanalytic concepts of processes and 
energy that are considered to play a part in the unconscious. This idea is developed throughout 
the thesis and can be seen more clearly by the end of Chapter Three. A second question at this 
point relates to Lacan’s ideas in general being more applicable to interpretation of art as cultural 
product than for use in explaining an element of the process of image making. My answer is that 
                                                          
25 J. Lacan, Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, Seminar XI (London, Vintage Books, 1998 (first 
published 1973)), 108. The gaze is discussed in detail in Chapters One and Four. Note that the notion of the ‘gaze’, 
in Lacanian theory, developed essentially in three steps.  The first, early, step consisted of a ‘look’ from one person 
to another.  The second step was an idea parallel to that of Sartre, where the ‘gaze’ referred to some degree of 
conflation of object with subject, where the subject who looks sees the person (object) being looked at looking 
back, and thus suddenly sees that person (until then seen as an object) as another subject.  (This seeing the ‘looking 
back’ person can cause shame/anxiety, a sudden self-consciousness of being judged, in the original subject who is 
looking). The third version is the ‘radical’ version as described in my text. See Lacan, ‘Seminar XI’, Chapters 6-9, 
particularly p. 84.   
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I believe the un-thought stage is agency in this regard, that agency implies process, that relevant 
processes are included in Lacanian thought (as we shall see not only his version of the dream-
work including primary processes, but also his notions of gap and stain), and furthermore, that 
the concept of the gaze itself can be seen to be a process, and an analogous process to the un-
thought stage.26  
 
There are several specific ways in which the model of image making provides criteria for 
choosing pertinent elements from the concept of the gaze to be used in the argument that is 
being developed. In the first place, the process of image making involves looking (perception), 
as of course does the concept of the gaze, which is in part, but not solely, optical (primarily in its 
history, and in its association with the scopic drive). In the second place the process of image 
making involves desire, the desiring subject, as does the concept of the gaze (as I shall discuss 
in Chapter Four). This is apparent, for instance, in the sense of wanting to make the image, 
wanting it to elicit interest or precipitate desire itself. Furthermore, the ‘unrealized’ aspect of the 
unconscious, the use of ‘meaningless’ signifiers can be seen in the mark making stage. This is 
discussed in Chapters One and Two.27 In this sense, the ‘enhancing’ stage of the process, the 
pulling out of images from the marks made, can be seen to be a development from the 
unrealized realm of the unconscious into more recognizable symbols (also discussed in Chapter 
Two). This involves interactions between the conscious mind and the unconscious mind. One 
way in which this happens, according to Lacan’s notion of the ‘gap’, is via an ‘irruption’ of 
unconscious material into the conscious mind, in this case as emerging signifiers.28 For me the 
un-thought stage plays an important part here that is considered further as the thesis progresses. 
 
These observations highlight a further reason for choosing Lacan’s concept of the gaze 
as a foundation for this thesis. One of my concerns in developing the thesis has been to maintain 
a focus emphasizing a structure, content and process more related to the dream-work than to the 
ideas of ‘expression’ of a consciously manifested ‘angst’ or as a result of a conscious process of 
‘imagination’ – in other words to highlight aspects of the ‘real’ as they may manifest, rather 
than working solely with results of the re-presentation of various aspects of the real.29 One 
                                                          
26 A further question is why not use (or use also) the notions of Merleau Ponty. My answer is two-fold. One is to 
retain a focus in psychoanalytic theory. The other is that phenomenology can be seen to concern itself more with 
perception, while psychoanalytic theory concerns itself to a greater extent precisely with notions about processes 
and content of the unconscious, which is the focus I wish to maintain. 
27 In brief, the ‘pure signifier’ for Lacan is the notion of the Saussurian ‘signifier’ detached from its ‘signified’, i.e. 
from ‘meaning’. In this sense it is ‘unrealized’. Lacan claims that the content of the unconscious consists of 
signifiers and as such is unrealized, as discussed further in Chapter Two. 
28 R. Barthes, “Rhetoric”, 32-51, where he speaks of images as ‘system of signs’ rather than a true language, as 
seen earlier. 
29 See the next section but one for an overview of some of Lacan’s basic concepts, including the ‘real’. 
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description Lacan provides for his concept of the gaze is that the gaze ‘operates in a certain 
descent, a descent of desire’, meaning that the subject is not completely aware of it, as he/she is 
operating in the arena of an unconscious desire that Lacan sees as the desire of the Other.30 
  
When I wrote earlier of my desire to maintain a fluidity of meaning, this can now be 
seen as an attempt to keep a balance, in the sense of emphasizing the ‘real’ of the un-thought, 
but seeing also a growing realization or recognition of meaning(s) which can be attached. This is 
what suggests a ‘conversation’ between the unconscious and the conscious mind – a kind of 
reciprocity. This reciprocity can be seen from another point of view, that of communication with 
others. In Lacan’s terms, ‘speech’ involves an intentionality that goes beyond that of the 
individual subject’s conscious intentionality of conveying a ‘message’ to another person. The 
speaker’s message, Lacan theorizes, is directed not only at the addressee but at the addresser as 
well, via the field of the Other. In other words, communication can become also communication 
to oneself as subject, via the Other of language/symbolism.  Language is speaking the subject, 
and this can apply to image making (as another form of symbolism) as well.   
 
An objection can be raised here to the effect that the concept of the gaze is over-
complicated for what is required. This is in the sense that both the first stage, the planning stage, 
and the third stage, the judging stage, are bathed in language. Language is seen in Lacan’s 
theory to be based in the ‘Other’, an aspect of the unconscious that involves language and 
symbolism as a cultural ‘package’, which can be used (‘particularized’) by individuals.31 
Consequently, following Lacan here, stages one and three can be conceived equally as 
unconsciously influenced/driven. The second stage, as I have proposed, is influenced by the 
unconscious too. However, a further (and reverse) complication is that the unconscious, for 
Lacan, is ‘structured like a language’, and can therefore be seen also as bathed in language.32 
Therefore, goes the argument, why not deal just with the concept of the unconscious, rather than 
the extra complications of the concept of the gaze? 
 
My answer to this is based on my experience in the studio. On the one hand, for Lacan, 
the notion ‘structured like a language’ does not mean it consists of rational discourse. On the 
other hand, although the unconscious as defined by Lacan is a very powerful component of the 
                                                          
30 J. Lacan, The Psychoses, Seminar III, ed. J. A.  Miller (New York, Norton and Co., 1993 (1981)), 24. The notion 
of the Other is discussed in detail in Chapter Two. Basically it is a notion encompassing the symbolic – for instance 
law and language.  
31 This is discussed in Chapter Two. 
32 Lacan, ‘Seminar XI’, 20. By ‘structured like a language’, Lacan posits that unconscious processes observe 
linguistic ‘rules’ while not utilizing the ‘logic’ of the rational processes of the conscious mind. These ideas are 
discussed more fully in Chapters One, Two and Three. 
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un-thought stage, ignoring those other aspects I have identified (perception, affect, materiality, 
energy) would, I believe, make my ensuing considerations too narrow. Therefore I feel that, 
although it is more complex, it is worthwhile pursuing a number of these complexities of the 
concept of the gaze. Whereas the three ‘stages’ of image making form a model which is a 
‘complex’ of several related and interactive ideas, as the concept of the gaze and my thetic 
research also result in a ‘complex’ of ideas. This is in the sense of bringing together a number of 
contrasting views on the relationship of perception, the unconscious and libido, which are drawn 
together in considering the particular arena of image making.  
 
My interest is in exploring process rather than object, in exploring energy intensities 
rather than rules or mimetic representation, in exploring the idea of the process of representation 
as seen in painting and drawing. 
 
 
     Section 4:  Notes on methodology 
 
I use italicised sections to set the tone of what I am investigating from the point of view 
of my practice.  I use theory to investigate what I don’t have direct access to by way of 
reflection and observation. But conversely I use reflection and experience to gauge the 
usefulness of various aspects of ideas related to my enquiry. 
 
My interest is in maintaining a coherent orderly unified playing field in terms of theory – 
in this case using aspects of post-Freudian psychoanalytic theory from writers who study, 
theorize and exposit within that field. This is the reason for choosing a ‘template’ such as 
Lacan’s concept of the gaze, which can then be adjusted and extended by way of other related 
ideas from writers who come from a like-minded ‘base’. 
 
In one sense this is the record of pertinent and relevant ideas from my interaction with 
my studio practice, brought together with ideas, from authoritative and primary sources that are 
related to each other and related to my studio practice. In another sense it is a contribution to the 
literature in terms of the further understanding of the process of image making. In my view, 
because this process is an internal and, as we shall see, not always a conscious rational process, 
this dual process of intermixing personal and theoretical strands of investigation is a necessary 
one, balancing the theoretical against a personal experience.  
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One result is that elements of various theories are used in what can seem a somewhat 
arbitrary and ‘patchwork’ manner. My reason for this is a personal one, in that I am searching 
for a pathway to better understanding within a paradigm which I attempt to keep consistent, but 
which has a few twists and turns along the way. 
 
 
Section 5:   Background concepts 
 
It is useful at this point to provide a review of some background concepts that are 
important for understanding the argument of the thesis and the concept of the gaze. 
 
5.1     Freud’s concept of the dream-work.   
    
The first background concept is Freud’s concept of the dream-work, that is the 
‘processing’ done by the unconscious as a basis for the ‘emergence’ of dream material. Not only 
does this provide a foundation for thinking about image making, in that images form part of the 
dream, but it also provides an encapsulation of Freud’s ideas about the unconscious, which in 
turn form a basis for the thinking of Lacan. The concept of the dream-work can be seen as a 
summary of the arena within which this thesis arises and from which it extends. 
 
Freud understood his work with dreams, with the resulting concepts of repression and 
the primary processes, to be so important that he referred to it as the ‘royal road’ to the 
understanding of the concept, as well as the manifestation, of the unconscious. For Freud, the 
concept of repression, a form of censorship by the conscious, ‘civilized’, rational mind, is basic 
to the understanding of the idea of the unconscious in the sense that repression is able to ‘hide’, 
to keep repressed, ‘pleasurable’ desires and energies that might result in ‘ un-pleasure’ for 
various reasons, such as social mores, the opinion of others.  
 
   Dreams arise, posits Freud, as a mechanism for wish fulfilment. All dreams are about 
the dreamer and only the dreamer.33 In addition all dreams are a result of what he terms the 
‘dream-work’. His concept of the dream-work is that it comprises a group of operations that 
transform the latent dream-thoughts into the manifest dream content that is the dream as such. 
This group of operations he refers to as the primary process. 
 
                                                          
33 Freud, ‘Interpretation’, 388. See also Chapter V, section d, ‘Typical dreams’, 207. 
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The dream-work, as proposed by Freud, involves distortions of ‘input’.34 This input 
consists of the day’s thoughts and experiences, along with memories of all kinds, as well as 
libidinal interference (for instance the presence of inadmissible sexual desire), and/or ‘somatic 
stimuli’ (extraneous sounds during sleep and the like).35 This input becomes what he refers to as 
the ‘dream-thoughts’, or the ‘latent content’ of dreams.36 The dream-thoughts contain a kernel 
of a (forbidden and unconscious) ‘wish’. The distortions of the dream-work are a result of 
unconscious processes working on the ‘input’, in order to ‘mask’ (a form of repression) the 
forbidden wish, resulting in dreams as remembered by the dreamer. The dream, as dreamed and 
remembered, is referred to by Freud as the ‘manifest content’ of dreams.37 But what he finds of 
particular consequence is the operation of the dream-work on the original dream-thoughts, since 
this can enable the retrieval (and understanding) of the original (soon to be masked) thoughts. 
The distorting operations of the dream-work he terms condensation, displacement, means of 
representability, and secondary revision, which together he refers to as the ‘psychical processes’ 
or the ‘primary processes’.38 Condensation consists of compression of aspects of various 
persons, places, and/or events into one symbol, when those various aspects share a particular 
feature.39 Freud states in this regard that: ‘the elements formed into the dream are drawn from 
the entire mass of dream-thoughts, and in its relation to the dream-thoughts each one of the 
elements seems to be determined many times over’.40 He refers to this as ‘over-determination’.41 
Displacement involves the displacement of intensity among the elements of the dream, for 
instance the use of one symbol for another when there is some aspect of similarity between 
them, but the chosen symbol is not so heavily weighted with some ‘forbidden’ quality or 
intensity. As Freud states, the result is that: ‘the content of the dream is ‘centred differently’ 
than the content of the dream-thoughts.’42 He points out that this distortion of the dream wish 
can be traced to repression, for instance censorship and resistance. Displacement includes the 
transposition of words used to express the dream-thought concerned.43 Displacement (always) 
involves a chain of associations. Displacement can be seen as a basis for condensation and also 
figurability (representability), insofar as displacement of intensity accompanies these processes. 
This basis of association may happen along lines of either similarity or contiguity. The third 
distorting process, means of figurability includes an aspect of a word, event, and so on, which 
                                                          
34 Freud, ‘Interpretation’, Chapter IV, ‘Dream-distortion’ section in particular. 
35 Freud, ‘Interpretation’, 97-105 in particular, also Chapter V, ‘Material and Sources of Dreams’. 
36 Freud, ‘Interpretation’, see especially Chapter V, 126. 
37 Freud, ‘Interpretation ’, Chapter V, 120. 
38 Freud, ‘Interpretation’, 398 and 340. 
39 Freud, ‘Interpretation’, see especially  212-214. 
40 Freud, ‘Interpretation’, 217. 
41 Freud, ‘Interpretation’, 235. 
42 Freud, ‘Interpretation’, 232. 
43 Freud, ‘Interpretation’, 255. 
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can be ‘encompassed’ in, and thus ‘translated’ to, an image. This can ‘benefit’ condensation and 
also censorship in obvious distortional ways. In addition to these processes, there are (some) 
ways in which dreams can if not represent, then at least indicate, logical relations. For example 
simultaneity of happenings in the dream can be seen as representing logical connections of some 
kind.44 Sensory intensity in a dream may indicate not psychical intensity in the corresponding 
dream-thoughts, but the most over-determined elements of the dream.45 The fourth distorting 
processes, secondary revision includes for Freud two possible aspects – censorship and re-
translation/distortion when the dream is being formed, and/or censorship and re-
translation/distortion when the dream is being remembered. The first aspect would take place in 
the unconscious, and the second would happen in the pre-conscious/conscious. It consists of the 
‘insertion’ of ‘cementing thoughts’ by the psychical agency of censorship – connections as 
needed to reduce the dream’s appearance of absurdity and incoherence’.46 Like the other three 
processes, it is ‘mainly’ manifested, he says, by choosing from ‘already-formed psychical 
material in the dream thoughts’.47  
 
Freud, as a result of his work with dreams, proposes two modalities of the functioning of 
the psyche, two types of ‘thinking’, or processes of psychical energy. These are the primary 
processes (the four distorting mechanisms above) in the unconscious, with chaotic results, and 
secondary processes, in the preconscious/conscious, resulting in rational, logical thoughts. He 
proposes that a ‘sliding’ of meaning can take place in both types of process, but this sliding is 
much more restricted (i.e. ‘bound’) in secondary processes.48 I discuss this in greater detail in 
Chapter Three, Section 1.2. Freud sees the ‘irrational’ primary processes, as he writes, not as 
falsifications of normal waking thought, not negligence, not intellectual errors, but qualitatively 
‘something completely different from it [from normal waking thought] and so not at first 
comparable to it.’49 
 
In addition to the primary processes, Freud proposes various attributes of dream material 
and processing, and thus the unconscious in general. For instance, dream material is not subject 
to considerations of time or rational logic. There is no negative (except, he adds later, by 
‘inference’). Trivial episodes may be used as ‘code’ for latent content (to avoid the censor), but 
the dream itself is never trivial. A basic principle is that feelings that are not acknowledged 
                                                          
44 Freud, ‘Interpretation’, 239-249. 
45 Freud, ‘Interpretation’, 250. 
46 Freud, ‘Interpretation’, 319. 
47 Freud, ‘Interpretation’, 320. 
48 For me the ‘modes of attention’ I discussed earlier are related to these two types of thinking, where the un-
thought stage is primarily influenced by primary processes. 
49 Freud, ‘Interpretation’, 329. My addition. 
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consciously can find expression in dreams; to this end affect is always ‘true’ in dreams, albeit 
attached to misleading events/ideas/people. The dream is unable to express (represent) bonds of 
logic, such as ‘when’, ‘because’, ‘just as’, although’, ‘either-or’, etc.; in other words, relational 
terms. His claim is that anything that resembles rational thought in a dream ‘is all dream-
material [e.g. already included as such in the dream-thoughts], not the representation of 
intellectual activity in the dream.’50 An exception could be that of certain secondary revision as 
seen in the pre-conscious. 
 
For Freud, the results of these premises are that it is necessary to understand and make 
use of the concept of the ‘dream-work’ in order to ‘understand’ the dream and its originating 
basis (dream-thoughts). However for me as image maker what is of particular interest here is the 
processes and content of the unconscious that result in the dream. There are many similarities 
between the product of the dream-work and the products of the un-thought stage, in that images 
can be seen to contain many of the attributes that I have listed for dreams.  
 
Freud proposes that art, too, can be a result of primary processes, and similarly art 
includes the inability to represent logical bonds. For him, this is true of the fine arts to a greater 
degree than of literature, which makes use of speech.51 Again, this indicates in a general way the 
trajectory of this thesis, in that unconscious processes become associated with the un-thought 
stage, as discussed below. This is why, working also from the historical context of aspects of 
Surrealism and more recent developments of psychoanalytic theory, I can see a way forward for 
development of my thetic argument relating to the un-thought stage of image making.  
                                                                                                                                                             
 
The following background concepts are to be understood in the context of 
psychoanalytic theory from the point of view of Lacan. In general Freud concerns himself with a 
‘development’ of the infant in terms of chronological time, for instance moving from one pre-
genital stage to another and resulting optimally in a ‘final synthesis of sexuality’.52 But Lacan 
emphasizes instead the concept of the ‘subject’ in the context of ‘obviously more complex 
[psychical] structures’, since ‘it is by starting with the experience of the adult that we must 
grapple, retrospectively, with the supposedly original experiences’.53 Here the past exists in the 
psyche as a set of memories, and these memories are constantly being reworked in the present, 
not only by ‘present’ circumstances, but also by means of what Lacan terms ‘retroaction’ and 
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51 Freud, ‘Interpretation’, 238-9, 405. 
52 Dylan Evans, Dictionary of Lacanian Psychoanalysis (London, Routledge, 1996), 40. 
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‘anticipation’. For example retroaction is seen where the Freudian pre-genital stages are 
‘ordered in the retroaction of the Oedipus complex’, and anticipation can be seen where ‘[i]n the 
mirror stage, the ego is constructed on the basis of the anticipation of an imagined future 
wholeness (which never, in fact, arrives).’54 
 
Background concepts included here are Lacan’s concepts of the ‘three orders’ (Section 
5.2), ‘need, demand and desire’ (Section 5.3), ‘lack’ (Section 5.4), and the ‘subject’ (Section 
5.5). 
 
 
5.2  Lacan’s principles of the three ‘orders’ 
 
Lacan’s concept of the three ‘orders’ of the psyche includes the symbolic, the real, and 
the imaginary. They are profoundly heterogeneous, interdependent, but distinct, as we shall see 
below.  
 
The symbolic order encompasses law, language, and culture, because of their linguistic 
dimension, but also because of the Law, which regulates desire and thus society (see further 
discussion in Chapter, Section 1.1.3). The symbolic dimension of language (language also 
includes aspects of the orders of the imaginary and the real, see below) is the signifier (see 
further discussion in Chapter Two, Section 1.1). Lacan says: ‘As soon as the symbol arrives 
there is a universe of symbols’, since these symbols, or signifiers, are a matter of a structure of 
differences and ‘constitute a totality’.55 For Lacan, signifiers can exist on their own, prior to 
being signs. As they acquire meanings (signifieds), they can ‘slip over’ (vary) these associated 
meanings. Lacan sees the symbolic order as ‘in travail, in the process of coming, insisting on 
being realized’ 
 
In terms of the individual, Lacan sees that ‘the introduction of the signifier’ to the psyche 
of the individual occurs at a point in life crucial to the structure of the psyche, termed the 
Oedipus complex.56 For Lacan, this ‘introduction’ is what gives the Oedipus complex its 
primary importance, since by this means individuals ‘acquire, conquer, the order of the 
                                                          
54 Retroaction: Jacques Lacan, Ecrits, A Selection (London, Routledge, 1999), 197; anticipation: Evans, 207 and see 
also Lacan, ‘Ecrits’, 306 and 1-7. 
55 Lacan, Book II, The Ego in Freud’s Theory and in the Technique of Psychoanalysis, 1954-1955, ed. J-A. Miller 
(London, W.W. Norton & Co., 1991), 29. 
56 Lacan, ‘Seminar III’, 189.  See also my discussion in Chapter Two, Section 1.1. 
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signifier’, in other words enter into language as a ‘universe’.57 Simultaneously the individual 
becomes a ‘subject’, subject to the order of the symbolic. In other words, for the individual there 
is no gradual acquisition of language. The symbolic order exists prior to the individual and it is 
transindividual, as can be seen for instance in language and law. The symbolic order is ‘essential 
for the human being to be able to accede to a humanized structure of the real’.58 
  
Lacan quotes Freud’s example of ‘fort/da’, wherein Lacan glimpses the symbolic as it is 
first manifested in a childhood ‘game’.59 Lacan (re-)interprets the sound the baby makes as the 
spool disappears in such a way that: ‘the symbol manifests itself first of all as the murder of the 
thing – and is thus deeply implicated with death’, while at the same time manifesting ‘the 
eternalization of his desire’.60 For Lacan this is an illustration of how a sense of death, lack and 
desire permeate the symbolic order from its earliest ‘acquisition’ by the individual, due to the 
close association of this acquisition with the complex circumstances of the Oedipus complex 
stage, and the Law. This is discussed further in Chapter One, Section 2.  
 
From the point of view of the unconscious, Lacan sees the unconscious not (as with 
Freud) ‘merely the seat of the instincts’, but rather as primarily linguistic, since it is composed 
of signifiers, and these signifiers are not only of the symbolic order, but are ‘structured like a 
language’.61 By this he means both that the unconscious is structured synchronically using 
language-like operations (for instance metaphor and metonymy), and also that ‘we only grasp 
the unconscious finally when it is explicated, in that part of it which is articulated by passing 
into words’.62 ‘What we teach the subject to recognize as his unconscious is his history’, as he 
grasps it subjectively (i.e. in words).63 This is why Lacan can speak of the subject as both 
subject to the unconscious and subject to/of the symbolic. For Lacan there is also a diachronic 
aspect to the unconscious that he speaks of as the opening and closing of the unconscious in a 
‘temporal pulsation’.64  
 
Lacan’s concept of the Other, ‘the realm of radical alterity’, is another way of looking at 
the symbolic order, where the ‘Other’ is understood as a radical ‘otherness’ to the individual as 
                                                          
57 Lacan, ‘Seminar III’, 189. 
58 Lacan, ‘Seminar III’, 198. 
59 The spool is ‘a small part of the subject, detached from him’ says Lacan. See Lacan, ‘Seminar XI’, 62 for further 
discussion of Freud’s example, and Lacan’s interpretation. 
60 Lacan, ‘Ecrits’, 104. 
61 Lacan, ‘Ecrits’, 147; Lacan ‘Seminar III’, 167. 
62 Jacques Lacan, The Ethics of Psychoanalysis, 1959-60, The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book VII, ed. J-A. Miller 
(London: Routledge, 1999), 32. 
63 Lacan, ‘Ecrits’, 52. 
64 See Chapter Three, Section 1.3.2 for further discussion of the ‘gap’. 
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‘subject’.65 As Lacan explains: ‘The Other is the locus in which is situated the chain of the 
signifier that governs whatever may be made present of the subject’.66 In other words, the 
unconscious is seen by Lacan as the discourse of the Other, belonging wholly to the symbolic 
order, such that it pre-exists ‘outside’ of the subject such that it pre-exists and yet ‘defines’ the 
subject (see also Section 5.5 below). 
 
 
The imaginary order is seen as ‘the world, the register, the dimension of images, 
conscious or unconscious, perceived or imagined’.67 David Macey speaks of the imaginary as 
‘an illusory construct’, involving ‘profound misrecognition’, and says ‘the imaginary traps the 
subject into alienating identifications that prevent the truth from emerging’.68 Lacan develops 
the idea of the ‘imaginary order’ as ‘formative of the function of the I as revealed in 
psychoanalytic experience’.69 This ‘I’ is the specular ego. The concept of the mirror stage is 
used to exemplify ‘a relation between the organism and its reality’. Lacan develops this concept 
in relation to ‘the assumption of the armour of an alienating identity, which will mark with its 
rigid structure the subject’s entire mental development’.70 These original identificatory 
procedures are both repeated and reinforced throughout life. For Lacan, ‘alienation is 
constitutive of the imaginary order’, as seen in the identificatory process for the young child in 
relation to its image seen in a mirror.71 The imaginary order is hypothesized as creating a bridge 
between inner mental notions and outer-directed mental acts.72 It is important to note that the 
imaginary for Lacan is not simply the illusory, for instance imaginary identifications can have 
very real effects, and the image certainly belongs to reality.73 Elizabeth Wright describes the 
imaginary order as ‘a belief in images that cover over the veiled object that promises jouissance’ 
(where jouissance is seen as ‘opposite to lack’).74 
 
 
The order of the real, for Lacan, ‘is that which always comes back to the same place – to 
the place where the subject insofar as he thinks […] does not meet it’.75  The real is 
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undifferentiated, whereas the symbolic can be seen as a set of differentiated elements he calls 
signifiers. The real encompasses both elements in the real world: events, objects, for example 
‘little sister’ and ‘penis’ in the case of Little Hans, where Lacan distinguishes these ‘real’ 
elements which intrude and disrupt the child’s imaginary pre-Oedipal harmony, and also 
‘events’ in the mental world: for example trauma, where the real is the object of anxiety.76 But 
the real is not reality per se: it is the impossible, ‘it is the opposite of the possible’, insofar as it 
is outside of the symbolic (meaning the symbolic can never encompass or explain it) and 
opposed to the imaginary, even though both the symbolic and the imaginary can affect it.77 
Lacan refers to ‘the cut’ in the real, which is the introduction of the symbolic in the sense that 
the world of words ‘creates the world of things’.78 The real is outside the subject, since the 
subject is defined by the symbolic. The real is also defined as the ‘impact with the obstacle.79 In 
Seminar XI the real is defined in terms of tuche and automaton, where the real is ‘beyond the 
automaton [that is] beyond the network of signifiers’.80 Here Lacan defines the automaton as the 
‘coming back’ of the real, as in repetition; the tuche is the ‘encounter with the real’, an 
encounter which is beyond the automaton and ‘as if by chance’.  The real is seen as ‘separated 
from the pleasure principle [the function of which is to ‘satisfy itself through hallucinations (the 
imaginary)], by its desexualizations, and by the fact that its economy later admits something 
new, which is precisely the impossible’.81 
 
 
The relationship between the three orders is complex, deeply interactive and not easily or 
directly articulated. It is an example of Lacan’s preference for triadic rather than dialectic 
methods of conceptualisation (for instance also need, demand, desire, as seen below). Lacan 
uses the topography of the Borromean knot (or chain) to describe how the interdependence of 
the elements of the triad is such that any one element could drastically affect the others. With 
the Borromean chain, if one link is broken, all links fall apart.82   
 
Following are various examples of interdependencies among the three orders. The real is 
outside the boundaries of the other two orders and cannot be assimilated by them. Nevertheless 
                                                          
76 Lacan, ‘Seminar IV’, (untranslated), from Freud, “Analysis of a Phobia in the Five-Year-Old Boy”, 1909, 
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the symbolic can affect the real, as the ‘cut’ in the real.83 The real exerts a strong and unequal 
pull on both symbolic and imaginary. The symbolic is deeply implicated in the imaginary in 
terms of the latter’s ‘structure’ and meaning/articulation. The imaginary can also influence the 
symbolic - they are an interdependent and yet contrasting pair. However, their influence and 
interdependence are not manifested symmetrically, e.g. there are no final consolidations or 
syntheses. From another point of view, the experience of the imaginary order is seen as relations 
between the ego and its images, where experience of the symbolic order is seen as relations 
between the subject and that to which it is subject, e.g. signifiers, speech, language.84  
 
Language includes aspects of all three orders since both the imaginary and the symbolic 
can influence the real and can be influenced by the real.85 In one summary of the 
interconnections and interactions between the three orders, it is proposed that Lacan’s concept 
of ‘being human’ is defined by the interferences between these orders.86 The three orders 
considered as a tripartite system are seen by Lacan to define and delineate the enormous 
complexity of human reality. The three orders also influence and help to define Lacan’s ideas of 
‘truth’ and ‘knowledge’ (see Chapter Two Section 1.1.8), as well as ‘full and empty speech’ (see 
Chapter One Section 2.2.3), which are relevant for the process of image making as considered in 
this thesis. 
 
5.3  Need, demand and desire 
Lacan’s tripartite system of ‘need’, ‘demand’ and ‘desire’ forms alliances with, and 
differences from, the tripartite system of the orders of the symbolic, real, and imaginary. In the 
context of human development, ‘need’ is related to the real. ‘Demand’ is related to the 
imaginary in that the cries of the infant are pre-symbolic ‘signifiers’ that structure the demand. 
‘Desire’ is related to the symbolic, in the sense of identification with the desire of the Other, 
where the Other is the order of the symbolic, as well as the Other in the sense of Other as 
represented in a particular subject, here the mother.87  
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Lacan sees ‘need’ as biologically based, thus the above reference to the real. Here need 
is conceptualised by Lacan as ‘manifested in the organism at several levels and first of all at the 
level of hunger and thirst’.88  
He proposes as an example of ‘demand’ the case of the child who learns that asking for 
(demanding) food can also gain attention, which then becomes an attached requirement, 
changing ‘need’ to ‘demand’. Demand, because it is articulated in signifiers/language, is based 
on a ‘metonymic undertone of death and “lack” ’.89 Lacan states that ‘all speech is demand; it 
presupposes the Other’, since as we have seen, the Other is the symbolic.90 
 
‘Desire’ is a more elusive term, basic to Lacan’s theories (see also Chapter One, Section 
2.2). For Lacan, desire is embryonically formed in the gap between need and demand, as we saw 
above, and is the need for ‘attention’ magnified to the requirement for the (impossible) total love 
and approbation of the Other (originally the caring adult). Thus desire is based on, and ‘situated 
in dependence on’ demand, meaning that Lacan’s concept of desire is not in relation to an object 
that is missing, but to the lack itself.91 In Chapter One, Section 2.2, I discuss the relationship 
between lack and desire, where lack (for instance the lack of total love and approbation) is one 
way of seeing the origination of desire. Lacan sees desire as a ‘nodal point’ by means of which 
the ‘pulsation’ of the unconscious is linked to sexual reality. More specifically, Lacan insists 
that ‘the motives of the unconscious are limited […] to sexual desire’. These motives he 
describes as the agency of the ‘combinatory’ laws of marriage alliance and kinship.92  For 
Lacan, desire is not a kinetic energy or ‘shock force’. It is not a ‘life force’ and it is not related 
to a biological function, as these are rhythmic in nature. Instead he sees desire as a ‘constant 
force’.93 Desire is also an un-requitable force, it cannot be satisfied in that nothing we as 
individuals do or have can assuage lack and quench desire. Lacan explains that desire can also 
be seen as the desire of the Other: ‘Man’s desire is the desire of the Other’. This is understood in 
(at least) two ways: as the desire for the Other’s approbation or the desire for whatever the Other 
desires.94 This too is discussed in more detail in Chapter One, Section 2.2.2 
 
 5.4 Lack 
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As we saw above (Section 5.2) ‘the symbol manifests itself first of all as the murder of 
the thing’. Lacan refers to this ‘murder of the thing’ as lack, and its result as un-requitable 
desire. The basis of lack is described by Lacan in different ways. At one point the basis of lack 
is seen as ‘lack of an object’, summarized from three different points of view: lack of the 
(imaginary) phallus, the (real) breast, and the (symbolic) phallus (this is lack as ‘castration’).95 
In another conceptualisation Elizabeth Wright says of Lacan: ‘The Symbolic Other is supposed 
to occupy the place of jouissance itself’. However ‘jouissance’ cannot be fully translated into 
words’. The remainder ‘which cannot be spoken’ is seen as objet a, or lack as it is seen in the 
symbolic/Other.96  
 
Lacan states that ‘a signifier is that which represents the subject for another signifier’. 
However there is no signifier, which fully represents the subject (for instance, as above, 
jouissance).97 This again is lack. Lacan also discusses the idea of ‘lack of being’.98  
 
Another symbol for lack is ‘objet a’.99 Lacan states: ‘the objet a’ is something from 
which the subject, in order to constitute itself, has separated itself off as organ. This serves as a 
symbol of lack, that is to say of the phallus, not as such, but in so far as it is lacking.’100 In 
Seminar 7, Lacan discusses the forbidden object of incestuous desire, the mother as das Ding in 
this light.101 Objet a can also be seen as the signifier that is missing in the Other, that is the 
signifier of the subject as such, for instance  ‘the subject is presented as other than he is, and 
what one shows him is not what he wishes to see’.102  
 
The realization of ‘lack’ is, in short, a trauma or loss that results in desire, and this desire 
can be most forcefully conceptualised through dependence on, and symbolic production of, 
demand. This instigates the conquest of the symbolic, the resulting coming-into-being of the 
subject, and the idea of the subject as split (see below).  
 
5.5  Subject 
 
As seen above (symbolic, Section 5.2), Lacan understands that the initiation of the 
‘subject’ at the time of the ‘conquest of the symbolic’, takes place at the point of the Oedipus 
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97 Lacan, ‘Ecrits’, 316-7. 
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complex. Lacan states: ‘In order for there to be reality […] the Oedipus complex has to have 
been lived through’, where reality is seen in the sense of a ‘reliable guide’.103 This is due to the 
field termed the Oedipus complex having a symbolic structure.104 As Evans reminds us, ‘The 
Oedipus complex is thus nothing less than the passage from the imaginary order to the symbolic 
order’.105 
 
For Lacan, the process of the initialising of the subject brings together a number of the 
background concepts I have just discussed. In ‘need, demand and desire’ (Section 5.3) I pointed 
out that desire can be ‘embryonically formed’ in the relation between need and demand. In 
‘lack’ (Section 5.4), we see Lacan relates his concept of desire to his concept of lack. In the 
section about the orders of the ‘symbolic, the real and the imaginary’ (Section 5.2) the order of 
the symbolic realm ‘defined’ in terms of language, Law and culture and is understood as pre-
individual, and trans-individual. The symbolic ‘forms’ the unconscious, which is structured of 
signifiers and as language to which the subject becomes ‘subject’.  
 
Lacan theorizes that from the time the subject is born ‘with the signifier’, the subject is 
born ‘divided’.106 ‘The subject is born in so far as the signifier emerges in the field of the 
Other’.107  This he sees as the primary condition of the human subject. This split is, from one 
point of view, between the unconscious and consciousness, and from another point of view 
between the posture of subject as being and subject as represented in language, that is between 
being both the enunciator of language and the subject of language.108 The subject is ‘an effect of 
the symbolic’.109  
 
 
Julia Kristeva’s concept of the ‘subject in process’ is a topic that provides a conceptual 
stepping-stone in my thetic model. This is in the sense that Kristeva accepts Lacan’s concepts of 
the subject and the symbolic in general, but proposes an additional pre-symbolic, pre-genital 
process as foundation and heterogeneous realm in relation to the Lacanian concept of the 
symbolic order, as manifested by the speaking subject during ‘practices of signification’.110 She 
is exploring a process: the effects of the drives on the symbolic realm of subject formation. She 
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elaborates a concept of the function and place of this pre-verbal ‘semiotic’ and its dialectic with 
the symbolic, as well as the derivation and difference from Lacan’s three orders of the 
imaginary, symbolic and real. 
 
In terms of the manner in which the speaking subject is constituted, Kristeva 
conceptualises the child’s ‘earliest pre-oedipal sexual phases’ as correlated with what she terms 
‘the “semiotic”, the unspoken and un-represented conditions of signification’.111 The semiotic is 
understood as the manner in which the drives, as ‘discrete quantities of energy’, become 
‘arranged’ by influences of ‘mother and family structures’ in this early phase.112 Kristeva 
explains that ‘it is the mother’s body [… that] becomes the ordering principle of the semiotic 
chora’ for the infant, the ‘subject who is not yet a subject’.113 
 
Kristeva speaks of the chora as the site of the semiotic. The chora is a ‘receptacle, 
unnameable, improbable, hybrid, anterior to naming, to the one, to the father and consequently 
maternally connated’.114 It is site, as process, for ‘pre-signifying impulses and drives’ in the 
infant. From another point of view, the chora is ‘rupture and articulations (rhythm), [that] 
precede evidence, verisimilitude, spatiality and temporality’.115 
 
The semiotic forms an active underlayer that is then sublated to the symbolic, beginning 
with the Oedipus complex phase, also referred to as the thetic phase. She says: ‘both the 
completion of the Oedipus complex and its reactivation in puberty are needed for the Aufhebund  
[sublation] of the semiotic in the symbolic to give rise to a signifying practice that has a socio-
historical function (and is not just a self-analytical discourse, a substitute for the analyst’s 
couch)’.116 Although after the time of the Oedipus complex the symbolic predominates, it is 
‘unable to exist’ without the ‘energetic force’ of the semiotic. On the other hand, the semiotic 
‘can only be discerned through its Symbolic overlay […] The semiotic (mythically, 
retroactively) precedes and exceeds the Symbolic, overthrowing and problematizing its 
boundaries.’117 One way to ‘see’ the semiotic is through materiality and physicality as they 
subvert meaning, for instance in ‘poetic’ texts and art. 
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For Kristeva, the idea of the ‘thetic’ is ‘a boundary between the two heterogeneous 
domains’ of semiotic and symbolic.118 This is a ‘permeable’ boundary, through which the 
semiotic can make its influence felt. Kristeva speaks of the realm of signification as a realm of 
positions. Positionality is a ‘break’ in the signifying process during which the identification of 
the subject is established, for instance in the sense of enunciation, which requires an 
‘identification’, such that the subject must separate ‘from and through his image, from and 
through his objects’.119 This break she terms the ‘thetic break’ or rupture.120 She says: ‘the thetic 
continues to ensure the position of the subject put in process/on trial’.121 For Kristeva, the 
‘subject in process/on trial’ is the perpetually becoming (speaking) subject in the process of 
accommodating the dialectic between the drives/imaginary/identification semiotic, on the one 
hand, as manifested during the involvement with the symbolic, on the other hand. In her words, 
the subject being put ‘in process/on trial’ involves a ‘practice calling into question (symbolic 
and social) finitudes by proposing new signifying devices’. 122 Textual (or artistic) experience 
becomes a ‘most daring exploration’, delving both into the constitutive process of the subject 
and also the ‘very foundation of the social’.123 This is what enables an art practice, for instance, 
to develop in terms of the dialectic between the semiotic and the symbolic. 
 
The semiotic chora, she says, ‘can be read not as a failure of the thetic, but instead as its 
very pre-condition.’124 She states: 
The subject must be firmly posited by castration so that drive attacks against the thetic will 
not give way to fantasy or to psychosis, but will instead lead to a “second degree thetic”, i.e. 
a resumption of the functioning characteristic of the semiotic chora within the signifying 
device of language. This is precisely what artistic practices, and notably poetic language, 
demonstrate.125  
 
For Kristeva, the idea of the ‘thetic’ is that there is a ‘space’ in the symbolic where the 
semiotic can make felt its influence, and that this is what enables an art practice to develop. The 
semiotic chora, she says, ‘can be read not as a failure of the thetic but instead as its very pre-
condition.’126  
    
With regard to the concerns of the present thesis, Kristeva proposes the chora as an arena 
for (her concept of) the ‘semiotic’ that can effect and affect ‘artistic practice’ in terms of its 
                                                          
118 Kristeva, ‘Revolution’, 66. 
119 Kristeva, ‘Revolution’, 63. 
120 Kristeva, ‘Revolution’, 43. 
121 Kristeva, ‘Revolution’, 63. 
122 Kristeva, ‘Revolution’, 210. 
123 Kristeva, ‘Revolution’, 66. 
124 Kristeva, “Word, Dialogue and Novel”, 50. 
125 Kristeva, “Word, Dialogue and Novel”, 50. 
126 Kristeva, “Word, Dialogue and Novel”, 50. 
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potential for ‘attacking’ and ‘developing’ the symbolic order. This is opposed to Lacan, who 
does not propose a conceptual framework for the pre-symbolic (except as a retrospective 
imaginary fantasy).  
 
 
Although Kristeva’s ideas can be seen as a ‘conceptual stepping-stone’ for my thesis, for 
instance insofar as she speaks of the ‘developing’ art practice, Bracha Lichtenberg Ettinger, 
whose ideas I consider in Chapter Four, Section 2, moves even further into this pre-Oedipal pre-
subjective disposition that is dismissed by Lacan. She proposes ‘wombic’ influences 
(perceptions and ‘drives’) working in parallel with what Lacan sees as psychical realms, the 
stain and the gap. In this way, and importantly for this thesis, she conceptualises an additional 
libidinal pathway extra to the Law that works alongside, rather than in conjunction with (as with 
Kristeva), the structural symbolic. She also proposes further ‘perceptual pathways’. She makes 
resulting observations on the process of image making from the point of view of an artist. These 
ideas add to my understanding as a practicing artist considering the un-thought stage in the 
process of image making and are incorporated into the developing schema of the thesis in 
Chapters Four and Five. 
 
 
These overviews of underlying concepts are intended as a background for the thetic 
question and for the developing thetic argument that follows. In the argument of the thesis I do 
not emphasize all the ideas just discussed, since the focus of the argument is centred on the un-
thought stage of the process of image making. Lacan’s concept of the gaze is based on his ideas 
of lack, desire, and perception. It includes space for the influence of unconscious operations 
concerns slippery and ‘new’ meaning within the structure and shifting of language and the 
symbolic in general. As I have indicated, it is for these reasons that I use the concept of the gaze 
as a basis for the argument developed in the thesis.  
 
For my purposes in this thesis, concepts of desire, lack, the realm of the symbolic, the 
realm of the real, and their interactions and influences, assume a primary significance as 
investigatory tools. 
      
 
 Section 6:  Overview of the development of the thetic argument   
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In Chapter One, I scrutinize Lacan’s ideas concerning the ‘origin’ and ‘basis’ of the 
unconscious: ‘lack’ and its consequent ‘desire’. I consider some ways in which these ideas are 
helpful to my project and point out some problematics. These problematics are then considered 
from the point of view of J-F. Lyotard, working within the context of psychoanalytic thinking, 
who contests Lacan’s idea of lack as the sole basis of the unconscious. However this leaves an 
un-resolved dichotomy between the two writers, for which a resolution is found in Chapter Two. 
 
In Chapter Two, Lacan’s concept of the ‘content’, or text, of the unconscious is 
considered. The primary focus is on two of Lacan’s related ideas, the signifier and the ‘Other’. 
These are seen particularly in the light of Lacan’s conceptions of the ‘realm of the symbolic’ 
and ‘realm of the real’, and his ideas of ‘truth’ and ‘knowledge’. While Lacan’s ideas are helpful 
in understanding the un-thought stage, I find paradoxes in his writing to do with the relationship 
between signifiers and affect. Lyotard’s proposals of ‘figure’ (expression) and its manifestation 
by way of dissimulation of the structure of signs are based on seeing libidinal energy itself as 
the basis of the unconscious. Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of schizoanalysis substantiates 
Lyotard’s notions, proposing that desiring machines and the libido are the basis for all social and 
personal production, and including the proposal that the idea of lack (with its basis in tragedy 
and absence) as a basis of the unconscious is not only unnecessary but contra-indicated. They 
emphasize instead the role of energy (libido) as a basis and ‘engine’ of the unconscious, and 
enable Lacan’s concepts, including lack, to be accommodated and better understood within this 
wider definition. 
 
In Chapter Three I consider Lacan’s ideas concerning ‘processes’ of the unconscious as 
they are relevant to the un-thought stage of image making. His ideas are based on the idea of 
‘primary processes’ as seen in Freud’s concept of the dream-work (which can produce images), 
and then re-contextualized by Lacan through his employment of structural linguistics (which I 
understand as more limited than Freud’s concepts in terms of image making). These ideas of 
Lacan are extended by Anton Ehrenzweig’s notions of syncretistic scanning, dedifferentiation, 
and re-introjection. Syncretistic scanning also comprises a mixture of the unconscious and 
perception (both interior and exterior), but seen from a different point of view. He adds 
substantially to a detailed notion of what can be seen to be happening in the unconscious and 
thus in the un-thought stage itself.  
 
In Chapter Four I examine Lacan’s concept of the gaze as a complex of related ideas to 
do with concepts of the unconscious and perception, for instance Lacan’s proposals that the gaze 
is the ‘object of the act of looking’, and the split between the eye and the gaze reflects the 
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subjective division itself, as well as the notion of ‘the gaze of the image’. B. Lichtenberg 
Ettinger’s related proposals about the ‘matrixial gaze’ extend both the basis and the ‘focus’ of 
Lacan’s gaze, providing a notion of the dispersal of both perceptual and libidinal processes.  
 
Finally, in Chapter Five, Lacan’s concept of the gaze is extended to a notional ‘libidinal 
gaze’, within which I seek to pull together the ideas that have been developed in the preceding 
chapters. This includes retaining much of Lacan’s concept of the gaze as a foundation for 
thinking about the un-thought stage of image making, as well as accommodating extensions to 
his ideas, seen together under the umbrella of a more broadly defined concept of the 
unconscious. This more broadly defined idea is a complex of ideas, articulated by writers 
working within the paradigm of psychoanalytic theory, and seen through the filter of experience 
I have gained in my studio practice. It provides a basis for situating my practice within the 
paradigm of contemporary art. 
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Chapter One considers one aspect of Lacan’s concept of the gaze, his ideas concerning 
the basis and origin of the unconscious. The specific ideas he develops are lack and its 
generation of desire. Some aspects of Lyotard’s contestation of, and extension to, Lacan’s ideas 
are considered. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     Chapter  One    The Unconscious – ‘Origin’                   
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Working in the studio after the first stage of planning is ‘complete’, I am left looking at a 
‘blank page’ – ready to begin.  I look.  I look with my eyes; I also have the strange feeling of 
looking into or with my mind; I become absorbed … and again I look at the page. There are 
now marks on the page. Without consciously addressing how or where to make the marks, or 
how to relate them, there are now marks on the page.  Where have they come from, ‘who’ has 
made these marks and why, ‘what’ is looking back? 127  
 
In order to consider ‘answers’ to these questions, as I explain in the Introduction, I 
propose to consider whether, and how, Lacan’s concept of the gaze can be used as a basis, or 
template, for elucidation of the ‘un-thought’ stage of my image making model.128 I am not 
arguing for a transparent articulation and comprehension, either of the unconscious or of the 
image or indeed of image making. Instead, my particular aim in this chapter is to emerge with 
ideas concerning the origin of the unconscious within the general aim of arriving at a way of 
understanding Lacan’s concept of the gaze. This is a step towards the better understanding of the 
un-thought stage, in terms of, and in the context of, my studio practice. Within Lacan’s focus on 
the theory and practice of psychoanalysis, he refers to the process of image making itself only 
rarely. Nevertheless, the elements of a basic understanding can be developed by extension from 
within his discourse.129  
 
Section 1:  Preview of Lacan’s concept of the gaze 
 
At this point, before I begin considering individual ‘elements’ of Lacan’s concept of the 
gaze, my intention is to provide a ‘preview’ of the salient points of the gaze as an overall 
concept, so that from the beginning of the thesis there is an overview within which to build up a 
picture of its more detailed component elements. I return to this overall concept in Chapter Four, 
after considering several individual aspects of the gaze in more detail. 
 
The first thing to note is that the gaze is not the eye as it manifests ‘looking’. Lacan’s 
basic premise is that there is no ‘coincidence’ between the eye and the gaze. In other words it is 
                                                          
127 As noted in my Introduction, these inserts in italics represent my ‘wonderings’ in the studio, and  introduce the 
questions that the thesis is aiming to address. 
128 I deal, in this thesis, with Lacan’s ideas as developed and articulated, for the most part, in the 1960’s. Note that, 
as explained in my Introduction, I use the word ‘image’ in place of ‘painting’ (my specific medium) to include 
painting and drawing. 
129 Lacan teaches that language is the basis of what is for him a ‘talking cure’, as well as the basis of the ‘structure’ 
of the unconscious. Culture today is suffused with various aspects of Lacan’s theories in various forms. I consulted 
his writing/seminars to identify aspects of his theory that are to me, as a painter, particularly relevant to the ‘un-
thought’ stage of image making.   
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not the eye that manifests the gaze. This he maintains because he defines the gaze as objet a, in 
other words functioning at the level of lack. As we will see in the rest of this chapter, for Lacan 
the concept of lack is a basic aspect of the unconscious. In other words, Lacan is implying that 
what I see is not necessarily (exactly) what is there, insofar as the unconscious influences 
perception.130 This implies a number of component elements. Perception is the basis of the gaze 
insofar as ‘looking’ is involved as the overt action; my looking and my ‘seeing’ another person 
‘apparently’ looking back in a certain manner. But more importantly for Lacan the gaze contains 
an ‘un-thought’ aspect of looking insofar as what I am ‘seeing’ is being influenced, although I 
am unaware of it, by (unconscious) processes.131 Each of these two aspects of the gaze, 
perception and the unconscious, is in turn made up of its own components. On the one hand, 
perception includes seeing and conscious mental processes. On the other hand, the unconscious 
can influence seeing, and includes the psychical field related to the eye that Lacan refers to as 
the ‘scopic’, which involves lack and desire. 
 
Lacan writes that the objet a in the field of the visible is the gaze, where objet a is 
defined as ‘the portion of emptiness that my demand presupposes’.132 This term is a symbol for 
lack, for instance for one of the four ‘causes of desire’ (the ‘objects’ of sucking, excretion, the 
gaze and the voice, resulting in oral, anal, scopic and invocatory ‘partial’ drives).133 
 
The concept of the gaze becomes a theorization about how we see and how we 
‘interpret’ the objects, events and persons around us. Lacan terms the gaze ‘the underside of 
consciousness’ in the sense that ‘seeing oneself see oneself’ as a subject is understood by Lacan 
to be an illusion, an illusion ‘in which the gaze is elided’.134 By this he means that this process 
of the gaze is not apparent to the one who gazes. But, he asks, if the gaze is elided, how then to 
imagine it? And he answers: by means of understanding it ‘in the dimension of the existence of 
others’. For Lacan, as we shall see, this ‘dimension of the existence of others’ refers to his 
notion of the unconscious as the Other.135 He is explaining that the function of the gaze includes 
an aspect that allows it to elude that form of vision which considers itself to be conscious. 
 
                                                          
130 Lacan, ‘Seminar XI’, 84. His notion of the ‘Other’ is considered in detail in my next chapter. For now it can be 
read as another ‘subject’, insofar as he/she particularizes aspects of the culture in which we live. Note that I see the 
word ‘imagine’ in this quote as implying not the ‘realm of the imaginary’, but related to desire. 
131  My notion of ‘un-thought’ includes mental processing which takes place in the unconscious and is not related to 
rational thought. 
132 Lacan, ‘Seminar XI’, 114. 
133 Lacan, ‘Seminar XI’, 103. 
134 Lacan, ‘Seminar XI’, 83-84. 
135 Lacan, ‘Seminar XI’, 84. 
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As a result, the gaze is, in relation to desire, where reality appears ‘only as marginal’.136 
 
 
Section 2:  Basis of the unconscious  
 
Reflecting in the studio one wonders – why? Why the desire to make images? Why make 
the images that I do? There are depths of depths here, reflections and refractions. Each answer 
leads to another question, each question leads to another answer. What is finally elicited is the 
feeling of blindness – I don’t know why I want to make my images; what I do know is that I want 
to and that, for me, they are significant. There is a blank wall at the end of the questions and 
answers – I still don’t know (but I wonder)…is this what is meant by the ‘unconscious’? 
Nevertheless  -  I persevere in the face of unknowing. 
 
In terms of understanding Lacan’s concept of the unconscious, which is an important 
component of the concept of the gaze, I propose to begin at the beginning, the basis of the 
unconscious. Lacan develops two relevant concepts. These concepts are ‘lack’ and ‘desire’. His 
ideas are related to Freud’s concept of the Oedipus complex and have been questioned in 
various contexts over the years. My aim is to establish an understanding of these ideas as a 
foundation for the argument of the thesis as it is developed in subsequent chapters. 
                      
2.1   ‘Lack’ 
 
Lacan proposes that the unconscious as a whole has a common origin.  He posits the 
unconscious as being initiated by (and based on) what he terms ‘lack’. Over the years Lacan 
theorizes several versions of the concept of lack: for my purposes, the two that are relevant are 
‘phallic lack’ and what he refers to as ‘anterior lack’ (being anterior to the phallic lack).137  
 
2.1.1    Phallic lack 
 
One way of understanding phallic lack is as a symbol for the early trauma, posited 
originally by Freud and known as the Oedipus complex, which includes the child’s realization 
                                                          
136 Lacan, The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XX , Encore 1972-1973, ed. Jacques Alain Miller (London and 
New York, W.W. Norton & Co., 1998, (1975)), 126. 
137 Where ‘phallus’ is defined as  a representation in the field of the symbolic that symbolizes a loss, an absence, 
engendered by ‘prohibition’, which has become associated with a fear of castration. 
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that he/she is not the mother’s (only) object of desire.138 The phallus is a symbol for loss, and 
one way of picturing this ‘loss’ is as the loss or lack of being desired exclusively. The fear that 
Freud posits as rising during the Oedipus complex (wherein Freud relates psychical 
development to biological determinants) is re-inscribed by Lacan as he connects castration with 
the idea of ‘lack’, and further with a basic understanding of cultural subjectivity by means of 
language theory. Language and the symbolic in general, according to Lacan, are ‘conquered’ at 
this point of the Oedipus complex in order to help to ensure survival, and to overcome the fear 
engendered by the realization of basic ‘lack’.139 But language involves another (reflective) lack 
– the lack of being able to embody the real, or the ‘being’, of the ‘speaker’, insofar as lack and 
fear are seen by Lacan to be the basis of the individual’s interaction with the symbolic. Because 
of being based on an experience of ‘lack’, languages and symbols of all kinds become closely 
linked with fear. This fear and trauma result in the ‘repression’ of much experience of the period 
prior to the ‘Oedipal phase’. In other words, the repression (or naturalization) of the ‘phallus’ 
function results in the idea of the ‘primary repression’ of lack, which Lacan posits as the basis of 
the unconscious, the basis of the complex arena of the symbolic, and the basis of the acquisition 
of both by the individual. I extend this to the process of image making insofar as my view of 
images is understood primarily as aspects of the symbolic order, rather than the imaginary order. 
 
2.1.2     Implications for Lacan 
 
Although for Lacan the significant early relationship for the infant is formed in a 
dualistic connection with the mother (nurturer), ‘proper’ relationships are only established with 
                                                          
138 The three phases of the Oedipus complex, as first proposed by Freud, and then extended by Lacan, can be 
summarized, from the point of view of the child, as follows. First there is an imaginary triangle, which consists of 
Mother (the Other for the child at this point), child, and phallus, phallus being the mother’s desired object. At this 
stage the child ‘understands’ that he/she is the phallus for the mother, which has connotations of all the mother 
could desire, including erotic fulfilment.  Second there is an intervention by the ‘symbolic’ father. He is seen to 
refuse the mother access to the child as phallus or object of desire, which causes deep trauma for the child, who 
thus realizes that the mother has desires other than for the child. The third step is an intervention of the ‘real’ father, 
who has the phallus (imaginary, symbolic and real), presents an interdiction of mother being phallus for child 
(prohibition), and thus (metaphorically but nevertheless traumatically) castrates the child – the final blow as the 
child realizes he or she cannot win the undivided attention of the mother, cannot ‘be’ the phallus, or the object of 
desire of the mother, and is thus ‘castrated’. By virtue of other associations (for instance emerging infantile 
sexuality), this instils a traumatic fear of loss of penis (male) or lost penis (female), which is repressed into the 
unconscious. However this allows (or forces) the ‘conquest’ of the symbolic realm in all its complexity (language, 
culture, law, prohibition of incest, etc.), in order to help deal with the trauma. In this last step, it is the repression of 
the (sexually linked) trauma that originates  the formation of the unconscious, and at the same time causes the 
formation of the ‘subject’. The subject is subject to the unconscious. They are both formed at the same time by this 
‘originary’ repression, and by the subject’s ‘conquest’ of the symbolic. For Lacan, there is no subject, as such, 
before this psychological ‘event’. This happens between the ages of three to five years. The primary reference for 
this is D. Evans, Dictionary of Lacanian Psychoanalysis, (London, Routledge, 1996), taken from Lacan, 
(untranslated) Seminar V; there are other references throughout his later work. 
139 Lacan, ‘Seminar XI’, 198. Freud posits that the male child eventually identifies with the father and the female 
child with the mother.  Lacan posits that the ‘loss’, or what he terms lack, is true of both male and female children; 
gender roles are acquired in a different arena, that of culture. 
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the introduction of a third element, the realm of the symbolic.140 Inter-subjective relationships 
are initiated triadically such that there is always ‘mediation’ by the symbolic (for instance 
language) so that the relationship can be acknowledged.141  
 
For Lacan, the symbolic is a ‘re-presenting’ function, attempting to represent and 
encompass the ‘real’.  The symbolic, he explains, can also be seen as a ‘wall’, being on the one 
hand a mediator between two subjects, enabling a condition wherein communication can occur, 
and on the other hand a hindrance to direct communication in the sense that the symbolic cannot 
‘em-body’ affective experience. Images, insofar as they are part of the symbolic, form a part of 
this ‘wall’. Furthermore, while this wall is always there, its role becomes ‘transparent’, insofar 
as the subject doesn’t notice that in dealing with symbols, affect and ‘being’ are not (fully) 
embodied (see Chapter Two, Section 1.1.9 for further discussion). For now the two important 
points are that representation, the symbolic, can never embody or assuage the underlying and 
unconscious lack, and that this symbolic order was gained in association with fear/lack.142 
 
The major relevance for Lacan of the phallic stage, he has said, is not so much the 
‘genital’, or sexual, dimension, but the importance of the ‘conquest of the symbolic’.143 
However, in effect, are these two ideas so different? The realm of the symbolic, being a ‘wall’ 
between subjects, also gives rise to the sense of ‘castration’, or lack, which pervades the notion 
of the Oedipus complex, in the sense that the individual is able neither to encompass nor to 
assuage lack and desire. Thus ‘castration’ is used here in the sense of the individual being 
unable to deal directly with the real, only with the representations of the real as the symbolic. 
For Lacan, this amounts to the ‘cutting off’ of a direct ‘commerce’ with ‘truth’ and ‘being’ as 
desire. The phallus becomes a primary ‘signifier’, an organizing principle with regard to all 
experiences of lack, any form of physical separation (from the placenta, the breast, and so on).144 
The phallus becomes an organizing principle even for experiences that have occurred prior to 
the time of the Oedipus complex, meaning that the ‘organization’ of experience can happen in 
                                                          
140 See the Introduction, Section 5.2.  
141 According to psychoanalytic theory the initial dual relation of child/(m)other is unacknowledged as such 
because it is symbiotic; language is not involved. 
142 Lacan also relates the realm of the symbolic to death, in terms of the death drive. See Jacques Lacan, ‘Seminar 
II’, 210 and 326. 
143 Lacan, Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book III, 1955-56, ed. Jacques-Alain Miller (Routledge, London, 1993), 199-
200. 
144 V. Burgin, The End of Art Theory (London, Macmillan Press Ltd., 1986), 39. Also Lacan, ‘‘Seminar XI’, 198. 
‘Signifier’ is Lacan’s term for a sign divorced of its signification as such. Again this is discussed in more detail in 
the next chapter. 
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retrospect (retroactively).145 This is one reason the phallus is known to Lacan as the ‘primary’ 
signifier. It is also known as the ‘empty’ signifier, in that the phallus does not represent what is 
present, it represents the ‘fact’ that there is a lack, thus it has no content even though it has a 
function.146 This is discussed in more detail in Chapter Two. 
 
2.1.3    Implications for the studio 
 
As I considered above, Lacan proposes a ‘wall’ (the order of the symbolic) between 
subjects. Certainly the feeling of non- or mis-communication is rife in the (my) studio, insofar 
as ideas and indistinct images emerge, but with difficulty and mystery. Sometimes (but not 
always) fear and anxiety accompany image making. The important point here is that Lacan’s 
realm of the symbolic, with its complicated half-hidden meanings, with its gaps and ‘absences’, 
and with aspects of both societal and individually particularized unconscious, is seen to embody 
certain ‘associations’.147 It also brings attendant problems, such as not embodying or allaying in 
a straight-forward manner the concerns of the individual. 
 
I see three specific implications for the un-thought stage of image making regarding 
Lacan’s notion of ‘lack’. One is the idea of the lack as being the basis of the unconscious. As a 
result, in one sense, language and image making, as the (limit-less) symbolic, have endless 
potentiality. In another sense, this potential is ‘castrated’ since it only ‘circles’ the ‘real’; in 
Lacan’s terms the real is actually missing from the symbolic. The second implication is the close 
connection to notions of fear, resulting from lack, as an unconscious basis for action. This 
connection arguably leads to the understanding of image making as a negative, even 
symptomatic, activity. The third implication is the idea that ‘something’ (the realm of the 
symbolic) is both interfering with, and mediating between, subjects, as they try to communicate 
by means of the symbolic, for instance (here) by means of images. However, while this latter is 
relevant to image making as an activity, it is perhaps less relevant to the un-thought stage itself. 
This is because in this stage meaning and a ‘logical’ sense of communication are not relevant, 
and conscious thought is being by-passed.  
                                                          
145 Lacan sees this as closely involved with his notion of temporality, involving an idea of ‘logical time’ that has to 
do not only with the temporal order of events in a subject’s life, but with the influence of these events on the subject 
in terms of his/her ‘understanding’.  
146 It is termed a signifier because, as I discuss in Chapter Two, it is not a sign in Saussurian terms, a signifier plus a 
meaning, but rather a signifier which signifies ‘lack’, and is therefore ‘empty’.  
147 In my Introduction, in the description of the un-thought stage of image making, fear was not articulated as an 
important factor. Furthermore, there seems to me to be a mis-match between my experience in the studio and the 
description here. Sometimes in the studio there is a feeling of resistance and ineptitude.  But what about the feelings 
of surprise, excitement and pleasure that can be present?  This can be widened to the question: is there any content 
or process of the unconscious, which is unrelated to fear, and repression of trauma/base instincts?  I will return to 
this question in Chapters Two and Three. 
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2.1.4   Anterior lack 
 
I turn now from Lacan’s notion of phallic lack to his parallel notion of ‘anterior’ lack. 
Anterior lack, he states, has to do with the ‘truth’ about the subject’s ‘beginning’ and ‘end’, and 
therefore concerns non-being and the un-knowable aspect(s) of being human. He refers to this as 
the ‘myth of the lamella’, where, confusingly, he labels the lamella as ‘unreal’, as an ‘organ’, 
and also as being the libido. He says: 
This lamella, this organ, whose characteristic is not to exist, but which is nevertheless an 
organ [ … ] is the libido. It is the libido, qua pure life instinct, that is to say, immortal life, 
or irrepressible life, life that has need of no organ, simplified, indestructible life. It is 
precisely what is subtracted from the living being by virtue of the fact that it is subject to the 
cycle of sexual reproduction [and thus individual death].148  
 
He calls the lamella the ‘unreal’ organ not in the sense of being imaginary, but because it 
is ‘defined by articulating itself on the real in a way that eludes us.’149 Thus, importantly for this 
thesis, Lacan re-inscribes the libido of Freudian theory as the lamella. His re-inscription 
physicalizes the libido as an organ that has the characteristic of non-being.150 The libido is not 
treated here simply as an energy, a drive, although he does add to its description that it is an 
instinct. This ‘subtracted’ ‘lamella’ is the result of a primary lack from which the human (as 
individual and as species) is never able to recover; a void that is never able to be filled, in that it 
is immortality that is lacking. Within his understanding of Saussurian semiotics he links the 
lamella with a primary signifier (signifier as a ‘sign’ without its signified, here the phallus), as 
well as with ‘force’, an energy, not a static formal principle or thing, but an energy that, he 
claims here, is lacking.151 Consequently, for Lacan, in terms of representation, this somatic force 
is a ‘radical’ re-inscription of the death drive. In other words, by extension, implications for 
image making include an idea that representation, based on lack, incorporates attributes of ‘non-
being’ or death in terms of the death drive:   
in the sense that […] the death instinct is only the mask of the symbolic order, insofar […] 
as it [the symbolic order] is dumb, that is to say, insofar as it hasn’t been realized. The 
symbolic order is simultaneously non-being and insisting-to-be, that is what Freud has in 
                                                          
148 Lacan, ‘Seminar XI’, 197-98.  (My additions.) 
149 Lacan, ‘Seminar XI’, 205. 
150 An un-acknowledged economy notably taken up by Deleuze and Guattari (see Chapter Two) in a direction that 
can be seen as machinic. Note that in other contexts Lacan refers to the libido as that same notion of sexual energy 
that Freud employs. 
151 For an example of the ‘embodied’ lamella, see Parveen Adams, “The Violence of Painting” in The Emptiness of 
the Image, Psychoanalysis and Sexual Difference (London, Routledge, 1996), 118-120, where she understands 
certain elements in various Francis Bacon paintings as being (inadvertent) illustrations of the idea.   She points out 
aspects of the ‘detachment of the gaze’, which are ‘inexplicable in terms of the phallic metaphor’, for instance the 
‘escape of libido’ through ‘orifices’ in the figures and resulting in ‘flat bounded shapes’.  
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mind when he talks about the death instinct as being what is most fundamental – a symbolic 
order in travail, in the process of coming, insisting on being realized.152  
 
The consequences he draws from these ideas are powerful. Pure and indestructible life 
force is what the individual human does not possess: immortality.153 The lamella is, in this case, 
the primary signifier with no content, reflecting the lack of immortal life for any individual. This 
lack, he proposes, is the basis of the unconscious, in the sense that on the one hand its 
consequences are the precipitation of anxiety or fear and the repression of our lack of 
immortality. On the other hand, the arena of the symbolic is adopted as a way of attempting to 
assuage this fearsome lack. 
 
Anterior lack can be seen as a shadow of phallic lack: again death and the erotic (sexual 
reproduction) together constitute a lack that forms the basis of the unconscious in highlighting 
the concept of ‘lack of immortality’. Lacan’s concept of the anterior lack of immortality points 
to a more clearly defined connection with death and non-being (for instance in terms of the 
conquest of the symbolic). In so doing, he adds a further sense of gravitas to the notion of 
phallic lack, insofar as anterior lack highlights an aspect of the concept of lack that can be lost in 
the more obvious relationship of the notion of the phallus to the erotic and to the fear of physical 
castration.  
 
2.2      Desire 
  
Moving on from the concept of lack to the closely related psychoanalytic concept of 
‘desire’, the basis of desire is seen by Lacan to be the unconscious desire to assuage the lack 
(whatever its particular definition). Thus Lacan’s concept of ‘desire’ is the reverse side of his 
concept of lack: both are unconscious, and thus ‘unknowable’; each is intimately related to the 
other, and both together form the very basis of the unconscious. While Lacan’s descriptions of 
lack may vary, he insists that there is only one lack, and likewise there is only one ‘desire’ 
aroused by lack. Lack, in any of his versions, is indestructible. Desire to assuage lack is aroused, 
but this desire can never produce the means to assuage lack, because lack is ‘irreparable’.154  
 
                                                          
152 Lacan, ‘Seminar II’, 210 and 326. (My additions.)  This is related to Lacan’s notion of the unconscious as 
‘unrealized’, which is discussed in the next chapter. 
153 In fact, ‘the drive’ becomes singular for Lacan, ‘embodied’ in the notion of the lamella as organ, the (again) 
primary signifier with no content (‘‘Seminar XI’, 193-4), wherein he comes to the conclusion that the life- death 
drive opposition seen in Freud is the opposition between the realms of the symbolic and the imaginary. 
154 Lacan, ‘Seminar  II’, 221-234. In this Seminar Lacan elaborates his understanding of ‘desire’. 
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Lacan states that desire can never be erased, and ‘desire lies at the origin of every variety of 
animation’. He states: ‘the name of what animates the deep-seated conflict at the heart of human 
action [is] ineffable.’ Furthermore: ‘as soon as one wants to spell it out, one ends up with all 
sorts of contradictions.’ 155 This underlying ‘desire’, described by Lacan in terms of its 
‘ineffable’ qualities, refers to an energy that is on the borderline of the somatic and the ‘mental’, 
or encompasses both. It is furthermore an energy that is spoken of in terms of both quality 
(mental and/or somatic), and quantity (energy). At some points, Lacan equates desire with the 
concept of libido (his notion of the lamella notwithstanding), although he writes that the term 
‘libido’ possesses a greater ‘relative objectification’.156  ‘Libido’, he argues, implies states, and 
changes of states, in terms of ‘transformations, regressions, fixations, sublimations’, whereas as 
we saw earlier (in the Introduction) desire is also defined as a ‘constant force’. In other words, at 
some points Lacan favours an economic model of desire over his model of the lamella, which is 
a biological given and thus (passively) mechanical. He equates desire and the libido in the sense 
that the concept of the libido is helpful in substantiating the understanding of different structures 
of sexuality as Freud initially observed them.157 For Lacan, this makes the concept of libido a 
theoretical domain, but closely related to his notion of desire. 
 
 In this way desire is a ‘threshold’ concept, which is used somewhat differently within 
different contexts.158 This idea is developed further as the thesis progresses. The point for now is 
that Lacan conceptualises desire solely as a result of lack, and, even though pervasive, it is not 
able to be assuaged. 
 
2.2.1     Circling of desire 
 
Lacan develops the idea that, although there is only one desire arising from one lack, this 
one desire appears to change and proliferate by changing metonymically, for instance as it 
relates to the world of material goods, the order of the symbolic, and the arena of affect. In other 
words, desire may be felt for a new pair of shoes. When they are acquired, desire might be felt 
                                                          
155 Lacan, ‘Seminar  II’, 222-223. (My additions). 
156 Lacan, ‘Seminar  II’, 221-234. See also D. Mundy, Tate exhibition catalogue, Desire Unbound (London, Tate 
Publishers, 2001, 55-56), where he points out the ‘convulsive beauty’, which Surrealists (Breton for example) felt 
so important in the repressed and the return of the repressed as embodied in the hysteric, on which the Surrealists 
built a poetics and aesthetics of desire. This desire epitomized their belief in erotic desire, says Lomas, as the agent 
of a critical transformation in human consciousness: ‘a convulsive force to be pitted against the despised status quo 
of bourgeois, patriarchal society and religion’. In this they were deeply influenced by Freud. 
157 This is referring to the oral, anal and genital stages of organization, see S. Freud, “Three Essays on the Theory of 
Sexuality”, 1905, Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, ed. J. Strachey 
(London, Hogarth Press, 1957). 
158 This is confirmed by Laplanche and Pontalis, The Language of Psycho-analysis (London, Karnac Books, 1988), 
239: ‘A satisfactory definition of libido is difficult to give.’ 
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for a new car. Desire remains; the objects are symbols of this desire. Each new object is 
substituted for the one already acquired as being the consciously desired object. These symbols 
circle ‘lack’ but can never approach or assuage it, because they are symbols, whereas lack is 
‘real’, in that it is not a representation but a ‘real absence’. As we have seen, Lacan posits that 
the symbolic cannot embody the real, and the real does not include the symbolic.  
 
2.2.2     Desire of the ‘Other’ 
 
Specifically, Lacan discusses one particular arena of the appearance of desire in terms of 
making images: ‘What occurs as the brush strokes […] fall like rain from the painter’s brush is 
not choice but something else.’159 For him, these brush strokes are something in which a 
movement is terminated. Furthermore, for Lacan the painter: ‘Operates by remote control’, 
operating in an arena of the ‘desire of the Other’ (he uses the word Other here in the sense of the 
locus of the symbolic and as being a trans-symbolic ‘unconscious’ – see Chapter Two, Section 
1.2.2 for further consideration of the concept of the Other). In this case, the process of image 
making is also for the purpose of satisfying ‘some appetite of the eye on the part of the person 
looking’.160 He explains that this ‘desire of the Other’ can be read in two ways: the subject 
desires to be desired by the Other, and also the subject desires what the Other desires.161 For 
Lacan, the ‘Other’ is the order of the symbolic in its radical alterity to the subject, as discussed 
in Introduction, Section 5.2. It can also be read as another subject who particularizes elements of 
the symbolic as it attempts to deal with the real. Since desire, in Lacan’s view, is a product of 
lack, the implication is (simplistically) that the flurry of brush marks made by the artist is the 
result of unconscious lack. Because the Other is seen as unconscious, for me this relates closely 
to the un-thought stage of image making in terms of an unconscious, un-thought stage that can 
drive the process of mark-making. However as I have pointed out, this also implies that image 
making is a symptomatic activity, an implication with which I cannot fully agree. This is 
discussed further in the next chapters. 
 
2.2.3      Full and empty images 
 
In relating lack, the symbolic and questions of immortality to image making, images 
become related to ontological questions, such as where have I come from, where am I going?  
Lacan implies that lack/desire, the ‘real’, is the basis both for the action I may take (making 
                                                          
159 Lacan, ‘Seminar XI’, 114. 
160 Lacan, ‘Seminar XI’, 115. Here he is referring to the scopic field. 
161 Lacan, ‘Seminar XI’, 104. 
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images) and for the array of symbols I may use (of which images form a portion). In this sense 
some image making can be seen to be ‘closer’ to the ‘real’ than others, echoing the gravitas of 
the real in terms of whatever ‘search’ may be engendered, whatever ‘questions’ asked. In this 
regard, Lacan speaks of full speech and empty speech, to indicate whether speech (another 
aspect of the symbolic) is approaching the ‘real’ or the ‘imaginary’, as (respectively) two ends 
of a spectrum. Lacan speaks of ‘full speech’ as being ‘an ideal – a joining of one subject to 
another subject on the other side of the wall of language.’162 As an ideal, this cannot happen 
fully. ‘Empty’ speech is ‘chit-chat’, and he relegates it to the realm of the imaginary. For me, 
this hypothesis implies that ‘full’ images in visual art, by extension, would be able to ‘join’ one 
subject (the maker) to another subject (the viewer) who is on the other side of the wall of the 
‘system of signs’ called images, while ‘empty’ images would not.163  In any case, both ‘empty’ 
and ‘full’, are in relation to the concept of desire, implying that while some images may be 
‘closer’ to the ‘real’ of desire than others, all are based in a search/desire for a lacking ‘object’. 
 
There are certain image making endeavours in which this ontological search for the 
indescribable is clearly reflected, for instance in the early drawings of Joseph Beuys 
(Illustrations 1.1 and 2.1).164 He later said that the years spent making those searching, 
inarticulate drawings formed the basis of his subsequent ideas and art-making. Bernice Rose’s 
essay in the ‘Thinking is Form’ catalogue of an exhibition of Beuys’ drawings, quotes Beuys as 
saying: ‘Drawing is the first visible form in my works […] the first visible thing of the form of 
the thought, the changing point from the invisible powers to the visible thing’.165 In other words 
for him mark making is seen as the manifestation of ‘the form of the thought’. Looking at an 
example of his early drawings (Illustration 2.1) with that comment in mind shows us a 
compendium of marks. Some marks form a recognizable image, for instance a stag’s head can 
clearly be seen in the lower left. Other marks seem to indicate some thing, although exactly 
what thing is not clear, for instance the rising forms could be trees or energy. Overall the image 
is apparently incompletely formed; any ‘meaning’ is mysterious, unclear in itself and not much 
                                                          
162 Lacan, ‘Seminar II’, 246. 
163 R. Barthes, “Rhetoric”, 32-51.  As discussed in Footnote 8 in my Introduction, Barthes discusses the semiology 
of images, listing three possibilities: language, which he dismisses because language is ‘doubly articulated’, 
‘system of signs’, or merely ‘agglutination of signs’. His choice is the second option, ‘systems of signs’, because of 
the syntagmatic (flow) and paradigmatic (condensation) interactions of denoted and connoted meanings 
respectively. This analysis indicates that images can form ‘systems’ with some language-like attributes. I see 
‘system of signs’ as appropriate for my purposes, because while there may be an energy and/or a materiality 
connecting the signs, there is no given structure equivalent to grammar in language.  
164 In the early 1950’s Beuys spent several years reading widely and drawing. During this time he made literally 
thousands of drawings. Two exhibitions devoted to these drawings, each with an exhibition  catalogue are: ‘Joseph 
Beuys, The Secret Block for a Secret Person in Ireland’, Samlung Marx (Munich and London, Schirmer/Mosel, 
1996), and ‘Thinking is Form, the Drawings of Joseph Beuys’, Ann Temkin and Bernice Rose, (New York, Thames 
and Hudson, 1993). 
165 Bernice Rose, “Joseph Beuys and the Language of Drawing”, ‘ Thinking is Form’, 73-118. 
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clearer with the help of the title. For me, these drawings represent the musings of a mind in 
conversation with itself, rather than primarily involved in communicating with others. Insofar as 
these early drawings are meant to be a communication with others, the idea of the ‘wall between 
subjects’ is clearly seen in the multiplicity of meanings/interpretations that might be attributed 
to them. But insofar as they are seen as the musings of a mind grappling with the indescribable, 
in an ‘ontological search for the indescribable’, I believe that they can be seen by the viewer as 
affecting and gripping rather than slick and ‘empty’. This accords with my experience in the 
studio, where the ‘leap’ from mind to matter, from an interior phenomenon (perhaps a 
combination of (previous) thought and (present) energy) to marks on the page, is precisely what 
can happen in the un-thought stage of the process of image making. It has both an ‘ontological’ 
aspect as being the birth of something ‘in the world’, and an ontological basis as being a 
‘search’ for a form of ‘truth’ because insofar as it touches on the ‘real, I believe, it becomes 
interesting in some way, to the artist as both maker and viewer, and/or to the viewer as one who 
wonders.166 
 
2.3     Caveat 
Lacan’s ideas are of value to me as an image maker in terms of his concepts of the Other 
(unconscious) as the locus of the symbolic, lack and desire as being the cause of the conquest of 
this symbolic, and the symbolic as a transindividual phenomenon. This provides a theoretical 
basis for communication by way of the symbolic, and for the basis and definition of the 
symbolic as a phenomenon. Linking the symbolic so closely with the unconscious, as Lacan 
does, makes it more understandable that an ‘un-thought’ stage of image making should be seen 
to be of importance, insofar as here the real may be better able to ‘permeate’ the symbolic.  
 
Lacan’s ideas provide a basis for understanding why some image making can be more 
affecting than others, in terms of fullness or emptiness. His ideas about the chain of signifiers 
and the motivation behind making images are useful, for instance in the sense exemplified by 
Beuys’ early drawing (for instance as meaning ‘evolving’). I return to this below by way of 
Lyotard’s ideas.  
 
However, in the present context of the un-thought stage of image making, for me there 
are anomalies in Lacan’s schema. The descriptions of the lamella in relation to sexual desire can 
 
 
                                                          
166 Lacan posits that ‘truth’ is closely related to ‘desire’. I consider this relation earlier and in the next chapter. 
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be opaque. For example, in the quotation from Lacan (see Section 2.1.4) about the 
lamella, the leap I find problematic is precisely exemplified in the leap between two adjacent 
sentences. One sentence is: ‘It is the libido, qua pure life instinct …[it] has need of no organ, 
[and is] simplified, indestructible life.’ The next sentence is: ‘It [the libido] is precisely what is 
subtracted from the living being by virtue of the fact that it is subject to the cycle of sexual 
reproduction.’ While immortality may be lacking, it is less tenable in Lacan’s own terms to 
describe the life force as ‘subtracted’, since it is, also, paradoxically, with us, even if only until 
death. In my view, confusing immortality with life force, as Lacan appears to be doing, reflects 
the very problem with his notion that desire rests on a basis of lack. The life force is not lacking, 
indeed it can be seen as embodying the notion of desire, as is articulated, in their various ways, 
by both Jean-Francois Lyotard, and the joint authors Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, and 
discussed in Chapter Two, Section 2. In the next section Lyotard’s ideas help to articulate my 
misgivings about Lacan’s concepts of lack and desire, the idea of lack as the basis of the 
unconscious and of desire resulting only from lack. In the present context, for instance, this does 
not encompass the surprise and pleasure, and the resulting ‘harmonious’ images that can arise in 
connection with the un-thought stage.167 
 
 
Section 3:   Lyotard: contestations 
 
 
3.1   Libido or lack as the basis of unconscious? 
 
J.-F. Lyotard contests Lacan’s concept of lack as a basis of the unconscious. For Lyotard 
the concept of the libido assumes a more direct relationship to the idea of energy, thus 
emphasizing a notion of the (physically) quantitative rather than (mentally) qualitative aspect of 
the psyche. He proposes an ‘economy’ of dispersal, concentrations and intensities of this energy, 
developing Freud’s ‘economic’ model of the psyche and as contesting Lacan’s ‘constant force’ 
of desire.168 He disputes Lacan’s notion of lack as the basis of the unconscious by arguing that 
because lack is by definition a negativity, it is theoretically impossible to propose it as a basis of 
the unconscious.169 This is on the grounds that Freud’s definitive ‘characteristics’ of the 
                                                          
167 I mean the word ‘harmonious’ here as indicative of some underlying order, for instance as discussed by A. 
Ehrenzweig as I consider in Chapter Three, Section 3. 
168 See, for instance, Freud, ‘Interpretation’, Chapter 7. 
169 J-F. Lyotard, “Beyond Representation”, The Lyotard Reader, ed. A. Benjamin (Oxford, Blackwell 
Publishers, 1989). This article was first published in 1974 as Foreword to Anton Ehrenzweig, ‘The 
Hidden Order of Art’ (in the French edition), which is discussed in Chapter Three, Section 3. 
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unconscious include notions not only of there being, in the process and content of the 
unconscious, no dealing with time, space and so on, but equally no negation. Lyotard states that: 
 if it is indeed true that the primary processes know no negation, then in the 
economy of drives there is not, nor can there ever be, an absence of the mother, or especially 
an absence of mother (an absent object); nor will there ever be a person to suffer from 
absence.170  
 
In other words, the notion of lack, for Lyotard, fails as a notion intended to explain the 
basis of the unconscious, both from the perspective of the idea of the lost ‘archaic mother’ (or 
any lack), and from the perspective of the subject who ‘suffers’ lack (the unconscious ‘includes’ 
no absence or contradiction). Lyotard argues that in the field of the unconscious (with reference 
to the drive), because of the impossibility of negation in the economy of drives, pain and 
pleasure must therefore be seen as equally affirmative. However, for Lyotard it is true that our 
re-presentations of pain and pleasure are not equally affirmative. In this way he argues that the 
unconscious, and unconscious desire, are not equivalent to the ways in which we make and 
interact with (their) re-presentations. He says:  
we must deal in some other way with the place and role of representations […] in 
relation to drives; not as substitutes concealing objects or the goals of drives, but as 
concentrations of libidinal energy on the surfaces of the visible and the articulable – 
surfaces that are themselves part of the endless and anonymous film of primary drives.171  
 
He argues here for a notion of libidinal energy, rather than the idea of lack or absence, as 
a basis for understanding the notion of the unconscious, and indeed of the value and place of 
‘representations’ or the symbolic. On the other hand, he substantiates Lacan’s notion that the 
symbolic as re-presentations of the real (as pleasure and pain) do not encompass the real itself. 
 
Lyotard, in support of his claim that ‘representations’ (‘symbols’), are themselves 
concentrations of libidinal energy, extends the notion of ‘disreal spaces’. His reference to 
‘disreal spaces’ includes sacrificial areas, temples, theatres, doctors offices. These, he claims, 
are regions ‘where desire can play in all its ambivalence’ because of the substitution of 
‘accepted images’ for ‘proper objects of desire’. His argument can be extended to apply to 
making (mimetic) images, such that making a work of art is equivalent to making a sign (in the 
linguistic sense of the word), because it replaces something (for instance a landscape in the 
country) for someone (in this case, the maker of the image). But, he explains: ‘for the student of 
the libidinal economy this function of the image or sign is not pertinent because it presupposes 
what one must try to produce by a theoretical argument: negativity’ (that is, the ‘absent’ 
                                                          
170 Lyotard, “Beyond”, 159.   
171 Lyotard, “Beyond”, 160. (My emphases.) 
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landscape), which thus involves ‘all the components of the theatrical space’.172  For me this 
would be an actor-spectator (the image maker), an object-sign (the image being made), a 
memory (an (absent) landscape), a final affect or goal (catharsis or the final image). Lyotard 
uses this model of theatrical (disreal) space (where rational considerations can be suspended) to 
emphasize his own critique of the ‘negativity’ of Lacan’s model (in its emphasis on the notion 
of lack, the absence of the ‘real’ object being re-presented), through which Lyotard’s ‘positive’ 
libidinal economy can be extended. In Lacan’s concept, claims Lyotard, the viewer must ‘go 
into’ the image to perceive or apprehend the meaning. Lyotard uses this argument to point out 
the dependence of Lacan’s model on representational (for instance theatrical) assumptions, 
which constitutes, claims Lyotard, a confusion between the unconscious itself, which rests on 
energy, and the realm of the symbolic, which rests on beliefs. Deleuze and Guattari, with their 
notion of schizoanalysis as discussed in the next chapter, also find Lacan’s use of lack 
problematic as a basis for the unconscious for similar reasons. In other words both Lyotard’s 
‘concentrations of libidinal energy’ and Deleuze and Guattari’s ‘schizoanalysis’ contradict the 
idea that lack belongs to an explanation of the basis of the unconscious. However, the notion of 
lack is not proved incorrect or useless as such, only inappropriate in the context of the basis of 
the unconscious. 
  
3.2   Libidinal energy and art works 
 
Having critiqued the notion of ‘lack’ and its overall ‘negativity’, Lyotard presents his 
‘positive’ idea of libidinal energy with regard to art works.  Rather than treat art as ‘images’ per 
se, distinguishing between their ideational content and their libidinal (aesthetic) content, he 
explains: ‘we should understand that their power to please resides wholly in the formal labour 
that produces them on the one hand and in the work of various kinds they stimulate on the 
other.’173 In this way, he supports his idea of a ‘surface’ of ‘libidinal energy’ as opposed to 
notions of ‘what appertains to truth on the one hand and what belongs to beauty or pleasure on 
the other’.174 If we were to see truth and beauty, not as comprising a binary opposition of 
individual unrelated attributes, but rather as being ‘united’ within the context of libidinal energy, 
then, he hypothesizes: 
It would become clear that in both cases, on both sides, we are dealing with 
transformations of libidinal energy and with devices governing these transformations – none 
of which, neither devices nor transformations, could be privileged and labelled as more 
profound than another, since they are all on the surface.175    
                                                          
172 Lyotard, “Beyond”, 160. 
173 Lyotard, “Beyond”, 159-160. (My emphases).   
174 Lyotard, “Beyond”, 160. 
175 Lyotard, “Beyond”, 159-160. 
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He is proposing that both ‘truth’ and ‘beauty’ in fact exist on the same ‘surface’ of 
libidinal energy, within various forms and strengths of transformations of energy.176 In addition 
I understand that he is (implicitly) issuing a challenge with regard to the un-thought stage, in 
terms of the meaning and import of ‘devices and transformations.’ The challenge he issues is 
this: 
Understanding will no longer be a matter of establishing an ultimate libidinal 
content (be it even a lack, the effect of an empty signifier) but rather of identifying, in all its 
ineffectual delicacy and complexity, the device by which the energy of drives is guided, 
blocked, freed, exhausted or stored up – in short channelled into extreme intensities.177 
 
And so, with his idea of ‘extreme intensities’ in the field of ‘libidinal aesthetics’, he 
refers to the identification of a device of ‘ineffectual delicacy and complexity’, which I regard as 
a challenge to my thetic question regarding image making: can I see the un-thought stage as a 
device for channelling intensities of energy? His notion provides me with a better understanding 
of one purpose of the un-thought stage of my image making model (which I have claimed as 
agency), since ‘channelling into extreme intensities’ is not conceived to be a conscious process. 
I use this as a guiding question as the thesis develops. 
 
3.3    Laxity and art-making 
 
In terms of the process of image making, Lyotard proposes the idea of the artist entering 
a state of ‘laxity’, which results in lowering the barriers that separate ‘exterior from interior 
reality’. This ‘lowering of barriers’ again gives prominence to Lyotard’s notion of a single 
libidinal surface ‘without thickness or limits’, which results in image making such that it: 
does not exist prior to what might be inscribed there by pen, brush, noise or voice, 
but is produced by the operations that transform affective intensities into colours, sounds, 
sentences. The artistic body extends beyond the body of the artist and beyond any body 
closed in on itself in its supposed three-dimensional identity. Freud said that there is 
communication within the unconscious or between one unconscious and another. There is 
nothing paradoxical in this if by communication we mean the transmission of intensities into 
new intensities and if we recognize that as it occurs such transmission produces its own 
                                                          
176 Lyotard, “Beyond”, 160. Note that David Maclagen, in his book Psychological Aesthetics, (London, Jessica 
Kingsley Publishers, 2001), agrees that aesthetics can usefully be seen as a reflection of feelings aroused by 
attributes embodied in a painting (by way of materials, etc.), rather than ‘attributes’ such as beauty and harmony, 
which are disembodied concepts. There is an intermingling of rational and irrational since all perception involves 
an interweaving between subject and object.  His book is parallel to my thesis in its interest in the psychoanalytic 
contributions to considering paintings. However, he concentrates on aesthetics as a subject (including the influence 
of the unconscious and ‘feelings’) and the viewer in relation to that, whereas my thesis is conceived from the point 
of view of the artist, in the process of making images. 
177 Lyotard, “Beyond”, 159. (My emphases.)  See also, for instance, Lyotard’s analysis of the dream-work, 
discussed in Chapter Three, Section 2. 
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medium: the heterogeneous surface that includes skins, organs, streets, walls, canvases, 
instruments.’178   
 
For Lyotard, because paintings do not ‘stand for’ anything, they simply ‘stand’, then 
communication becomes a transmission of intensities into new intensities, and the ‘device’ or 
operation which helps to enable this transmission is a lowering of barriers between interior and 
exterior reality, by means of ‘laxity’.179 The basis of his notion is a point that Freud makes 
concerning laxity, which Lyotard paraphrases: ‘The ability to sublimate is associated with a 
certain laxness […] a laxness in repression that normally ends conflict.’180 For me, Lyotard’s re-
inscription of this state of ‘laxity’ relates closely to the un-thought stage of image making with 
regard to ‘relaxing’ rational thought, ‘giving way to the reserves of energy’ and to the devices 
that bring areas of intensity to this energy. This is opposed to the idea that image making 
occupies only an arena of logic and rationality, by way of thought and representation, and 
involves only a rational topic/plan and/or judgement. Lyotard discusses the importance of the 
concept of extreme intensities by considering libidinal energy as the basis for his major claims 
for art. He says: ‘It [the importance] is in this region of contact, this laxist libidinal space or 
region of free displacement potential that is always at work in art, or at least in true artistic 
initiatives.’181 So he recommends that we abandon the (‘safe’) category of ‘works of art’ or of 
signs in general, and that we instead recognize as truly artistic ‘nothing but initiatives or events 
in whatever domain they may occur.’182 In this sense, image making for Lyotard is a ‘region of 
contact’ with a ‘laxist libidinal space’, a place of ‘free displacement potential’. Art becomes 
defined not in terms of ‘notions [knowledge] but as initiatives or events [intensities], in 
whatever domain they occur’. For Lyotard, then, image making is an ‘enabling’ of the 
metamorphosis of the libidinal into the pictorial in terms of areas of intensity by means of 
‘devices’ such as ‘laxness’.183 I see this occurring in the un-thought stage; some particular 
devices for this enabling are seen in the Chapter Three where I discuss the views of Anton 
Ehrenzweig. 
 
 
                                                          
178 Lyotard, “Beyond”, 164. This is discussed also in Chapter Four, from Bracha Lichtenberg Ettinger’s point of 
view. 
179 A term Lyotard borrows from Freud. 
180 Freud, “Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis”, 1917, in Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological 
Works of Sigmund Freud, ed. J. Strachey (London, Hogarth Press, 1957). This is as understood by Lyotard, 
“Beyond”, 162. 
181 Lyotard, “Beyond”, 165. 
182 Lyotard, “Beyond”, 165. 
183 The critique one could make of this proposal is the one that Freud makes of Jung’s notion  of a ‘life energy’, 
which is opposed to the more specific ‘sexual energy’ that Freud proposes. Freud believed that the notion of life 
energy was too broad and non-specific to emphasize the particular aspects that he saw as being of over-riding 
importance, for instance the basis of sexual energy for drives, the objects of drives, and so on. The more radical 
reply to that observation is that perhaps there is no need for an array of drives and partial-drives. 
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Section 4:    Summary and implications 
 
In terms of the basis of the unconscious, the subject of this chapter, I have now 
considered Lacan’s ideas of lack and desire. He exemplifies the notion of lack as ‘phallic’ or 
‘anterior’. He proposes further that ‘desire’ is a result (only) of this lack, and consists of 
pervasive and on-going, but futile, attempts to assuage the lack. There is one lack and one 
desire; for him these two together form the basis of the unconscious. The argument as it relates 
to image making has several aspects. Lacan’s concepts of lack and desire provide the foundation 
for his notion of the ‘conquest’ of the symbolic as each individual attempts to re-present, 
understand and communicate the ‘real’. Thus there is a close association between Lacan’s 
concepts of the unconscious as the symbolic and fear/death. He proposes that the symbolic can 
not encompass the real and that as such the symbolic can be seen as a wall, both mediating and 
hindering communication between individuals. In this sense, the un-thought stage can be seen as 
unconscious agency, in terms of lack and desire. However I believe there is more to art than the 
position of the ‘symptomatic’; as I have indicated, I question this as a complete explanation of 
the un-thought stage of the process of image making. 
 
Lyotard’s ideas have addressed the caveats I raised earlier from my viewpoint in the 
studio, namely the notion of lack as the basis of the unconscious, and the notion that desire is 
solely a result of lack. For Lyotard there is another (than lack) idea of the origin of the 
unconscious, and there is another (than Oedipal) context for the notion of desire. He sees the 
libido as a flow of energy, and itself  the basis of the unconscious. 
 
  At this point, I see these ideas of Lyotard’s as developing a critique of that aspect of 
Lacan’s hypothesis of desire that depends solely on lack. By this means Lyotard is able to 
emphasize the centrality of the drive to issues of cultural productivity (for me, image making) 
such that the notion of lack is seen as if not unnecessary, at least not requisite. In other words 
lack can (sometimes) be replaced, or influenced, by the force of libido and other ‘devices’ that 
channel this energy into ‘extreme intensities’. Lyotard describes image making in terms of 
intensities of libido metamorphosing into art objects. In this way I see him dealing with what I 
am concerned with in this thesis, the appearance of aspects of the ‘real’ in image making. This 
can be seen as supporting my idea of the un-thought stage as agency, but disputing Lacan’s 
related notion of lack and its centrality as the origin of the unconscious. Lyotard posits as a 
platform for the process of making art what he terms the ‘laxity’ of the artist, which, for me, is 
closely related to my idea of the un-thought stage.  
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The argument so far, then, involves Lacan’s notion of the basis of the unconscious, lack 
and its consequent desire, with many useful implications, including the conquest of the 
symbolic. Lyotard contests Lacan’s notion of lack as the basis of the unconscious by 
introducing instead the idea of the libido itself in this role. My contention is that while some of 
Lacan’s ideas are useful in general and to image making in particular, they do not illuminate 
some aspects of the process of image making as I see it in the studio. The ideas of Lacan and 
Lyotard appear to be mutually exclusive in that without ‘lack’ and the Oedipus complex, for 
Lacan, ‘desire’ would not arise and nor would the symbolic develop and be ‘conquered’ by 
individuals. But Lyotard argues that ‘lack’ as a basis of the unconscious is theoretically 
impossible and practically insupportable. At this point, I have left these two sets of ideas in 
contention, awaiting discussion of further relevant ideas in the next chapter. 
 
 
Section 5:   Next chapter 
 
The next chapter considers the ‘content’ of the unconscious, focusing on Lacan’s 
concepts of the signifier and the Other. In terms of the un-thought stage of image making, there 
is a consideration of what is useful and what is less useful within his relevant ideas. In addition, 
I consider what aspects of Lacan’s ideas can be seen to be ‘extended’ by accommodating ideas 
of Lyotard, and of Deleuze and Guattari, within the context of my continued emphasis on ‘new’ 
forms of ‘knowing’ or modes of attention. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
84
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
______________________________________CHAPTER_TWO 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
85
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter Two considers a second aspect of Lacan’s notion of the gaze, the ‘content’ of 
the unconscious, including signifiers, the ‘Other’, in connection with their relevance for the un-
thought stage of image making. Lyotard, as well as Deleuze and Guattari, provide critiques of, 
and extensions to, Lacan’s ideas. 
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Chapter Two:  The Unconscious – Content               
 
In Chapter One I established a foundation for the thesis by discussing Lacan’s idea of the 
basis of the unconscious, since the unconscious is itself an integral part of his notion of the gaze.  
In addition, I questioned his concept of lack as a basis for the unconscious, and as the ‘cause’ of 
desire, by means of Lyotard’s contestations in terms of libidinal energy. However, in Chapter 
One I did not propose a resolution of these seemingly conflicting ideas.  My aim in this chapter 
is three-fold. One is to discuss Lacan’s notions of the ‘content’ of the unconscious on the basis 
of the foundations laid in Chapter One. The second is to contest certain elements of these 
notions of ‘content’. The third is to propose a means of seeing these two contesting sets of ideas, 
which include the two sets seen in Chapter One, as accommodating each other under the 
‘umbrella’ of a third set of ideas, rather than remaining binary opposites. The aim in this chapter 
(and the thesis as a whole) is not so much a comfortable ‘synthesis’ of varying views, but a 
means of seeing these varying views as individual parts of a ‘larger whole’, where the parts can 
all contribute to the larger picture. 
 
Lacan makes use of the word ‘content’ in relation to the unconscious in a number of 
ways which are relevant for the process of image making. In one sense, he uses this word to 
mean ‘text’ of the unconscious, in the sense of mental ‘storage’ (rather like the 0’s and 1’s in a 
computer). Note that this ‘text’ is not understood as being equivalent to a piece of writing, or 
(any) discourse, but as ‘unrealized’ text as discussed below. Lacan refers to this ‘text’ as 
‘signifiers’ because, like the basis of computer language as 0’s and 1’s, this ‘text’ of the 
unconscious does not encompass meaning (signified).184 A second way he uses the word 
‘content’ is in terms of ‘subject matter’. This refers to two component concepts, ‘the Other’, and 
‘censored chapters’.  For Lacan, as we have seen, the word ‘Other’ with a capital ‘O’ includes 
his notion of the realm of the symbolic, which he defines as ‘a transindividual phenomenon 
insofar as it is particularized in each individual’.185 A third sense of the ‘content’ of the 
unconscious for Lacan is in terms of ‘process’, which is the subject of Chapter Three. 
 
 
                                                          
184 In general (Saussurian) linguistic sense, a sign is seen as a combination of signifier (as for instance sound) and a 
signified (meaning). Lacan divides these attributes and refers to signifiers on their own. 
185 Lacan, ‘Ecrits’, 49. Lacan also writes:  ‘We must distinguish two others, at least two – an Other with a capital O, 
and an other with a small o, which is the ego. In the function of speech, we are concerned with the Other.’  
(‘Seminar II’, 236).   
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Section 1:  Unconscious as the ‘unrealized’ 
 
Musing again in the studio, I consider the question of ‘content’. How to consider image 
making in terms of it being influenced by the ‘content’ of the unconscious, by definition, 
unknowable, unspeakable? Content…what is content? Could it be an encapsulated idea, which 
can be somehow ‘caught’ in images? The more I try to control it rationally, the more elusive the 
results. It seems to me, as I ponder, that words and images possess a seemingly irrational and 
unpredictable dimension of references and resonances. Is it possible to access or ‘allow’ the 
unconscious to become in some way ‘present’, to recognise it for what it is, and to ‘understand’ 
its manifestation? The mystery of the unspeakable… 
 
1.1   The signifier 
 
My aim in this section is to consider Lacan’s concept of the signifier, in its relevance 
both to his understanding of the unconscious, and to my understanding of the un-thought stage 
of image making. The notion of the signifier is important to this thesis because, by this means, 
mark making can be seen to be related to (mental) signifiers as the ‘text’ of the unconscious 
‘manifested’ materially on the artistic support. Lacan explains his concept of the signifier in two 
ways that are relevant to my thesis, experientially and linguistically. The experiential point of 
view has to do with perception and memory, and the ‘traces’ involved. The linguistic point of 
view is related to memory and its implications in terms of ‘content’ of the unconscious. From 
these ‘definitions’ there emerge a number of implications for the un-thought stage of image 
making. 
 
1.1.1   Perception and the relevance of ‘the story’ – the experiential point of view 
 
 What does Lacan mean by the term ‘signifier’?186 Basically, he refers to signifiers as 
‘unrealized’ in the sense that they do not include ‘meaning’. In one sense, Lacan uses Freud’s 
understanding of the connection between perception and memory to consider what I term the 
‘experiential’ basis for the signifier. For Freud, images and events from the preceding day can 
form part of latent dream content. Lacan adopts Freud’s idea that a mental ‘trace’ manifests 
somewhere between perception and consciousness (therefore being ‘unconscious’) as a basis of 
                                                          
186 In classical linguistics, a signifier is ‘attached’ to a signified to form a sign – in other words a physical sound or 
image is attached to an idea to form a symbol, which has become a culturally agreed ‘notation’ for an idea/thing. 
Lacan’s proposal ‘detaches’ the signifier from the ‘meaning’ such that the signifier is then ‘unrealized’ in terms of 
meaning, and he refers to this as the ‘pure signifier’. This is differentiated from the rhetoric, the ‘meaning’ that 
might be revealed when interpreting a dream, for instance.  
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the transfer of material from external visual cognition to mental recognition and memory. Lacan 
also adopts Freud’s ‘need to make an absolute separation between perception and 
consciousness’. In other words, in order for these traces of perception to pass into memory, 
‘they must first be effaced in perception and reciprocally.’187 This happens in a synchronous 
fashion. However, Lacan, moving away from Freud, ‘re-inscribes’ these traces of perception as 
‘signifiers’. Furthermore there is the important point that, for Lacan, not only synchrony but 
diachrony is involved. This is by virtue of there being analogous layers of traces that are 
associated with each ‘trace’.188 I see this as ‘reflections and refractions’ of perception. Lacan 
argues that the signifiers constitute themselves in simultaneity ‘only by virtue of a very defined 
structure of a constituent diachrony.’ In other words, there exists a ‘story’ or concept to hold 
them together and relate them.189 This is an important point in that it implies some sort of 
connecting ‘system’ between certain signifiers that is not implied in the notion of ‘pure 
signifier’. This ‘connecting system’, as a network of associations, allows scope for a concept 
that allows for subsequent ‘re-attachment’ of signifier with signified, except, I believe, for the 
important matter of the actions of the primary processes, which presumably would not take 
account of these ‘connections’ and they would be lost.190 In any case, since the emergence of the 
‘signifier’ is ‘between’ perception and the conscious mind, and therefore not in a 
conscious/rational arena, I propose that this emergence relates to my un-thought stage. For 
example, as a result of these ideas, the un-thought stage might be seen as a locus for the 
formation, and even association, of signifiers, within the process of image making, congruent 
with the formation of signifiers as a result of perception. The further step implied here, that of 
the signifiers being ‘grouped’ by an overarching ‘story’, can add a complexification to the 
spiralling of the three stages of image making proposed in my Introduction. This I consider 
further in Chapter Three, Section 3, with the discussion of the relevant ideas of Ehrenzweig. His 
notion of syncretistic scanning can be seen to assume and accommodate some such ‘connecting 
story’, while for Lacan this is more problematic.   
 
1.1.2   Memory – the linguistic point of view 
 
                                                          
187 Lacan, ‘Seminar XI’, 46. 
188 Lacan, ‘Seminar XI’, 46. 
189 R. Barthes, “Rhetoric”. In his analysis of the rhetoric of the image, Barthes suggests the image is held together 
by means of a ‘field’, such as a concept or story, within which to ‘read’ or understand it.  However this raises the 
question: how can a ‘story’ (discourse) be seen to exist in Lacan’s notion of the unconscious? Lacan is specific, as 
we see below, in saying the unconscious is not a discourse. This is discussed further in Chapter Three, where 
Ehrenzweig’s notions of syncretistic scanning can be seen to provide a possible way forward. 
190 See Introduction, Section 5.1 for Freud’s version of primary processes. See Chapter Three, Section 1 for Lacan’s 
version. 
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Lacan also uses Freud’s ideas to consider the concept of signifier from another point of 
view, that of memory. Memory is an aspect of image making that is only implied in the 
description of the image making process in the Introduction, but which is nevertheless implicitly 
and intricately important. Lacan discusses Freud’s ideas about the ‘laying down’ of memory. 
For Freud this happens in four ‘stages’: 1-4 years, 4-8 years, pre-pubertal period, and period of 
maturity.191  Because of this, claims Freud, the consequent ‘laying down of the psyche’ involves 
a process of stratification. Freud’s final point, which is the most riveting for Lacan, is that these 
memory traces, at each stage, are subjected to a rearrangement in accordance with fresh 
circumstances – in fact to a re-transcription. What Lacan finds important is Freud’s statement: 
‘what is essentially new about my theory is the thesis that memory is present not once but 
several times over, that it is laid down in various kinds of indications.’192 These kinds of 
‘indications’ are various types of mnemonic inscriptions employed by individuals as they 
mature, which influence both how memory is laid down and on what basis its content is ordered. 
The important point here is Lacan’s interpretation of Freud’s ideas: as memories pass from one 
stage of development to another, and, as they are rearranged, the signified may not get carried 
across with the signifier. This is the basis of Lacan’s ‘linguistic’ explanation for his use of the 
term ‘signifier’ – the signifier which has lost its meaning. Furthermore, for Lacan, this: ‘is 
where any explanation of the existence of repression has to begin.’193 The idea of the possibility 
of the ‘readjustment’ of memory, as such, is consistent with Lacan’s basic principles about the 
psychoanalytic ‘talking cure’, in that memory can be ‘changed’ in retrospect, by learning and 
realization; and that this ‘readjustment’ can work to modify symptoms, views, character traits 
and dream content. Lacan’s idea is that this ‘readjustment’ happens in psychoanalysis with the 
help of analysis, the re-attachment of signified to signifier, by way of association of ideas. I 
believe that such ‘readjustment’ happens in everyday life, particularly relevant here in the 
process of image making, in that signifiers can be manifested as marks, but meaning can 
become ‘re-attached’ as the making progresses. A final image may bear little relation to the 
initial version, not only visually, but in ‘meaning’ and ‘resonance’. The points here are that 
memory is implicit in image making, for instance as being the source of many unconscious 
‘signifiers’, and additionally that memory has implications in terms of development and re-
assessment of ideas as the un-thought stage is en-acted and the spiral stages of image making 
proceed. 
                                                          
191 Fleiss letter # 51. For references to Freud’s letters, see Lacan, ‘Seminar III’, 180.  
192 Lacan, ‘Seminar III’, 180. 
193Lacan, ‘Seminar III’, 182. However, note that Freud does not mention here that  ‘meaning’ is being lost, just ‘re-
written’, in that memories are ‘re-organized’. See “A Note On The Mystic Writing Pad”, 1905, Standard Edition of 
the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, ed. J. Strachey (London, Hogarth Press, 1957) Volume 19, 
227. Here Freud describes perception as being ‘written’, then (partially) erased and over-written. But, he says, there 
is a sub-layer of the ‘writing pad’, and likewise of memory, which can retain a ‘permanent trace’. This is not 
emphasized by Lacan. 
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1.1.3     Unconscious comprised of signifiers and structured like a language 
 
What role does the signifier play in the unconscious? There is another side to Lacan’s 
argument about the content of the unconscious. He sees there is a ‘primary, classificatory 
function’ in terms of the ‘structure’ of this ‘text’ of signifiers.194 He implies that this is due to 
the ‘primary classificatory system of the pre-cultural’, by which he means that nature provides 
‘signifiers’ which allow the overlay of culture on nature, in other words the ‘innate’ prohibition 
of incest.195 He proposes that this primary system is the basis of the ‘organization’ of the 
unconscious. He sees this manifested in the unconscious as a combinatory operation functioning 
in a ‘pre-subjective way’, which assures us that there is ‘beneath the term unconscious, 
something definable, accessible and objectifiable.’196 These combinatory operations are the 
primary processes of condensation, displacement, secondary revision and the attribute of 
figurality as discussed by Freud in the dream-work.197 Lacan re-inscribes these processes in 
terms of linguistic tropes. He speaks specifically of metaphor and metonymy. ‘Metonymy’ as a 
combinatory linguistic operation, for Lacan, is that by which the part is taken for the whole – 
e.g. ‘sails’ taken to mean ‘ships’ in the statement ‘thirty sails’ – a word-to-word connection.198 It 
is the combination of one term with another to produce an ‘effect’. Lacan’s proposal is that 
‘condensation’ is a form of metonymy.199 ‘Metaphor’ is the conjunction of two signifiers such 
that there is a disparity of images signified. Lacan explains that this happens in such a way that 
meaning:  
flashes between two signifiers, one of which has taken the place of the other in the 
signifying chain, the occulted signifier remaining present through its (metonymic) 
connection with the rest of the chain [of signifiers].200  
 
In other words, for Lacan, ‘displacement’ is a form of metaphor. He proposes that the 
‘symptom’ is a type of metaphor, such that something (body part or function) that cannot be 
‘allowed’ to signify ‘acquires’ a substituted term. He proposes further that ‘desire’, as seen 
earlier in the notion of the ‘circling’ of desire, is a type of metonymy, which, as such, becomes 
                                                          
194 Lacan, ‘Seminar XI’, 21. 
195 Lacan, ‘Seminar XI’, 20. 
196 Lacan, ‘Seminar XI’, 21. He goes on to say that this notion does not include xome concepts Freud and others 
have attributed to the unconscious, such as the ‘creative imagination’. 
197 See Introduction, Section 5.1. 
198 Lacan, ‘Ecrits’, 157. 
199 Lacan, ‘Ecrits’, 258. 
200 Lacan, ‘Ecrits’, 157. (My addition.) The chain of signifiers is a reference to the word groupings and differences 
which constitute language, but which revolve around the one desire, and is discussed more fully below.  
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indestructible.201 This reference to linguistic tropes ‘used’ in the unconscious includes also 
Lacan’s discussion of ‘mechanisms of defence’ that can be seen within the arena of 
psychoanalytic practice. He sees these as being the ‘reverse side of the mechanisms of the 
unconscious’, and they include such linguistic tropes as ellipsis (dropping of words 
grammatically required but understood as if present), suspension, anticipation, digression, irony 
and retraction.202 In a somewhat altered sense, what Lacan describes as linguistic operations can 
be seen to be applicable in the context of image making. My interest is less in the conscious 
application of these ideas, more in the unconscious primary process sense. For instance, an 
image, or part of an image, can be seen as a metaphor for something else, even if that was not 
the conscious intention of the artist. 
 
Based on these observations, Lacan further proposes that the unconscious is ‘structured 
like a language’.203  This is clarified with the proviso that: ‘If I say that everything that belongs 
to [psycho-] analytic communication has the structure of language, this precisely does not mean 
that the unconscious is expressed in discourse.’204 In other words, while it is structured like a 
language, it is not ‘realized’ as a language, nor is it in the form of understandable discourse. 
Again he posits that with signifiers, meaning, as encompassed in discourse, is absent. 
 
It is useful to note in the reference to the ‘occulted signifier’ in the quotation above, the 
implication of a structure of signifiers, connected by means of metonymy, which also refers 
back to Section 1.1.1 and the ‘analogous layers of traces’. This is an exemplification of the idea 
of the unconscious as structured like a language. 
 
I find Lacan’s re-inscriptions of aspects of unconscious processes into linguistic 
modalities to be more restricted than Freud’s original ideas, in terms of complexity and richness 
of mental material. One example is that ‘text as signifier’ implies a paucity of detail and 
resonance not seen in Freud’s notions that include ‘ideas’ incorporating memory and affect. 
However Lacan’s concept of a complex ‘structure’ of the unconscious in terms of metaphor and 
metonymy can to some extent dilute my concerns, since the underlying (possibly complex) 
metonymic ‘associations’ provide his idea with resonances not immediately obvious.  
 
                                                          
201 Note that Lyotard, among others, critiques Lacan’s notions of metonymy and metaphor as being eccentric with 
regard to both Saussure and Jakobson.  However, for my purposes, the important point is that linguistic operations 
are understood to be taking place. The ‘circling of desire’ is discussed in Chapter One, Section 2.2.1. 
202 Lacan, ‘Ecrits’, 169. 
203 Lacan, ‘Seminar XI’, 20. 
204 Lacan, ‘Seminar III’, 166. (My addition) 
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In any case, the concept of signifiers as being the unrealized ‘text’ of the unconscious is 
useful in relating them to mark-making within image making. ‘Text’ in image making, by 
extension and in the present context, can be marks, colours, materials, or erasures, which may be 
signifiers, but which do not, on their own, immediately ‘mean’ anything in the sense of 
discourse; this is ‘content’ as raw, and not immediately ‘meaningful’, material. Lacan proposes 
that in language the signifier has an ability to anticipate meaning by ‘unfolding its dimension 
before it’, for instance in the sense of a sentence beginning ‘I shall never…’.  He speaks of 
meaning (in words) in terms of the chain of signifiers in that it is in the chain of the signifier 
‘that meaning insists’, and yet, none of the individual elements of that chain ‘consists’ of the 
overall meaning being expressed.205 The mark-making ‘text’ emerging from the un-thought 
stage of image making can share this attribute.  
 
1.1.4      Signifiers and dreams 
 
As we have seen, one way that Freud studies the ‘content’ of the unconscious is by 
studying the ‘content’ of dreams (see Introduction, Section 5.1). Although by the time the dream 
is being ‘narrated’ it is already a ‘polluted’ or moderated medium, in that it is influenced by 
secondary revision as it emerges into, and is realized by, the conscious mind, it nevertheless 
includes two points of interest in the present context. First, Freud investigates dreams as a tool 
for better understanding the ‘text’ of the unconscious, since more direct access is denied, by 
definition. He does this by analysing and ‘interpreting’ each individual element of the dream 
and its narration. Lacan makes use of, and re-inscribes, these findings, as we see below. Second, 
in my view, Freud’s dependence on the relationship of dreams to the unconscious as a tool for 
investigation of the unconscious can be (further) extended to the relationship of the un-thought 
stage of image making to the unconscious, since the manifestation of images plays such a large 
part in dreams. I am not implying that this process of image making involves the conscious use 
of dream images. The point is that images manifesting in dreams and images manifesting in the 
un-thought stage of the process of image making can arise from the same source, the 
unconscious. In this sense, the psychoanalytic study of dreams can be helpful to my 
consideration of the process of image making, in the sense not of the meaning of dreams (or 
images), but in the sense of a basis for the emergence of images.206 
 
                                                          
205 Lacan, ‘Ecrits’, 153. 
206 There are differences between the interests and methods of surrealists and the present project. For instance, the 
surrealists believed in the power of erotic desire to ‘transform’ society in terms of the role of the ‘freeing’ of the 
individual, as noted in their manifestos (See Introduction).  The surrealists used actual dream images in their work. 
The present approach relies on a more questioning attitude to the underlying processes and content of the 
unconscious. 
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Lacan refers to the text of the dream, the dream content, as being the reflection of the 
text of the unconscious, in that both consist of signifiers. In the case of both the unconscious and 
dreams, the ‘text’ does not ‘make sense’ or constitute discourse. In manifest dream content, the 
‘rhetoric’, the ‘story’, may tell us one thing, while the underlying meaning, when analysed 
signifier by signifier, may be entirely different. In other words ‘content’ and ‘meaning’ are 
different attributes from one another. This emphasizes the point that ‘text’ as I am using the 
term here is not in any way equivalent to discourse or rhetoric. My understanding is that since 
signifiers are ‘unrealized’, in general they cannot be seen as related to each other (structured) in 
any ‘logical’ way. This is an important notion for this thesis, in that, while content and meaning 
are different attributes, the important questions include whether, in the unconscious, there is any 
‘logical’ or over-riding relationship between them, and if so how robust this relationship might 
be, and in what way(s) it might be manifested. We saw in Section 1.1.1 that there may be 
‘associations’ between signifiers. The problematic with this is that the primary processes can be 
seen to destroy these associations. Within Lacan’s thinking, the idea of associations between 
signifiers is interesting in relation to image making and the un-thought stage because content 
with no attached meaning implies chaos, and yet he speaks of ‘interpretation’ of signifiers 
included in dreams and symptoms. I want to consider the relationship of signifiers as they 
appear on the artistic support as marks (and so on). Can there be seen (theoretically) to be a 
relationship or not (e.g. is it just chaos)? This ‘relationship’ is what I refer to as a ‘harmony’ of 
marks as the thesis progresses. For me these are questions to be asked of the unconscious itself, 
and of the dreamwork, as clues to the un-thought stage of image making. In other words, in 
terms of the enigma of making art, does the un-thought stage reflect a chaotic unconscious in the 
sense of primary processes comprising mechanical and ‘meaningless’ combinations and 
displacements? Or does the un-thought stage involve a more cohesive and potentially 
meaningful process (as proposed for instance by Anton Ehrenzweig and discussed in Chapter 
Three)?  
 
1.1.5    Signifier as the unrealized 
 
Having discussed aspects of Lacan’s concept of the signifier, what then is its ‘function’? 
The notion of signifier has a number of implications and cross-references for Lacan. Because he 
proposes that the unconscious is ‘made up’ of signifiers, he claims that the content of the 
unconscious is: 
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neither being nor non-being, but the unrealized […] by definition what happens there is 
inaccessible to contradiction, to spatio-temporal location and to the function of time [and is] 
also indestructible.207 
 
 This is a logical result of his idea that signifiers do not encompass meaning. It is also a 
re-inscription of Freud’s notion of the primary processes in terms of what it is that they process, 
since Freud did not speak of signifiers as such, but rather psychic events, memories, affect (as 
seen in Section 5.1 regarding the dream-work in my Introduction). In my view, Lacan’s notion 
of the ‘unrealized’ allows expression and affect to be under-theorized. In other words, because 
signifiers are seen as re-presentation, and because re-presentations are distanced from the real, 
signifiers would appear to be totally divorced from any direct relationship to affect. In the 
studio, expression and what I term ‘harmony’ (the opposite of chaos) are of importance to me, 
so this under-theorization is problematic. This topic is considered a number of times in differing 
contexts in the following chapters. What is important here is Lacan’s further point that the 
unconscious (notwithstanding the linguistic points made in the next section) is radically 
different from the field of the conscious (or the preconscious), in terms of both logic and 
structure. In positing this radical alterity, Lacan explains that the preconscious and the 
unconscious cannot be seen as related because the preconscious material is already manipulated 
and revised, in other words to some extent ‘realized’, with attached ‘meaning’ (signified). I see 
the idea of a ‘radical alterity’ between unconscious and conscious material as being based, in 
Lacan’s thinking, on an assumption that there is a predominance of signs, rather than signifiers, 
in the conscious and pre-conscious, whereas the reverse would be the case in the unconscious. 
There is, in addition, the notional effect of the primary processes breaking up and condensing 
any ‘associations’ of signifiers in a non-logical and non-meaningful manner, theoretically 
resulting in complete chaos. 
 
1.1.6    Signifiers and meaning, the chain of signifiers 
 
This leads to a preliminary consideration of the connection between signifiers and 
meaning. According to Lacan, signifiers are (sometimes) formed of associations of traces of 
perception. Such a network of signifiers can be seen as unrealized ‘thoughts’. My question is - 
can we see signifiers, or associations of signifiers, as ideas?208  And how would ‘meaning’ be 
related to this? For me the notion of ideas includes the notion of meaning. As I indicated above, 
even if there is a complex network of signs/signifiers, it seems to me it could still be prey to 
primary processes, which result in ‘randomness and chaos’. From my point of view, as signifiers 
                                                          
207 Lacan, ‘Seminar XI’, 131. (My additions.) 
208 Lacan, ‘Seminar XI’, 24-26. 
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‘emerge’ from the un-thought stage, as in (for Lacan) psychoanalytic interpretation and (for me) 
image making, their possible/probable meaning is unrealized. According to Lacan, meaning is 
not attached to signifiers that make up the ‘text’ of the unconscious, although as we have seen 
there may be ‘associations’ between signifiers. This implies that meaning is attached as or after 
the material ‘emerges’ from the unconscious. This would indicate that the first and/or third 
stages, the planning or judging stages (see my Introduction, Section 1.1) of image making are 
the relevant stages to relate to meaning, not the un-thought stage. Thus, meaning is outside my 
immediate focus on the un-thought stage. Nevertheless, I want to take a side-step to consider the 
attachment of signified to signifier here, as it introduces some ideas that are useful as the 
discussion progresses (see Section 1.1.7). Lacan explains that the signifier emerges as 
irreducible and non-sensical, in other words composed of non-meanings, un-realized, and, I 
would add, resulting from un-thought process.209 In this context, as developed in the thesis, ‘un-
thought’ implies mental, but non-rational, processing. How then does meaning become 
attached? Lacan’s notion of meaning is that in language it emerges in connection with the sign 
by means of differences from other signs, thus by means of a structure of signs, and it can do 
this in two particular ways. One of these is through the process of metonymy, the other is 
through the process of metaphor, so that both are a result of (or result in) linguistic structure. 
Metaphor, he says, occurs at the precise point at which sense emerges from non-sense, and it is 
effective in terms of the parallelism of the signifier with others in the same language, within the 
particularized arena of a given subject(s). ‘But’, he goes on to posit, ‘the whole signifier can 
only operate […] if it is present in the subject’. By this he means if the language is understood 
by the subject, ‘and has thus passed over to the level of the signified’, then that meaning has 
become ‘attached’ for the subject. In other words, meaning of the signifier evolves out of the 
relationship of one signifier/sign to others in the ‘same language’. This can be seen in the notion 
of ‘association of ideas’ in psychoanalytic interpretations, for instance. But he also points out 
that ‘the structure of the signifying chain discloses […] the possibility […] insofar as I have this 
language in common with other subjects, to use it in order to signify something quite other than 
what it says.’210 This is metonymy. It implies, for one thing, that, while the unconscious is 
comprised of un-meaningful signifiers, meaning ‘emerges’ both as a result of the subject and 
his/her grasp of the language, and of the structure of that language, or indeed the structure of the 
unconscious (as seen above), in the sense that the signifier can slip over various signifieds, 
always depending on the ability of other subjects to apprehend this within the bounds of their 
knowledge of the language. This is proposing that ‘meaning’ resides not only with a word/sign, 
                                                          
209 Lacan, ‘Ecrits’, 158.  
210 Lacan, ‘Ecrits’, 155. ‘Signifying chain’ here refers to the development of meaning, in terms of metonymy and 
metaphor, and the slippage of meaning occurring. 
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not only in the structure of differences of a particular language, but in addition within a 
‘collective history’ and particularized history of usage. Lacan posits this connection between 
signifier and meaning with reference to the problems in the analytic interpretation of dreams, 
which is not based on a ‘code’ of images to be ‘decoded’, but depends rather on associations 
provided by the client/patient.211 Jean Laplanche provides a thoughtful analysis in which he 
argues against the idea of psychoanalytic matters in general and dreams in particular being 
manifested in such a way as to be ‘interpretable’ in the sense of there being an over-code, or 
language, on which such an interpretation could be based. For Lacan the unconscious consists of 
seemingly inchoate associations of signifiers that following a ‘logic’ differing from our 
conscious rational logic, and that are accessible (if at all) only by ‘association of ideas’.  
 
Meaning in image making can arise from gesture, presence, erasure of marks, materials, 
colour and so on. Such meaning is not necessarily ‘realized’ as it emerges in the un-thought 
stage. 
 
This leads to another of Lacan’s concepts, the  ‘chain of signifiers’. This is closely 
related to the circling of desire, as we saw in Chapter One, Section 2.2.1. The realm of the 
symbolic is the never ending, and never succeeding, circling of symbols in an attempt to assuage 
lack in the realm of the real, our individual relationship to non-being. In other words this 
circling is driven by desire. Lacan states: ‘This attempted meeting is always a failed one, 
because the realm of the real contains no signifier’.212 In my view, images, as well as 
aspects/elements of images, can be thought of as signifiers circling metonymically in various 
contexts, attempting, and failing, to assuage lack in the realm of the real. This could be 
conceived of in terms of marks, where various marks can be tried; in terms of images, where 
different images are tried; in terms of particular signs or symbols; in terms of subject matter, and 
so on. In this sense, the ‘value’ for the artist is, as in any chain of signifiers, to keep trying. In 
each case, the next trial will be the one which truly expresses the idea ‘wanting’ to be expressed, 
the ‘being’ of the maker. Some attempts may be ‘closer’ to the ‘real’ than others, as we saw in 
Section 2.1 in Chapter One about full and empty speech/images. In this sense, image making 
itself, the process, the materials and the subject matter, can all be seen as dealing not only with 
signifiers, but also with chains of signifiers. The still unanswered problematic remains that, even 
                                                          
211 J. Laplanche, “Psychoanalysis as anti-hermeneutics”, Radical Philosophy, Vol 79 (Sept/Oct. 1996), 7-12. For 
me, image making shares these attributes, as I discuss in the next section. However, note that I am interested in the 
‘location’ of meaning only insofar as this can be seen to be included, or indicated, in signifiers as being the ‘text’ of 
the unconscious and therefore directly relevant to the un-thought stage. Insofar as meaning is located in ‘codes’ or 
linguistic structures in the conscious mind, it is outside the focus of my thesis.  
212 Freud called this the primal repressed. See for instance Freud, ‘Interpretation’, 399-402. 
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if it is accepted that some linguistic tropes are also appropriate to image making, where and how 
are affect and desire involved in the un-thought stage? 
 
1.1.7   Signifiers and the un-thought stage 
 
Lacan’s ideas about the circling of signifiers, and the unconscious as ‘structured like a 
language’, help to elucidate the un-thought stage as a necessary but indeterminate link between 
the unconscious mind and its manifestation in the on-going process of realization of image 
making. Earlier I posited that there is a predominance of signs in the pre-conscious/conscious 
mind, and a predominance of signifiers in the unconscious. In thinking about various linguistic 
tropes that can ‘happen’ in both unconscious and conscious arenas, the difference seems to me 
to lie not so much in the type of process (metaphor, metonymy) but in the level of meaning that 
is ‘attached’ to the signifier as it is being (mentally) ‘processed’. For instance, the linguistic 
trope of metaphor involving two signifiers, thus happening in unconscious mode, could be much 
more of a ‘wild card’ and produce more of a surprise than a metaphor involving two signs, 
happening within a rational arena and trailing their encumbrances of meanings along with them. 
This can be seen also in image making. ‘Meaning’ can restrict the placement of an object, for 
instance, in a mimetic image – a hand needs to be placed (in general) at the end of an arm. In 
language, even in something as experimental as ‘Finnegan’s Wake’, James Joyce is concerned 
to ‘invent’ words that combine several ‘known’ words and which carry reflections and 
refractions of the meanings of those words in their own right, thus complexifying the 
meaning(s) of the resulting invented word. This can be seen as the rational basis for the 
combinations, even though no doubt intuition also plays a role. However, in the un-thought 
stage of image making, marks as signifiers can be made without meaning being ‘attached’, until 
a later stage. In brief, I argue that rationality and the gestalt can severely limit the field of 
opportunity of slippage and surprise, and that the un-thought stage can enhance this field of 
opportunity. In one sense, this limitation might not be a bad thing when we consider Barthes’ 
idea of the ‘terror’ entailed for viewers when meaning is ‘not tied down’.213 Nevertheless, the 
relevance to some aspects of mark making and images is clear, for example, in the Joseph Beuys 
drawing, see Illustration 2.1 below, where some marks have ‘evolved’ into recognizable images, 
some have not. Some hover in between.214 In some cases an image maker wishes to ‘tie down’ 
implicit meanings, in some cases images are left more ‘open-ended’. 
 
                                                          
213 Barthes, “Rhetoric”, 39. 
214 See also the reproductions of the Beuys early drawings, 1.1 and 2.l, and further discussion in Section 1.1.8 
below. 
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1.1.8   ‘Truth and knowledge’ 
 
Lacan’s notions of ‘truth’ and ‘knowledge’ are relevant to this question of the field of 
opportunity for slippage and surprise. He says of the subject: he may not know his ‘beginnings’ 
(which is his truth that is itself inexpressible); he can only describe a chain of discourse (the 
order of the symbolic) around the real.215 In this way the chain of discourse circles and slips 
away from the real, the ‘truth’, and becomes instead ‘knowledge’, science, technology and the 
like, which is instead an attempt to ‘control’ the ‘world’ of the individual, and to ‘protect’ the 
individual from repressed and hidden traumas.216 Lacan’s terms ‘truth’ and ‘knowledge’, and 
their differences, give other clues as to his idea of the ‘contents’ of the unconscious. In one way, 
his ‘truth’ refers to the unconscious awareness of non-being (viz. the ‘lamella’) and its 
implications for the individual.217 In another way, truth refers to the unconscious desire for the 
lost (archaic) mother. In any case, for Lacan, in this context ‘truth’ always refers to the truth 
about desire and its engendering lack.218 ‘Truth’ is not always beautiful, he argues, not even 
always beneficial to learn. In addition, truth relates to each subject; it is a particularized matter, 
not a ‘universal truth’.219 For Lacan, desire, although ‘particularized’, is a basic aspect of the 
human condition. ‘Truth’ has to do with the ‘real’ (or desire/trauma), ‘knowledge’ has to do 
with the symbolic (or re-presentation). These ideas about truth and knowledge can be used to 
extend the understanding of image making as being a part of the ‘chain of signifiers’, like 
science, or any ‘knowledge’. This would be image making as (part of) a discourse. But these 
ideas may also, conversely, allow image making to be seen as a possible arena for a reflection of 
‘truth’. This can happen as the unconscious ‘irrupts’ (via what Lacan terms the ‘gap’) into 
images.220 Lacan proposes that this can happen in certain forms of language discourse, where 
the unconscious might irrupt, if circumstances permit, through witticisms, accidents, and slips of 
the tongue.221 It happens also in dream images, which leads to the idea that in image making too 
there is a relationship with Lacan’s idea that it is a direct connection with ‘desire’ in the 
unconscious that lends elements of ‘truth’ and ‘fullness’ to the results of image making. This I 
see as a result of the ‘un-thought’ stage, insofar as the suspension of rationality can allow the 
‘real’ more opportunity for manifestation. Image making, in terms of its link with the un-thought 
                                                          
215 Lacan conceives that truth and knowledge are located in non-communicating parts or aspects of the psyche, in 
terms of the orders of the real and the symbolic respectively.  
216 Benvenuto and Kennedy, The Works of Jacques Lacan  (London, Faber, 1986), 166.  
217 See the notion of the ‘lamella’, the ‘organ’, the ‘libido’, based on lack of immortality as discussed in Chapter 
One.  
218 Lacan, ‘Seminar XI’, 36. 
219 Evans, 215, taken from Lacan,  (untranslated) Seminar XVII, 122. 
220 See the discussion of the notion of ‘gap’, Chapter Three, Section 1.3.3, referring to a ‘point’ where 
aspects/contents of the unconscious may issue forth inadvertently from the unconscious. 
221 Lacan speaks of ‘true speech’ as being: ‘an ideal – a joining of one subject to another subject on the other side of 
the wall of language’. Lacan, ‘Book II’, 246. 
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stage, is also erratic, unpredictable and often untranslatable directly into ‘meaningful’ 
representation, either in making or understanding images. Truth and knowledge are exemplified 
for me with regard to images in that I see some as being ‘closer to truth’, for instance many of 
Beuys’ early drawings (see below). Other images are based much more on ‘knowledge’, such as 
anatomy charts or maps, a result of rational thought/knowledge, but without resonance or 
interest as art (as such) for me.222   
 
While I am speaking in this thesis from the point of view of the process of image 
making, I believe that it is possible in some images to see, as viewer, this process ‘in flight’. The 
idea of signifiers being manifested in image form is exemplified for me by an early drawing of 
Joseph Beuys, ‘Aus: Warmephysiologie’ (Illustration 2.1). Groups of marks can be seen in this 
drawing ranging from signifiers (no signified) to structures of signs (the overall drawing). It is 
as though the drawing were terminated before a final ‘editing’ stage. For me, this drawing is a 
juxtapositioning of the dim (column), mysterious (body with arrows), calm (curtain: soft pencil 
lines all vertical), fairly clear (standing figure), completely in-decipherable (mass at centre: a 
cliff or building, with perhaps road and tree or shield), and unclear (arms outstretched, or wings 
in motion), such that the drawing allows the viewer wide scope in terms of ‘attachment’ of 
meaning. There is no ‘mastery of technique’, no classical perspective, no clarity of message; it is 
open to interpretation. There is enough information to elicit ideas, but not enough to ‘tell’. In 
some ways this resembles a dream: elements that are somewhat focused intermingle with 
elements that are completely mysterious in a condensed manner, with no particular emphasis to 
one or the other, as they co-habit in the space or non-space of the picture plane. It appears to me 
that Beuys is using these drawings as a form of unconscious signifiers-into-marks-into-image 
process. In this sense, some of these marks are still signifiers for us as viewers, and perhaps for 
him as image-maker, while others have migrated into more ‘meaningful’ associations of marks. 
This drawing exemplifies how signifiers, and even accidents and ‘facture’, can be incorporated 
within the drawing itself and allowed to remain as such, rather than being ‘made into’ 
understandable signs, while at the same time including various ‘signs’ (i.e. the standing figure) 
and furthermore becoming a ‘system of signs’ working as an overall image. 
 
 
 
                                                          
222 J.-F. Lyotard, “Newman: the Instant”, The Lyotard Reader, ed. A. Benjamin, (Oxford, Blackwell, 1989). Note 
that here is another relevant use of the word ‘empty’, where Lyotard refers to Newman’s realization that the orange 
line in his first ‘zip’ painting, emptied out the painting. This I believe is in terms of the need for ‘interpretation’ or 
‘going into’ images, for instance when images are seen as being a re-presentation of a referent. Note that this is 
closely related to the discussion in Chapter One, Section 2.2, Full and Empty Images. 
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ILLUSTRATION  2.1 
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Although Lacan’s ideas about signifiers being ‘manifested’ with various degrees of 
‘truth’ are helpful in considering what can appear to be ‘non-sense’, there remain problematic 
areas. As one uses these ideas in a particular analysis, as for instance in this Beuys drawing, or 
in a dream, one feels that there is ‘something left out’, something to do with affect and 
excitement: visceral reactions.223 In other words the concept of signifiers de-emphasizes the 
influence of affect. Lacan discusses the links between signifier and meaning, but there is little 
consideration of the role of desire/affect in this role.224 In other words, the important question 
for me, at this point, is: are signifiers the only relevant content of the (linguistic) unconscious, 
and if so how does ‘affect’ enter the picture? Lyotard, and Deleuze and Guattari, again help to 
articulate my concerns (see Section 2 below). 
 
1.1.9   Communication and the ‘wall’ 
 
Moving on, still within the realm of Lacan’s thought, there is also a connection between 
signifier and the un-thought stage that has to do more specifically with the idea of 
communication. Communication is an aspect that is only implied in the descriptions of image 
making in my Introduction and in the discussion about phallic lack in Chapter One, Section 
2.1.1. Lacan explains that in communication there is an appropriate use of the ‘pure signifier’ 
whenever what is important is not the meaning of the message, but the fact that the message 
arrives.225 For instance, the communication of a neurotic symptom always represents the 
‘essential duality’ of signifier and signified, in that in presenting as a signifier with no signified, 
its importance as a message is that it ‘arrives’.226 It’s meaning is unknown at that point to the 
conscious minds of both analyst and patient. It is an ‘unknown knowledge’.227 In psychoanalysis 
it is only after analysis (via the methodology of interpretation by way of free association of 
ideas) has been ‘successful’ that the signified, the meaning of the symptom, can become 
connected to the signifier for the individual concerned.228 This can also be true in image making 
situations: the meaning of an image or of marks in an image can become clear(er) through a 
process of association of ideas. Lacan explains that the order of the signifier begins insofar as it 
differs from the order of ‘meaning’; the signifier signifies precisely nothing. The order of 
                                                          
223 It is possible to conceive of the ‘meaning’ being lost, but the ‘affect’ remaining.   
224 Although see ‘sexuality in the defiles of the signifier’ as he discusses it in Seminar  XI, where he relates desire 
and the signifier by means of the association of lack, desire, the subject and the signifier. 
225 Lacan, ‘Seminar III’, 200. 
226 Lacan, ‘Seminar III’, 167. 
227 Lacan, ‘Seminar III’, 189. 
228 However, in my view a paradox remains.  From the point of view of the unconscious, they were presumably 
always connected, otherwise how could the ‘connection’ be ‘re-established’? But from the inception of the 
symptom, albeit via a trace or a very circuitous connection/ history, this connection was lost, as in the explanation 
of re-transcription of memory just below. Yet it is proposed by Lacan that it is possible, by way of psychoanalysis, 
to re-connect them. See also Section 1.1.6 above. 
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meaning would ‘emerge’ within the structure of signs in language. This can be seen also in the 
case of images. The popular concept of effective communication requires transindividual 
meaning to be attached; the idea of the incoherent in communication can be explained by the 
lack of such meaning.229 One point of making art rather than advertising imagery is that art 
deconstructs the notion that communication by means of images is part of a rational, collective, 
easily decoded system. My point in terms of the un-thought stage is that it is difficult to do this 
effectively from within this rational, ‘easily decoded’ system. In this thesis, dreams are seen as a 
bridge to the better understanding of the formation of images insofar as certain images have an 
affinity with dreams in the sense that both encompass elements the (exact) ‘meaning’ of which 
is not immediately (or ever) obvious. Dreams are not always effective means of communication, 
even between dreamer and dream. Likewise, many images are ‘unclear’ in meaning as they are 
being made – indeed in the un-thought stage meaning is not an issue at all. What matters at that 
stage is the mark making itself. Later these marks can be thought of as ‘unrealized’ signifiers. 
This is related to Lacan’s idea of the symbolic as a ‘wall’, where it can function as a mediator 
for, and/or as a hindrance to, communication. Lacan’s notion of signifier opens language and 
image making to the ‘un-known’, the unrealized. Considering the signifier as a ‘cause’ of 
signification, or considering the signifier as existing with a potential but unrealized signified, for 
me, begins to get very close to the challenge of making images, insofar as the apparently 
meaningless within certain conditions can be ‘allowed’ as part of the process of image making.  
 
  The ‘wall’ in communication, and the potentiality of the signifier in the realm of 
the un-thought as the un-realized, can be exemplified by Cy Twombly’s painting, The Bay of 
Naples (Illustrations 2.2 and 2.3). Here I am again in the position of viewer of a completed 
painting, speculating about the process of making, even about what I term an un-thought stage 
of making. One reason I can do this is that the overall image is a compendium of marks, 
erasures, ‘gestures’ and so on such that, as with some of Beuys’ drawings, one can ‘see’ results 
of the process of making, since they are not painted over or out, but are still visible in the 
finished image. This painting can be seen to highlight both appearance (signifiers) and meaning 
(signification), and especially their interaction, in the sense that these two attributes do not 
always emerge in a connected manner. In other words, neither ‘images’ nor meanings always 
appear fully; there are elements of trace and absence; a sense of meaningful communication is 
sometimes unclear, unrealized. Looking at Bay of Naples, one sees pencil marks and paint 
marks scattered over a large, otherwise bare, stretched canvas. The canvas provides a luminous 
background, interrupted by the ‘detritus’ of marks. There are not only the contrasts between 
                                                          
229 The idea of communication is used here in a popular sense of ‘putting out ideas for the consideration of others’, 
whether visual or verbal, and implies a ‘system’ of ‘language’ of which all participants are aware. 
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painted marks and pencil marks, but between painted marks evidently applied by brush, tube or 
fingers (detail, Illustration 2.3). Although many of the marks do not consist of recognizable 
signs, nevertheless some structures of marks are recognizable enough to give a hint of what they 
might signify. Twombly’s work offers an approach to Lacan’s concept of the pure signifier in 
the sense that there are marks in the painting that have no immediately apparent attached 
meaning. But somehow, as Barthes points out in his discussion of Twombly’s work, they 
contribute to what Barthes calls the overall ‘effect’. Here I draw on Barthes’ consideration of 
Twombly’s work in the essay ‘The Wisdom of Art’.230 ‘Effect’ for Barthes ‘is the very general 
effect which can be released, in all its possible dimensions, by the word/title [in Cy Twombly’s 
case] ‘Mediterranean’.231 This includes all the ‘enormous complex’ of associated memories, 
sensations, languages, certain histories, mythologies, all the forms, colours and lights ‘that occur 
at the frontier of the terrestrial landscape and the plains of the sea,’ in this geographic area. All 
this, says Barthes, even though Twombly starts with material and marks that have no analogy 
‘with the great Mediterranean radiance’.232 Thus, as well as ‘including’ signifiers in the image, 
the painting as a whole can be conceived as a signifier of the painter’s experience. It is not a 
sign for the Bay of Naples because of the lack of being a pre-agreed societal connection of 
signifier and signifier, as for instance a picture postcard might be. But it can be seen as a 
signifier of something of importance for the painter, the Mediterranean, and can create an 
‘effect’ to that end. The notion of ‘effect’ can be seen as an ‘interim’ notion between signifier 
and sign, between meaningless marks and ‘meaningful’ images – in other words it is a 
‘phenomenon’ which is not explicated by Lacan’s notion of the signifier. 
 
Thus this painting can be seen in terms of Lacan’s ideas of signifier and sign. But my 
question remains concerning any sense of ‘expression’, or visceral excitement.  
 
Lyotard’s notions of ‘figure’ and intensities of libido metamorphosing into images are 
more helpful than Lacan’s notion of signifiers in this instance (see Section 2 below). As such 
Lyotard’s ideas highlight ‘deficiencies’ of Lacan’s notion of signifiers and help to account for 
Barthes’ idea of effect insofar as the notion of ‘effect’ can be seen to rely partly on affect and its 
effect on a structure of signifiers. 
 
1.1.10   Caveats - signifiers 
 
                                                          
230 Roland Barthes, “The Wisdom of Art”, Calligram, ed. Norman Bryson (Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 1988), 174, in which Barthes describes his notion of ‘effect’. 
231 Barthes, “Wisdom”, 174. (My addition and emphasis). 
232 Barthes, “Wisdom”, 174. 
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ILLUSTRATION  2.2 
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ILLUSTRATION  2.3 
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Again we see that Lacan offers useful ideas in terms of image making, for instance the 
(possible) approach to the real through the un-thought stage of ir-rational content (signifiers) 
and processes. However, again we see that there are caveats. A problematic is articulated by 
James Elkins, who presents an ‘anti-semiotic’ stance. He proposes that:  
Pictures are most interesting when neither alternative is possible [neither semiotics nor 
semeiotics] so that a viewer is forced to attend to the ways that outlandish and partly 
incomprehensible marks both hinder and enable whatever story the picture seems to tell. 
The incoherence of the pictures begins here, with the admission that things are very strange 
indeed.233  
 
He argues that there are graphic marks that are neither ‘visual chaos’ nor similar to 
‘signs of writing or notation’. He gives a number of examples of particular manifestations: for 
instance, ‘marks swirled into washes, scumbled into larger areas or smudged into continuous 
gradations [where] they lose their disjointedness but not the idea of disjunction’.234 The play 
between particular types of marks and contours on the one hand, and ‘stepless’ change on the 
other is also part of the way marks carry meaning. He proposes that ‘graphic marks’ be 
understood as objects that are simultaneously signs and not signs, calling this ‘visual semiotics’. 
Certain visual phenomena are ‘ignored’ by the viewer as inconsequential to what is seen as the 
‘image’. In other words, for Elkins, the notion of signifier is not adequate to describe all aspects 
of imagistic ‘content’. While he is speaking from the viewer’s point of view, for me the un-
thought stage in the process of image making can be seen as one locus and/or agency for this 
manifestation of ‘incoherence’ that can nevertheless result in an ‘effect’. Thus, even though the 
Lacanian signifier has proved helpful in understanding some relationships between the ‘content’ 
of the unconscious and its manifestation as marks and images, other opinions indicate that there 
are imagistic phenomena not included in Lacan’s conceptualisation of the signifier as such.235 
Barthes’ notion of ‘effect’, as seen earlier (Section 1.1.9), is also relevant here in pointing out 
that ‘partly incomprehensible marks’ can contribute to an ‘effect’ which is integral to the 
understanding and appreciation of the overall image, and yet that are not seen as particular 
signifiers or signs. This is considered further in Chapter Five, Section 5.  
 
                                                          
233 J. Elkins, On Paintings and the Words that Fail Them (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1998), 
particularly Chapter One. 
234 Elkins, ‘Paintings’, Chapter 1.  
235 There is the further point that there is an inherent link between the content and process of the unconscious and 
the mysterious stage of image making. See in relation to this point A. Schore, Affect Regulation and the Origin of 
the Self (Hove, U.K., Lawrence Erlbaum Associates Publishers, 1998), in which he summarises his recent research 
in the area of neuro-psychology, that of  right/left brain research. He further develops the idea that there is an 
inherent link between the workings of the unconscious and the workings of the right brain, on the one hand, and the 
way images ‘work’, on the other.   
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A further caveat concerns the (re-iterated) question of the relationship of signifier and 
affect, visceral reactions. Earlier the question was: how to re-attach meaning, meaning which is 
assumed to have been attached at some prior moment (for instance as the event is being 
‘perceived’) and then ‘lost’ in terms of ir-rational primary processing. For Lacan, as we have 
seen, meaning can be ‘re-attached’ by means of linguistic-type tropes, for instance by means of 
association of ideas. This is complicated by the fact that for me meaning can also arise directly 
from affect. While the notion of the unconscious as unrealized approaches a tenable analogy to 
mark making, there is still the point that signifiers as ‘defined’ do not include affect, even 
though they may be re-presentations of affect.236 
   
1. 2   ‘Subject matter’ of the unconscious 
 
1.2.1   Individual ‘censored chapters’  
 
Having now considered Lacan’s notions about the ‘text’ of the unconscious as signifiers, 
I can now consider the ‘subject matter’ of the unconscious. One aspect of the subject matter is 
Lacan’s notion of ‘individual censored chapters’, about which he maintains: ‘The unconscious is 
that part of the concrete discourse, in so far as it is transindividual (someone, somewhere 
knows) that is not at the disposal of the subject in re-establishing the continuity of his conscious 
discourse.’237 In this sense, these chapters are an individual’s ‘extimate’ (intimate but not 
consciously available) knowledge, in that others may know of these events, but the individual 
concerned does not ‘know’. Again, Lacan terms the knowledge ‘unrealized’. However, he 
proposes that this knowledge can be ‘rediscovered’ by the individual. The notion of the 
unrealized results in (and supports) his notion that the unconscious embodies the function of 
cause, as opposed to that which is determined in a ‘chain’, where something is happening in the 
arena of ‘Law’.238 In terms of the process of image making I see this as adding an element of the 
personal, the subjective, to what has so far been a more universal and transindividual idea of the 
order of the symbolic.  
 
1.2.2     The notion of  ‘Other’ 
 
The second aspect of the ‘subject matter’ of the unconscious is Lacan’s notion of ‘Other’ 
with a capital ‘O’. This concept is complementary to that of the subject, it encompasses the 
                                                          
236 Lacan also posits the notion of the screen, which I see as a reflection of the unconscious into the arena of the 
subjective. 
237 Lacan, ‘Ecrits’, 49. 
238 Lacan, ‘Seminar XI’, 21. 
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notion of the signifier, and is seen as the realm of the symbolic. The notion of the ‘Other’ is 
similar to the notion of ‘censored chapters’, but it has a different emphasis in that rather than 
‘extimate’ knowledge particularized for a given subject, it is a trans-personal knowledge. The 
Other can also be seen as particularized in a subject for another subject. The Other in general is 
seen as the symbolic, the discourse of the ‘unconscious’, the locus of speech and an arena for the 
attempted treating of the real by means of the symbolic. Seen as a broader canvas, it is for 
instance culture as a whole. This ‘originary’ Other is exemplified and particularized in the 
discourse of the Other (first as mother) such that the desire of the subject is that point of lack 
where the desire of the mother is beyond what she (as mother) is able to articulate as meaning. 
The concept of the Other is included here because it is so closely related to the idea of the 
symbolic and the unconscious. It is also closely related to the notion of the gaze itself, in that 
both incorporate the idea that the unconscious plays a significant but ‘invisible’ role for the 
subject in terms of perceptions ‘received’, ‘knowledge’ accepted, and conclusions ‘reached’ and 
adopted. The significance for the un-thought stage of image making is that ‘surprises’ may 
result, in not having been pre-apparent to the rational self/subject/mind, and in not having been 
pre-determined by previous cultural ‘discoveries’ (or inertias). There are a number of aspects of 
Lacan’s notion of Other that are relevant to the un-thought stage of image making, as I now 
consider. 
 
1.2.2.1    Where speech is constituted 
 
The Other, for Lacan is ‘the locus in which speech is constituted’.239 The ‘location’ of 
speech and language, therefore, is not the ego, not the subject, but the Other. Speech and 
language are beyond conscious control, and so come from ‘beyond’ consciousness, in that our 
language pre-exists us as the cultural milieu into which we are born. Therefore, argues Lacan, 
‘the unconscious is the discourse of the Other’, in the sense discussed earlier (Chapter One, 
Section 3.3) that unconscious desire is made up of a ‘lack’ in the discourse of the mother. There 
is, then, a reflexive relationship between subject and Other, in that the Other is an influence on, 
and particularized in, the individual, but with much of its importance and influence located as a 
transindividual unconscious rather than in the conscious mind. Again we see the subject as 
subject to the unconscious (Other). Nevertheless the Other, like the symbolic, is closely linked 
with lack and desire. The discourse of the Other, he states, ‘indicate[s] the beyond in which the 
recognition of desire is bound up with the desire for recognition’.240 Lacan’s use of the word 
‘Other’ implies not only the locus of the constitution of speech but also the locus of the process 
                                                          
239 Lacan, ‘Seminar III’, 274.   
240 Lacan, ‘Ecrits’, 267. (My addition.) 
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of image making, being also symbolic. For me, these ideas are intricately connected to the un-
thought stage, in that it is this stage that most obviously ‘allows’ the ‘emergence’ of unrealized 
material, whether it be marks or words. 
 
1.2.2.2    As praxis 
 
A second theoretical aspect of the notion of the Other involves the notion of praxis. For 
Lacan, praxis ‘designates a concerted human action, whatever it may be [in his case the practice 
of psychoanalysis], which places man in a position to treat the real by the symbolic.’241 I 
understand that ‘treating’ of the real (in other words for Lacan, lack and desire) by the symbolic 
is also the position of many painters, in that there is a search, in some way, for ‘truth’ by means 
of the symbolic, as seen in the discussion above about ‘truth and knowledge’ (Section 1.1.8). 
The praxis here is image making.  
 
1.2.2.3    As cause 
 
A third way Lacan considers this notion of the Other is as cause, where, he proposes: ‘ 
[…] the Freudian unconscious is situated at that point where, between cause and that which it 
affects, there is always something wrong’, meaning a surprise, a shock, an unexpected jump of 
some sort.242 The Other can be seen as beyond the limits of what any individual can know, in 
that some things will always exceed one’s knowledge. This is the Other as the ‘unrealized’. It 
can manifest in image making such that the emerging image, as Other, can surprise us, as 
makers, as well as surprising viewers. In other words, an image can be thought of as Other in the 
same sense that another subject can be Other, which is to say insofar as it represents something 
of the Other for the subject (the painter and/or the viewer). The Other is the locus in which 
images are constituted, because insofar as the Other is unrealized it is difficult for the conscious 
mind to ‘plan’ and ‘execute’; instead it is necessary to offer an encouraging environment, the 
un-thought stage, if surprise and the real are of interest.243 For me, an example of the Other as 
the locus in which images can be constituted is Beuys’ large collection of early drawings, titled 
‘Secret Block for a Secret Person in Ireland’. It has been suggested that this collection may have 
been meant as a ‘gift’ to James Joyce. I would go further, however, and say it is a document in 
                                                          
241 Lacan, ‘Seminar XI’, 6. (My addition.) 
242 Lacan, ‘Seminar XI’, 22. 
243 As an example in which language and making images are put on to an ‘equal footing’, Antonin Artaud says: 
‘My drawings are documents…’.  One can see in many of his drawings the erasures, the scrubbing through the 
paper, burning parts of the paper, as though he were trying to pierce and thus to document the very surface 
(subjectile) of his unconscious in order to enter this domain. (Quoted from writings by Artaud in J. Derrida and P. 
Thevenin, The Secret Art of Antonin Artaud, trans. Mary Ann Caws, (Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press, 1998 (1986)), 
106. 
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‘reply’ to ‘Finnegan’s Wake’. This is in the sense that Beuys felt that he was experimenting both 
with the idea of representation itself (as did Joyce), as well as with an attempt to manifest ideas 
as they were developing in his head. In this sense Beuys was experimenting with ideas as yet 
‘un-realized’ (Illustrations 1.1, 2.1, and 3.1). As discussed earlier, ‘true’ images in visual art 
would be able to join one subject (the maker) to another subject (the viewer) who was on the 
other side of the wall of the ‘system of signs’ called images; this would be a communication of 
the ‘real’, and as such, difficult or impossible to achieve. As Lacan states, this is only an ideal, 
but for me it makes clearer some aspects of ‘what’ is happening in the un-thought stage of 
image making, and what might be seen to be a goal. It is seen to be mysterious, or even chaotic, 
because something is happening on the level of the ‘wall’, the attempt to represent the un-
representable and/or the unrealized, the attempt not only to ‘tap’ the unconscious but also to 
‘pierce’, as if in metaphor, the support by means of marks, erasures, etc. A ‘cause’ is trying to 
initiate an ‘effect’. This is reminiscent of Antonin Artaud’s work, as discussed by Derrida, 
where Derrida makes an issue of the term ‘subjectile’ as it is used by Artaud (Illustration 2.4).244 
Derrida interprets this as being, for Artaud, the surface of the paper (support for Artaud’s 
drawings), which gets burned, scraped, or distressed by Artaud, as well as the nominal ‘surface’ 
or surface membrane (thus subjectile) of the unconscious itself, as though scraping and burning 
that surface away to get closer to a truth for which he was searching. In other words, in Lacan’s 
terms, this can be seen as an (extreme) example of the attempt of the artist to grapple with and 
re-present his ‘truth’. 
 
1.2.2.4     Caveat - Other 
 
In amongst these ideas of Lacan, there arises a caveat for me. Lacan sees the 
unconscious as the discourse of the Other that consists of signifiers, and as such the unconscious 
is a ‘cause’ that has yet to be ‘realized’.245 For Lacan: ‘The unconscious is that which is in the 
subject but can be realized only outside, that is to say in the locus of the Other in which alone it 
may assume its status.’246 However the notion of ‘re-attachment’ of meaning remains opaque. 
As I have already discussed, in terms of images I understand that in some instances marks can 
be seen as signifiers, a transitional concept between mental material and manifestation. I see that 
the unconscious mental material may have ‘associations’ as it is assimilated. But the irrational 
primary processes work over this material, resulting in the inchoate, according to Freud and 
Lacan, and, as we shall see, also Lyotard. What then happens in terms of image making? Marks  
                                                          
244 Derrida and Thevenin, ‘The Secret Art of Antonin Artaud’, in the section called ‘to Unsense the subjectile’.  See 
the reproduction of the drawing by Artaud, Illustration 2.4.   
245 Lacan, ‘Seminar XI’, 131. 
246 Lacan, ‘Seminar XI’, 147. (My addition). 
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are made, associations are made. What keeps them related? What can produce ‘harmony’, 
relatedness, as they emerge? Why is the result not complete and total chaos? What links or 
associations are maintained in Other and unconscious, both ‘internally’ and as they emerge in 
‘response’ to some stimulus?  
 
One way of understanding this is that in the un-thought stage the ‘marks resulting in 
images’ come first, and meaning may be ‘added’ later, as the images evolve and ‘come together’ 
with other mental associations over the spiralling three stages of image making (as posited in the 
Introduction, Section 1.1). In such a case, meaning, as it develops, is implied by Lacan to be 
random with regard to the signifiers from which it is ‘developing’. In addition to this the 
connection between signifiers and affect is opaque. However I maintain that, in the studio, there 
is (often) a relatedness and ‘harmony’ of marks from the beginning, and my question is: how 
can this be explained by Lacan’s ideas? I don’t believe that it can, except obliquely by the 
notion of initial diachrony (but prey to chaotic distortion by primary processes) as stated earlier 
(Section 1.1.10) with regard to perception. I consider the contestations of Lyotard and of 
Deleuze and Guattari in Section 2.  
 
On the one hand, in spite of my caveats, I continue to believe that Lacan provides a 
useful foundation for a better understanding of the value of the un-thought stage of image 
making. For instance, this value includes a consideration of the un-thought stage as reflecting 
results of primary processes. On the other hand, the authors Deleuze and Guattari, as well as 
Lyotard, provide a wider context within which to view Lacan’s concepts within the present 
context.  
 
 
Section 2:   Contestations and extensions 
 
2.1   Lyotard 
 
2.1.1   Figure and dissimulation 
 
Having contested Lacan’s notion of lack as the basis of the unconscious, as we saw in 
Section 2 of Chapter One, Lyotard proposes further that (as opposed to Lacan) the real can be 
seen to interact with the symbolic, and that ‘expression’ can be seen to ‘emerge’ as a 
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consequence.247 He retains Lacan’s idea of signifiers and signs as being of importance, but he 
proposes that there is more to the story. Lyotard relates ‘meaning’ to Lacan’s concept of 
structures of signs. He then relates ‘expression’ to Lacan’s notion of desire/libido. He agrees 
that meaning as encompassed (or not) by structures of signs (signs seen as signifier allied with 
signified) does not automatically, and indeed cannot theoretically, include expression (affect, 
feeling). But, in line with his interest in the libidinal economy in general, and within the general 
context of Freudian/Lacanian thinking, he proposes a remedy. This is a notion he terms the 
‘figural’. The ‘figure’ is the ‘influence’ on the field of the semantic by the libido. Lyotard agrees 
with Lacan’s proposals that the linguistic structure of signs, working by means of difference 
(although of course for Lacan based on the primary signifier, the phallus), can be seen as the 
basis of language and meaning. However Lyotard argues that this structure can be 
‘dissimulated’. Dissimulation is the ability of the energy of the libido to ‘bend’ the structure(s) 
of signs, such that ‘figure’ (expression) is the result.  
 
To explain the idea of dissimulation in terms of art, Lyotard proposes that meaning can 
result from looking ‘into’ a piece of art, for example from a notion of theatricality that carries on 
from his ideas as seen in Chapter One, Section 3. Theatricality for Lyotard has to do with the 
idea of the difference between, but the conjunction of, reality and phantasy, or inside and 
outside, or house and stage, in other words the existence of ‘disreal’ spaces.248 Lyotard argues 
that historically art works have fallen into this arena of theatricality with a characteristic 
‘quieting of pre-conscious censorship’. This results in an understanding of the work of art as 
reducing the necessity for the ‘function’ of censor. But Lyotard says: ‘no longer does it [art] 
have essentially, not to say exclusively, the role that Freud assigns to it of quieting pre-
conscious censorship’, by consciously assigning it to an arena of phantasy and thus other than an 
arena of reality.249 Instead Lyotard’s concern is with the function of form. He argues that 
through figure, and dissimulation, works of art include expression, not by means of the 
signifiers without meaning, or the system of signs with (deferred) meaning, and not by being in 
a ‘place’ of a lowered censorship, but instead by means of the dissimulation of these structures 
of signs by the workings of the libido. Thus, for Lyotard, both the structure of signs and the 
notion of figure, in other words concepts of meaning and expression taken in conjunction, are 
necessary to a clearer understanding of the overall content and process of art. I see this as 
dissimulation of systems of signs by libidinal energy, resulting in apparent changes to the shape 
                                                          
247 ‘Expression’ in this case has a different meaning to that being used when speaking of the Expressionist 
movement, where the painter attempted to illustrate or ‘re-present’ his/her feelings and thoughts.  
248 Lyotard, “Beyond”, 156. 
249 Lyotard, “Beyond”, 157. For instance, there are artists who involve themselves substantially with formal 
considerations. 
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or form of, or within, the object. For him, this ‘figure’, in a work of art, refers to a ‘certain 
density’, which cannot be described or translated into words, as can the meaning, but which is 
contained as a distortion within the ‘structure’ of the words or image.250 Lyotard refers to this 
‘certain density’ as ‘intensities’ of libidinal energy. ‘Expression’, argues Lyotard, ‘is the 
presence in the secondary process, in discourse and in realist representations, of operations 
belonging to the unconscious system.’251 For me, this explains the relationship of these notions 
to the un-thought stage, in that these intensities are not planned or conscious phenomena. In 
other words, although secondary revision can delete much ‘censor-able’ material, some aspects 
of the primary process and the libido seep through (for instance they appear to the conscious 
mind as being of little or no consequence to the project in hand).  
 
Lyotard identifies three types of ‘figure’: an image ‘induced in the viewers mind’ (an 
example in art would be elements as ‘perceived’ and/or retained in the viewer’s mind), the 
trope, or order of artistic signifiers (which could be exemplified in terms of style, or ‘code’ of 
the image), and the form of the representation (as for instance drawing, painting, materials, and 
so on). These result in the expression of a different kind of meaning than that of the work’s 
‘immediate significance.’ He mentions the work of Van Gogh as an example, where the 
paintings themselves provide much more, qualitatively and quantitatively, than is provided in 
Van Gogh’s descriptions, in his letters to his brother, of what it is that he is painting, and 
painting about. 
 
Lyotard exemplifies this difference between meaning and expression by discussing the 
work of Marcel Duchamp and Barnett Newman (Illustrations 2.5 and 2.6).252 His argument is 
that the large glass of Duchamp is (in the main) an organization of symbols, of codes, which 
presents certain ideas (and certain confusions), but which can, in effect and with study, be ‘de-
coded’ into articulated ideas, at least to a degree. On the other hand, he says, a work by 
Newman, for instance Onement, has no codes or symbols to be interpreted or translated.  Rather, 
it can have the effect of making the viewer become aware of his own presence there in front of 
the painting. The viewer’s attention or awareness is channelled away from ‘going into’ the work 
in front of him and its interpretation, as required in the Duchamp piece, and instead awareness 
‘bounces back’ to that of the viewer’s own perceptual processes and concomitant bodily 
existence. In other words, the painting seems to empty out and the viewer becomes re-focused, 
away from immersion in ‘meaning’ ‘within’ the representation that becomes predominantly  
                                                          
250 J-F. Lyotard, “The Psychoanalytic Approach to Artistic and Literary Expression”, in Toward the Post-Modern, 
eds. R. Harvey and M.S. Roberts (Amherst, New York, Humanity Books, 1999 (1978)).  
251 Lyotard, “Approach”. 
252 See J-F. Lyotard, “Newman”. 
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important as an intellectual endeavour. In front of the Newman piece, the intensities of ‘energy’ 
of the colour field and the structure of the painting, together with the lack of symbols, is one in 
which sensorily induced affective reactions to the object become predominantly important, as an 
experiential, visceral, phenomenon. The latter is a reaction that is less easily explained by means 
of signifiers. In other words, one is an intellectual adventure, while the other is an adventure of 
bodily participation, although of course each piece of work involves something of both types of 
experience.253   
 
These two forms of interpretation, meaning and expression, are discussed in Lyotard’s 
article ‘The Tensor’, where he states that the libidinal economy aspect, or  ‘figure’, is not meant 
as a substitute for the semiotic, but can be read ‘under its cover’, so to speak.254  
  
He also does this in his article ‘The Dream-work Does Not Think’ in speaking of 
secondary revision (and indeed the figure) being present in both the form and the foundation – 
the underlying fantasy and the ‘text as object’.255 In another essay, his analysis of the 
shortcomings of the semiotic analysis leads him to suggest an account of the ‘economy’ of 
works of art as being: 
 
cast in libidinal terms [which] would have as its central presupposition the affirmative 
character of works; they are not in place of anything; they do not stand for, but stand; that is 
to say, they function through their material and its organization. Their subject is nothing 
other than a possible formal organization (not an inevitable or necessary organization); and 
it conceals no content, no libidinal secret of the work, whose force lies entirely in its 
surface.256 
 
In this way Lyotard extends Lacan’s notion of the signifier. He critiques what he sees as 
Lacan’s binary between meaning and expression, and instead amalgamates the two ideas as a 
material surface. This begins to address my concern about the place for affect within the 
semiotic domain, and I see it as showing a way forward for reconciling the meaningless signifier 
and the meaningful sign, where the libido as a dissimulator of the structure of signs can 
introduce expressivity into this structure. The consideration of further relevant aspects of 
Lyotard’s work, and their relationship to Lacan’s ideas, is continued in the next chapter, 
concerning processes of the unconscious. But first I want to consider a set of ideas that can 
                                                          
253 As Lyotard has overcome ‘opposition’ between expression and meaning by means of his notions of 
dissimulation (within the structure of language), there is a similar ‘dissimulation’ (within the system of signs) 
proposed for images. 
254 J.-F. Lyotard, “The Tensor”, in The Lyotard Reader, ed. A. Benjamin (Oxford, Blackwell Publishers, 1989), 9. 
255 J.-F. Lyotard, “The Dream-Work Does Not Think”, in The Lyotard Reader, ed. A. Benjamin (Oxford, Blackwell 
Publishers, 1989), 41-51. 
256 Lyotard, “Beyond”, 158. 
  
 
118
provide a useful ‘bridge’ between Lacan’s and Lyotard’s ideas, showing them to be more 
compatible than is at first obvious. 
 
Section 2.2  Deleuze and Guattari in ‘Anti-Oedipus’ 
 
 
The work of Giles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, as seen particularly in their book ‘Anti-
Oedipus’, contests some of Lacan’s views and supports others, in terms that are relevant to the 
paradigm of the unthought stage of image making.257 While psychoanalysis bases its model of 
the psyche on the process (or condition) of neurosis (not the neurotic individual), with its guilt, 
lack and fear and its basis in the nuclear family, Deleuze and Guattari propose ‘schizoanalysis’ 
as a model of the psyche based on the process of schizophrenia (not the clinical schizophrenic), 
emphasizing scattering, and breaks and flows, of energy.258  
 
At the root of the concept of schizoanalysis is the notion of desiring-machine production, 
which Deleuze and Guattari insist is not a metaphor.259 There are several ways of understanding 
this ‘machine’ of which they speak (meaning the workings of desire) and its three modes. One 
mode is that ‘Every machine […] is related to a continuing material flow that it cuts into,’ for 
instance the mouth that cuts off the flow of milk, of air, of sound.260 The second mode is: 
every machine has a sort of code built into it, stored up inside it. This code is inseparable not 
only from the way in which it is recorded and transmitted to each of the different regions of 
the body, but also from the way in which the relations of each of the regions with all the 
others are recorded.  
  
For example, an organ may have connections that associate it with several different 
flows; it may waver between several functions, and even take on the regime of another organ – 
the anorectic mouth, for instance. ‘These indifferent codes [indifferent in the sense of no 
signification] follow no plan, they function at all levels and enter into any and every sort of 
connection’.261 These codes approach Lacan’s idea of signifier in terms of having no signified. 
The third mode is the residual break, which produces a subject alongside the machine, 
functioning as a part adjacent to the machine. This subjective break, they say, ‘is not at all an 
                                                          
257 G. Deleuze and F. Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, Capitalism and Schizophrenia, trans. R. Hurley, M. Seem, and H.R. 
Lane (London, The Athlone Press, 1984 (1972)). 
258 From the vast array (dare I say structure) of schizoanalytic notions, ideas and concepts, I propose to choose only 
those which pertain to the psychoanalytic ideas chosen as being immediately relevant to the ‘un-thought’ stage of 
image making, thus providing a balance to, and additional context for, Lacan’s ideas, while not considering 
Deleuze and Guattari’s contributions in other directions such as in the political arena. 
259 Deleuze and Guattari, 41. Note that Deleuze and Guattari speak of ‘desire’ in a different sense than does Lacan. 
It is closer to what Lyotard terms ‘libido’, as being defined as a life energy, not an energy engendered by lack. 
260 Deleuze and Guattari, 36. 
261 Deleuze and Guattari, 38. (My addition). 
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indication of a lack […] but on the contrary a share that falls to the subject as part of the whole, 
income that comes its way as something left over.’262 They refer to this as consumption (or 
‘consommation’). They provide a ‘shorthand’ summary of these processes by naming the three 
stages: 
--production of production: a ‘connective’ synthesis, 
--production of recording: a ‘disjunctive’ synthesis, and 
--production of consumption: a ‘conjunctive’ synthesis. 
 
2.2.1   Lack 
 
Deleuze and Guattari (as well as Lyotard) do not agree that Lacan’s concept of ‘lack’ 
provides a credible explanation of the basis of the unconscious and the well-spring of desire. 
They propose instead a re-thinking and re-visualizing of libidinal energy and its relationship to 
what we call the unconscious. In particular they make a radical move away from psychoanalytic 
concepts of lack. They argue that Lacan’s idea of lack (an ‘insufficiency of being’, or a ‘lost 
object’) as a basis of the unconscious, is incorrect, on the basis that the idea of lack is a belief, 
not an energy. Deleuze and Guattari say:  
The schizoanalytic argument is simple: desire is a machine, a synthesis of machines, a 
machinic arrangement – desiring-machines. The order of desire is the order of production; 
all production is at once desiring-production and social production. We therefore reproach 
psychoanalysis for having stifled this order of production, for having shunted it into 
representation. Far from showing the boldness of psychoanalysis, this idea of unconscious 
representation marks from the outset its bankruptcy or its abnegation: an unconscious that 
no longer produces, but is content to believe. The unconscious believes in Oedipus, it 
believes in castration, in the law. It is doubtless true that the psychoanalyst would be the 
first to say that, everything considered, belief is not an act of the unconscious; it is always 
the preconscious that believes.263  
 
In other words they disagree with an unconscious seen as made up of representations, 
Lacan’s linguistic orientation, and propose instead the idea of an unconscious based on the 
libido as a basic life ‘force’. They point out that in even the psychoanalytic paradigm, 
production ‘continues to rumble, to throb beneath the representative agency that suffocates 
it.’264 On this basis they propose that the concepts developed by Lacan (Other, signifier, with 
lack and desire as a basis of the unconscious) indicate, or presume, that beliefs, concepts, 
representation are present at a certain, but not originating, level of the unconscious. Furthermore 
they propose that these beliefs and concepts can place restrictions and limitations upon the 
                                                          
262 Deleuze and Guattari, 40. (‘Subject’ is used here as subject to the unconscious as discussed in Chapter One 
Section 2.) 
263 Deleuze and Guattari, 296. 
264 Deleuze and Guattari, 297. 
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libido, consistent with an economic model of the drive. For Deleuze and Guattari, the basis of 
the unconscious is pure libidinal energy, with attendant breaks and flows.  
 
2.2.2  Desire and the ‘body without organs’ 
 
Concerning desire, Deleuze and Guattari say: ‘the sign of desire is never a sign of the 
law, it is a sign of strength (puissance)’.265 In other words, desire is not a signifier in the 
representational sense, nor is it dependent upon a belief (in lack); instead it is power itself, an 
energy, wildly scattered and scattering.266 Here we return to the idea of libido as force, or 
energy, as in Lyotard’s ideas and as in Freud’s ‘economic’ proposals for desire.267 Deleuze and 
Guattari say of desiring: 
It is at work everywhere, functioning smoothly at times, at other times in fits and starts. It 
breathes, it heats, it eats […]. Everywhere it is machines – real ones: machines driving other 
machines, machines being driven by other machines, with all the necessary couplings and 
connections. An organ-machine is plugged into an energy-source-machine: the one produces 
a flow that the other interrupts. The breast is a machine that produces milk and the mouth a 
machine coupled to it. […] Something is produced, not mere metaphor.268  
 
They posit that desire, for them the energy of the libido, is a given, a bottom line, in the 
constitution of human individuals, in the constitution of life itself. It is an immanent energy, 
manifesting (optimally) in desiring-production.269 They speak of ‘desiring-machines’ in 
connection not only with breaks and flows of energy, but as energy flows that can actually 
produce in the sense of forming syntheses. Desiring-machines occur in both molecular and 
molar circumstances (for instance, neurologically and in terms of belief). The interesting 
questions for them, they say, are how to ‘describe’ desire, and what can ‘become’ of it, both 
individually and socially. The unconscious, they argue, is ‘ignorant’: ‘it knows nothing of 
castration or Oedipus, just as it knows nothing of parents, gods, the law, lack’.270 The 
unconscious does not ‘believe’, it just ‘produces’. The unconscious, they say, is not structural or 
personal; it does not symbolize, imagine, or represent. The unconscious engineers, is machinic. 
The unconscious is the ‘real’ in itself, the ‘impossible real’ and its production.271  
 
                                                          
265 Deleuze and Guattari, 111. 
266 This is scattering in a different sense than as used by Ehrenzweig later in the thesis: here I understand scattering 
to imply not a process developed for a purpose (for instance to enable fight or flight reactions based on a perceptual 
and rational basis), but rather a process of energy production and dissemination that facilitates production by 
desiring-machines. 
267 Reference for this is Freud’s ‘economic’ theory, as seen for instance in ‘Interpretation’, Chapter 7, especially the 
section on ‘regression’, where Freud develops an idea of the excitation and paths of excitation taking place in the 
psyche. 
268 Deleuze and Guattari, 1-2. 
269 Deleuze and Guattari, 110. 
270 Deleuze and Guattari, 61.  
271 Deleuze and Guattari, 53. 
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I see these ideas as a context within which to approach more directly the un-thought 
stage. The un-thought stage is then an aspect of the content and processes of the (human) 
unconscious at the molar level. In other words there is a level at which beliefs and concepts 
influence and/or thwart the flow of desire, but this is what might be termed a ‘deep pre-
conscious’ level rather than the level of the unconscious. Hereafter I term this the ‘human 
unconscious’ to differentiate it from Deleuze and Guattari’s more comprehensive notion of the 
unconscious, but avoiding the connotations of the term ‘preconscious’. 
 
In the schizoanalytic view, the repression of desire is equivalent to the repression of 
‘production’. In terms of their interest in the breaks and flows of libido, Deleuze and Guattari 
say: ‘Oedipus presupposes a fantastic repression of desiring machines.’272 This is in the sense of 
the concept (Oedipus as lack) closing down desire in many directions. Again they are 
‘admitting’ the importance of Oedipus, but ‘re-locating’ it. Repression does exist in 
schizoanalysis, where it is seen as breaks rather than flows of energy. As well as potentially 
causing malfunction and even stasis, breaks can play an important part in the functioning of 
production.  
 
To understand this, it is necessary to understand Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of a non-
productive identity (or agent) termed the ‘body without organs’ – the body without an image. 
The body without organs is seen to be, for instance, the earth, or the socius (the body of the 
social or society). When that ‘body’ reaches a catatonic state of inertia, a total lack of intensities, 
it is termed a ‘full body without organs’. It then ‘belongs to the realm of antiproduction.’273 
While an element of antiproduction is a necessary concomitant to production, the full body 
without organs involves a non-productive stasis to the point of catatonia – or death. One way of 
thinking about the ‘body without organs’ is as a version of Lacan’s notion of  ‘Other’, in that it 
can include symbolism, the trans-personal field of knowledge as an entity. Deleuze and Guattari 
have developed this notion in pursuit of their own ends, in connection with desiring-production, 
and independent of the notion of beliefs, at least at the molecular level. What emerges from 
Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of the body without organs is the idea of ‘primary repression’ 
defined as the repulsion of desiring-machines by the body without organs.274 In other words, 
what becomes important in normal production is the ‘opposition of the process of production of 
                                                          
272 Oedipus here implies the myth and more importantly the complex. Deleuze and Guattari, 3. Note that their use 
of schizophrenia is a matter of process, not the description of a schizophrenic patient: ‘the artificial schizophrenic 
found in mental institutions is a result of tampering with the process of production’ (5). 
273 Deleuze and Guattari, 8. 
274 Deleuze and Guattari, 8  
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the desiring-machines and the non-productive stasis of the body without organs’.275 But extra 
repression and stasis ensue when there is an overload of anti-production.  
 
2.2.3   Signifiers and libido 
 
Deleuze and Guattari say: 
What the schizophrenic experiences, both as an individual and as a member of the human 
species, is not at all any one specific aspect of nature [e.g. the production of sexual 
pleasure], but nature as a process of production.276  
 
For Deleuze and Guattari production and consumption are understood as immediate and 
un-mediated processes (i.e. ‘no intermediate, interfering laws, lacks, myths, beliefs’). As stated 
above, they posit an equally un-mediated production of a ‘recording’ process, which I 
understand as a ‘non-human’ version of the symbolic.277 They say:  
the recording process and consumption directly determine production, though they 
do so within the production process itself. Hence everything is production: production of 
productions, of actions and of passions; productions of recording processes, of distributions 
and of co-ordinates that serve as points of reference; productions of consumptions, of 
sensual pleasures, of anxieties, and of pain.278  
 
Note here the interesting point that emotions (passions) result from the desiring-
production machines and their process. Everything is seen as a process of breaks and flows of 
the underlying desire, even the idea of ‘expression’ is one which can be explained in this 
manner.279 In this way they avoid describing even the expression of affect, without relating it to 
the process of production.  
 
Deleuze and Guattari not only critique, but extend Lacan’s, and to some extent 
Lyotard’s, understanding of the cooperation (or co-existence) between signifiers, signs and the 
libido, in other words the relationship between the symbolic and the real, as relevant to the un-
thought stage. They do this by expanding and strengthening the idea of the libido and its role 
and influence by way of their proposal that desiring-machines produce either ‘desiring 
production’ or ‘social production’ (depending on the context) and are thus integral. The coding 
produced is concomitant with desiring production, which is described as an inscription on the 
‘body without organs’. Deleuze and Guattari congratulate Lacan for his notion that ‘signifiers’ 
                                                          
275 Deleuze and Guattari, 8. 
276 Deleuze and Guattari, 3. (My addition.) 
277 Deleuze and Guattari, 4.  (My additions, their emphases.) 
278 Deleuze and Guattari, 4. 
279 Deleuze and Guattari, 6.  
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(their ‘codes’) in the unconscious are ‘meaningless’ (while dismissing his notion of the empty 
signifier). I see ‘codes’ and ‘signifiers’ as equivalent insofar as they serve a purpose, but both 
remaining ‘meaning-less’ as such. In terms of the idea of the ‘recording’ of ‘codes’ on the body 
without organs, they say: 
If this constitutes a system of writing, it is a writing inscribed on the very surface of the 
Real: a strangely polyvocal kind of writing, never a bi-univocalized, linearized one; a 
transcursive system of writing, never a discursive one; a writing that constitutes the entire 
domain of the “real inorganization” of the passive syntheses, where we would search in vain 
for something that might be labelled the Signifier – writing that ceaselessly composes and 
decomposes the chains into signs that have nothing that impels them to become signifying. 
The one vocation of the sign is to produce desire, engineering it in every direction.280    
 
Here ‘signifiers/codes’ and desire are intimately interrelated. In the last sentence of this 
quotation, I understand ‘produce’ as being machinic in the sense of ‘encouraging’, or 
‘directing’, the flow of desire, making it a functional notion in the sense of ‘engineering’ the 
breaks and flows in the ‘flow’ of libidinal energy. This puts into a different context Lacan’s 
theory of signifiers as the ‘text’ of the unconscious, in that it emphasizes the non-linguistic 
aspect of this so-called ‘text’. Deleuze and Guattari make more understandable the idea of a 
signifier as not having a meaning per se. For them it exists as a ‘code’, at some level between 
molecular and molar, in a machine where the machine has to do with neurology and the code is 
necessary in terms of production, for instance as if it were a code in a machine producing 
textiles. I had read Lacan’s notion of signifiers previously as referring to elements of language, 
even if (partially) in a basic imagistic sense (as hieroglyphs). Deleuze and Guattari are talking 
about codes as having a function rather than a (potential) meaning, because for them codes 
‘engineer’. Lacan’s signifiers are exemplified through language, while Deleuze and Guattari’s 
‘codes’ are understood on the level of the neurologically functional. But I don’t see this as 
mutually exclusive. They say: ‘ […] the unconscious of schizoanalysis is unaware of persons, 
aggregates, and laws, and of images, structures and symbols. The unconscious is not figurative, 
since its figural is abstract […] it is not representation but solely machinic, and productive.’281 
This is close to Lacan, but in the context of a (desiring) machine code rather than an element of 
language.282 Codes at a ‘molecular’ level of unconscious functioning are more understandable in 
                                                          
280 Deleuze and Guattari, 39.  
281 Deleuze and Guattari, 311. 
282 Deleuze and Guattari speak of ‘non-human’ sex at this molecular level. In another sense Lyotard (The Inhuman 
(Stanford, CA, Stanford University Press, 1991), 4-5) speaks of ‘the inhuman’ element of the human being, where 
humans ‘forget’ their helpless and indeterminate childhood before the process of acculturation. This is from a 
different point of view than that of Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of ‘non-human sex’, but it presents a similar 
result in that while their notion proposes a  ‘libidinal’ underlayer to the human, Lyotard’s underlayer of the 
‘inhuman’ is one of ‘animal’ life as seen in the young child but which may still result in what he terms the 
‘unharmonizable’, the reluctance or resistance to the ‘humanizing’ which happens with ‘constraint and error’, for 
instance the ‘education’ which ‘Freud calls castration’.     
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these terms rather than in linguistic (but unrealized) terms, even though at a molar level the 
latter are comprehensible.  
 
2.2.4    Libido: qualitative and quantitative 
 
There is another point of particular interest to this thesis. Deleuze and Guattari regard 
desire as having both qualitative and quantitative attributes. While quantitative attributes include 
levels of energy, qualitative attributes are seen in terms of liquidity, resistance, viscosity, and the 
like.283 They discuss this in relation to the psychoanalytic ‘session’, but I propose that this can 
be seen in terms of libidinal energy both in the un-thought stage and processes of artistic 
production, and in resulting images (although not ‘symmetrically’, as one does not necessarily 
produce the other).  Sometimes the process of making has a lugubrious or even tortured ‘feel’ to 
it, while sometimes it flows like clear water.  
 
2.2.5    Extensions: the ‘real’ 
 
It seems to me that in these Deleuze and Guattari terms the un-thought stage of image 
making can involve the flow (quality and quantity) of libido to result in production (the object) 
as well as the on-going recording of this flow on the body without organs. ‘Coding’ may 
operate at the level of the (non-human) unconscious (functional rather than representational), 
whereas all ‘representation’ (viz. signifiers) operates at the level of the ‘human’ unconscious, 
even though it is a very basic level (including the concept of lack and the Oedipus complex for 
instance). Both ‘codes’ and ‘signifiers’ may include aspects of memory and perception as Freud 
proposed with regard to the dreamwork, which can be seen to imply also image making. I 
propose that aspects of mark-making are representation (partly because based in a molar level of 
human unconscious and conscious making) but they also incorporate, partially at least, a 
‘coding’ at a more ‘molecular’ level. We can now see ‘real’ defined by Lacan as (sexual) desire 
(human unconscious), and also ‘real’ as the (Deleuze and Guattari) unconscious based on the 
libido. Representation, in the sense in which Deleuze and Guattari speak of it, ‘no longer applies 
to a distinct object, but to a productive activity itself’, in other words, it is a process.284 This is 
similar to Lyotard’s views about the ‘surface’ of the libido and its productions and intensities. 
Again the question of the relationship of the real to the symbolic arises; again discourse suggests 
that there is a ‘radical alterity’, albeit now in a differently defined context, that of libidinal 
                                                          
283  Deleuze and Guattari, 65-66. 
284  Deleuze and Guattari, 263. 
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energy seen as desiring machines and the symbolic seen as signifiers at the human level of the 
functioning of the unconscious.  
 
 
Section 3:  Summary and implications  
 
In this chapter I have discussed the considerable contributions made by Lacan’s notions 
of the signifier and the Other to the understanding of the un-thought stage of image making. 
These include the notion of ‘unrealized’ signifiers as ‘text’ of the unconscious as well as some 
linguistic-type characteristics of these signifiers and their structure. What Lacan’s idea of the 
signifier addresses most graphically in this context is the ‘leap’ from the mind to materiality, 
from the signifier in the unconscious to the mark as signifier on the artistic support, allowing us 
to conceptualise the ‘link’ on each ‘side’ being the signifier. The image can emerge as signifiers, 
then as a structure of signifiers, which may then mutate into a ‘system of signs’ (with Barthes as 
seen earlier), and include meaning. The signifier can be seen as a basis of the symbolic, and as 
unrealized ‘text’ of the unconscious in this reading.  
 
For me there are several relevant implications. One is the idea of the potentiality of 
signifiers ‘manifesting’ as marks on an artistic support without ‘rational’ guidance, and the 
related idea that the gestalt (perception) and rationality (process) can limit the field of 
opportunity of slippage and surprise occasioned by the emergence of the real by way of (the 
appearance of) the unrealized symbolic. This is due to the predominance of signs rather than 
signifiers in the conscious mind, as seen in Section 1.1.7. A second implication relates to 
Lacan’s definitions of truth and knowledge. The notion of signifiers enabling a glimpse of truth, 
being closely allied to desire and what I refer to as the ‘real’, can differentiate art from other 
imagery. This is at an individuated level of interest and experience. As I said above, the real can 
now be seen to be libidinal energy (Deleuze and Guattari) and/or sexual energy (Lacan - a result 
of ‘lack’). The enabling of a glimpse of (individuated) ‘truth’ is what explains my thetic interest 
in the un-thought stage insofar as it can encourage the appearance of the real as intensities of 
libidinal energy. I see this in the close connection Deleuze and Guattari propose between coding 
and desiring machines – they are seen as interactive, inter-dependent and inter-related. 
 
Another implication is related to Lacan’s proposal that signifiers have both diachronous 
and synchronous ‘links’ in the unconscious, forming a structure there similar to linguistic 
structure. This structure is based on lack and its connection to the symbolic, by means of the 
primary signifier, as well as by means of the linguistic operations of metonymy and metaphor. 
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He sees signifiers as a type of communication, and as a link between perception and memory. 
One major implication for the un-thought stage is my queries about his notion of primary 
processes, in that they can be seen to ‘break’ these links of association between signifiers. At 
this stage of the thesis, this is still unresolved.  
 
Lacan’s concept of the Other contributes a sense of the Other as the unrealized, such that 
it can emerge as cause for us as individuals, resulting in shock and surprise. In this way the 
signifier and the Other are seen as closely related ideas. The Other is seen as the locus of the 
symbolic as humans make an effort to approach and communicate the real, on the one hand, and 
as the locus of transpersonal culture and language on the other hand. Implications for the un-
thought stage include an enhanced understanding of the content of the unconscious as unrealized 
and trans-personal. 
 
My caveats in Chapters One and Two have concerned the status of lack and desire as 
basic to Lacan’s notion of the unconscious, in view of my interest in the relationship between 
what Lacan terms the realms of the real and the symbolic. In other words this involves notions 
of knowledge and truth, knowing and un-knowing, thinking and other mental processing, and 
the borderlines and boundaries of (visual) semiotics. When these are seen in the light of the un-
thought stage of image making all result in the feeling that within Lacan’s linguistic re-
inscriptions of Freud’s ideas, the question of meaning is too narrow when it de-emphasizes 
expression of affect/desire, and sees desire as a result of lack rather than a force in its own right. 
Lacan’s propositions are helpful to, and provide a basis for, my enquiry, but, for me, do not 
provide ‘the whole story’, in terms of the connection between signifiers, meaning and affect 
(even though he does consider desire as ‘existing’ in what he terms the ‘defiles of the signifier’). 
 
In terms of contestations of, and extensions to, Lacan’s ideas, I see Lyotard’s 
development of the notion of quite particular ‘devices’ of the libido, such as figure, 
dissimulation, and representations as ‘intensities’ of libidinal energy, as introducing a bridge 
between Lacan’s notion of the ‘linguistic’ unconscious and Lyotard’s ‘intensities’ of libidinal 
energy (see Chapter One, Section 2). At this point an initial synthesis can be achieved whereby 
Lyotard contributes the idea of figure and dissimulation to my debate and brings together 
Lacan’s binary of meaning and expression.285  
                                                          
285 There are other ideas in terms of the connection of image making with the ‘real’. For instance Kristeva proposes 
that in the semantic element of speech the speaking voice contributes in such a way that the materiality of voice and 
desire are not yet stripped away, as they are in for instance printed language. Even with handwriting there is the 
element of materiality of body and desire, seen in gesture and emphasis. (Julia Kristeva, ‘Revolution in Poetic 
  
 
127
 
Deleuze and Guattari contest Lacan’s notion of lack, which they say ignores the overall 
picture. They argue that in any case ‘lack’ is based on belief and therefore cannot be a part of 
the unconscious. They propose different ideas in their notion of schizoanalysis. For me, this 
opens out a larger arena for thinking about the un-thought stage. This is done firstly by arguing 
for the flow of energy rather than the flow (or not) of specifically (lack-induced) sexual energy. 
The latter is not ruled out, but seen as a ‘sub-set’ of psychical phenomena. Secondly, by way of 
Lyotard, it provides an understanding of the image as other than (only) re-presentational, that is, 
also more directly influenced by codes, the ‘production’ in the ‘real’ (including the intensities of 
which Lyotard speaks), by means of what I can now understand as the force of the libido.286  
 
I can now propose a direction for  ‘coming to terms’ with my various queries and 
caveats. This direction is to incorporate into the Deleuze and Guattari notion of schizoanalysis 
that which Lacan terms ‘lack’, such that the latter is seen as being of (fundamental) importance 
in our culture, although not seen as the basis of the unconscious. In addition, there is the idea of 
‘codes’ inscribed, which can be seen to include signifiers as a ‘sub-set’ at certain levels. My 
proposal, in line with that of Deleuze and Guattari, and as implied by Lyotard, is that human 
beliefs and concepts (for instance the Oedipus complex) can indeed result in Lacanian-type lack 
and ‘sexual desire’, with the associated phenomena and implications (signifiers, the symbolic, 
and the like). But there is more to the story in that not all libidinal energy is affected by such 
beliefs and concepts – some of our (creative) energy is less influenced by (for instance Oedipal) 
beliefs than others. In other words there are multiple libidinal pathways. The importance of this 
for image making is at this point quite subtle, since image making is on the whole 
representational, and subject to beliefs and concepts. My argument here is that what is at stake is 
the potential influences of libidinal energy per se, as well as lack driven desire, and the mixture 
of these influences in the un-thought stage. 
 
In other words Deleuze and Guattari’s arguments broaden the context within which 
Lacan’s ideas are to be understood. include their notion of libido as an energy that is 
understandable by means of its results (production) that form the unconscious in the molecular 
sense and on which can be built representation and meaning in a molar sense. Deleuze and 
Guattari see Lacan’s observations as being relevant not in the arena of the basic (schizoanalytic 
                                                                                                                                                                                                     
Language’ (New York, Columbia University Press, 1983 (1974)). This I see as related to Lyotard’s ‘figure’ and 
dissimulation and relevant to image making. 
286 There are the concomitant queries about the relationship of signifiers to both meaning and affect, which I discuss 
in the next chapter. I see Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of schizoanalysis as tenable notions of the workings of the 
body/psyche, based on a depth of practical experience and I use it in this context. It can also be seen as a basis for 
considering political bases, connections and interactions in other contexts. 
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notion of the) unconscious, but in the arena of a particular ‘human layer’ of this unconscious (or 
perhaps, a ‘deep’ pre-conscious) that we as humans have evolved – thwarted sexual energy, 
beliefs, concepts and language. This implies varying qualities and qualities of libidinal energy 
extant at any given time. Lacan’s concepts of the unconscious, the gaze, the conquest of the 
symbolic would be very difficult to envisage without the concept of lack and the desire it 
engenders, Lyotard’s notions of figure and dissimulation notwithstanding. But understanding 
Lacan’s concept of the Oedipal as operating at a level of belief leaves room for other actions and 
interactions of different levels of ‘energy’. Deleuze and Guattari propose that ‘non-human’ sex 
is the unconscious investment of the large molar aggregates (social and or biological 
environments) such that ‘sexuality is everywhere’, while human’ sex involves persons, things, 
beliefs (needs and interests).287 They posit that Lacan’s notion of the ‘Other’ is his attempt to 
‘determine the non-human nature of sex’ (in seeing the Other as a body without organs, as 
discussed above).288 In this way, the representations and beliefs of which Lacan speaks are still 
very pertinent when seen as being supported by, or within, such notions as those of production 
and desiring-machines developed by Deleuze and Guattari. In fact Lacan’s notion of desire in 
the defiles of the signifier is actually supported by the idea that there is a less thwarted flow of 
libidinal energy also ‘available’. 
 
These ideas add to the understanding of the un-thought stage by proposing a (radical) 
context within which to ‘see’ the un-thought stage occurring, as well as a clearer idea of the un-
thought stage as encompassing not only Lacan’s concepts of the unconscious in terms of origin, 
process and content, but also additional libidinal pathways, devices and intensities. There is a 
sense that the unconscious and its ‘energy’ is a ‘wider than human’ field of energy in the sense 
that any ‘humanizing’ aspects of language and belief are only part of the story. One can now 
visualize Freud’s ‘deep and dangerous currents’, as well as signifiers.289 What might then be 
seen is signifiers manifesting as the ‘beginning’ of aspects of human meaning, representation, 
and belief. This puts Lacan’s notions into a molar context where his concepts and beliefs are 
appropriate and useful. In this way the ideas of (Lacan’s) desire and (Lyotard’s and Deleuze and 
Guattari’s) libido can be seen to accommodate and enhance each other, rather than being 
distanciated by different basic assumptions. 
 
                                                          
287 Deleuze and Guattari, 293. 
288 Deleuze and Guattari, 295. 
289 Recall Freud’s polarity: on the one hand the unconscious of dangerous currents/drives and on the other hand the 
unconscious as beliefs needing help (his praxis was as an analyst who worked with beliefs). Deleuze and Guattari, 
‘Anti-Oedipus’, 293. 
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In answer to my (italicized) query at the beginning of the chapter, I can now see the 
unconscious not so much as ‘encapsulating ideas’, rather as encompassing unrealized signifiers. 
 
 
Section 4:   Next chapter 
 
There is still the unresolved caveat stated above, which has to do with Lacan’s notion of 
the primary processes producing ‘chaotic’ results. This is important to me in that I feel there can 
be a certain ‘harmony’ (see Chapter Two, Section 1.1.4) and feeling of association in terms of 
marks made in the un-thought stage that Lacan’s ideas de-emphasize. This is dealt with in the 
next chapter, where I not only consider Lacan’s notion of ‘processes’ that take place in the 
unconscious, but importantly I discuss Ehrenzweig’s notions about processes that (implicitly) 
both critique and extend Lacan’s ideas within the paradigm of the human unconscious and the 
un-thought stage of image making.  
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Chapter Three includes consideration of a third aspect of the unconscious as part of 
Lacan’s notion of the gaze, which is the ‘processes’ he sees operating in this arena.  Lacan’s 
view of the ‘primary processes’ and the ‘appearance’ of the unconscious are considered. 
Ehrenzweig’s and Lyotard’s relevant ideas about unconscious processes are discussed and 
related to Lacan’s ideas and to the un-thought stage of image making. 
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Chapter Three: Unconscious - Processes  
   
 
Having considered Lacan’s theories of the basis and the content of the unconscious in 
the first two chapters, as I stated in Chapter Two there is a third relevant sense of the ‘content’ 
of the unconscious for Lacan, the category of ‘process’.  My aim in this chapter is to consider 
and expand the notion of primary processes taking place in the unconscious by continuing to use 
Lacan’s ideas as a basis. However again in this chapter reservations arise, and I deal with these 
reservations by incorporating other points of view, here as proposed by Lyotard and 
Ehrenzweig. In a surprising manner these several ideas dovetail together when seen within a 
wider context relating to an economic understanding of process.290   
 
 
Section 1:  Dreams and other processes 
 
I wake up from a dream...a long and complicated dream, with several major episodes. 
The dream seems to shrink, stretch and shape shift all at the same time, as I try to remember it – 
rather like looking at oneself in a funny mirror and trying to make sense of the image. As I lie 
waking up and reviewing the dream, I have the strange feeling that the dream is somehow 
‘transposing’ as I re-view, rather like a decoder automatically transposing words as they arrive. 
This ‘transposition’ involves my ‘searchlight of awareness’ moving over a dishevelled and 
water-y series of scenes and events. But as the light of awareness hits each event, the event 
becomes transformed, tamed down, it loses much of its ‘surprise’, its ‘weirdness’. It’s like a 
comic film, as the camera pans across a group of people, the viewer catches a glimpse of each 
one doing something intense just as the camera catches them, but they instantly freeze into a 
pose for the camera. The events of the dream get ‘translated’ as I represent to myself an 
understanding, in order to remember and in order to narrate to others. I reflect in the studio on 
this process of translation. I see that it is a very similar phenomenon to one that can happen in 
and around the un-thought stage of image making: the idea of the unrealized, the ‘wall’ of 
                                                          
290 Note that B. Lichtenberg Ettinger’s notions also constitute a process. However I reserve her ideas for Chapter 
Four, ‘The Gaze’, because she provides a path of ‘synthesis’ with Lacan’s notion of the gaze since her ideas are 
developed particularly within the overall context of Lacan’s notion of the gaze.  
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symbolism, with the subsequent ‘translation’ of clues and hints, of evident chaos, into something 
more coherent – an image. The quality of the experience can be the same. 
 
1.1   The dream-work as a process of the unconscious       
 
Lacan agrees with Freud’s concept of the dream-work (see Introduction, Section 5.1) in 
terms of the basic set of ‘operations’ or processes occurring in the unconscious. However, again 
Lacan re-inscribes it. While he retains the basic four operations of condensation, displacement, 
figurality and secondary revision, Lacan emphasizes the linguistic operations of metaphor and 
metonymy as equivalent to condensation and displacement respectively. Looking back at 
Chapter Two (Sections 1.1.3 and 1.1.4), Lacan makes use of Freud’s findings, but re-orients the 
Freudian conceptualisation of the unconscious, proposing a basis of lack and a linguistic 
framework. He re-inscribes the unconscious as ‘structured like a language’. The linguistic 
operations of metaphor and metonymy are working on the ‘pure’ signifiers comprising the 
unconscious. In Chapter Two I made known my disquiet about what I feel is Lacan’s over-
emphasis on psychical structure and (from the point of view of the un-thought stage) his ‘under-
theorization’ of affect and the real and their interrelationships with signifiers.  
 
1.2   Word-presentations, thing-presentations, and cathexis 
 
I return to Freud’s ideas once again in this section in order to provide a specific example 
of what I feel is de-emphasized in Lacan’s re-inscriptions of Freud’s concepts of the dream-
work and the structure of the unconscious. As a basis for his concept of the dream-work, Freud 
proposes a relationship between perception and the conscious and unconscious. As I discussed 
in Chapter Two, Section 1.1.1, he posits that the unconscious includes material ‘between 
perception and the conscious mind’ (which Lacan re-inscribes as signifiers). In his paper ‘The 
Unconscious’, Freud discusses word-presentations and thing-presentations, each of which 
involve complex associations of various aspects of, and within, perception.291 Word 
presentations, he proposes, work by means of auditory, visual and kinaesthetic elements (in 
terms of speaking, reading, writing) and as such are complicated associative processes. They are 
‘closed presentations’, meaning that although ‘capable of extension’ these associative processes 
are limited.292 However a word acquires meaning by means of links with a ‘thing presentation’ 
(at least, he says, ‘in terms of substantives’). A thing-presentation also works by means of a 
                                                          
291 S. Freud, “The Unconscious”, 1915, Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, 
ed. J. Strachey (London, Hogarth Press, 1957),Volume XIV, 159 – 217. 
292 Freud, “Unconscious”, 200-202. 
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complex of associations, made up this time of a nearly infinite variety of ‘visual, acoustic, 
tactile, kinaesthetic and other presentations’ (one can look at a thing from a limitless number of 
angles, etc.) and thus are ‘open-presentations’.293 Both types can be ‘stored’ in the unconscious 
and can be cathected in varying degrees.294 Thus these word-presentations and thing-
presentations as perceived and carried in the unconscious include cathected energy (attached 
psychical energy), the amounts of which can vary, in particular here by means of the operations 
of the ‘primary processes’.  
 
For Freud, there is a qualitative difference as material moves from the unconscious to the 
pre-conscious/conscious system. He argues that: ‘the conscious presentation comprises the 
presentation of the thing plus the presentation of the word belonging to it, while the unconscious 
presentation is the presentation of the thing alone,’ each along with their cathected energy.295 
However, he posits, this energy is much more freely mobile from thing-to-thing in the 
unconscious, while much more tied down and less mobile to the thing-plus-word in the pre-
conscious system.296 He refers to this latter energy as more ‘bound’, so quality of energy and its 
level of binding are seen as equivalent. These ideas of Freud comprise, I believe, the basis for 
Lacan’s notion that there exists ‘desire’ in the defiles of the signifier.297 They also support my 
earlier conclusion that in general the conscious is comprised of signs and the unconscious is 
comprised of signifiers. In addition they describe aspects of the differences between primary and 
secondary psychical processes, in that these processes are working on different types of ‘data’. 
 
In re-inscribing Freud’s ideas, as we have seen in previous chapters, Lacan describes 
signifiers as the ‘content’ of the unconscious, as signs ‘minus’ attached meaning, and as 
enabling the unconscious to be structured like a language with linguistic-type operations 
happening rather than the more comprehensive view of primary processes that Freud proposes 
(stressing ideas, cathexis of energy and so on). 
 
Freud’s arguments pinpoint for me a precise value of encouraging the emergence of 
marks (as signifiers, or thing-presentations) without mentally attached descriptions (meaning, or 
word-presentations), in that the increased mobility allows for increased slippage and surprise. It 
also addresses two things I have pointed out as being problematic for me in Lacan’s ideas. One 
is the ‘detachment of meaning’ and its ‘re-attachment’. The other is the ‘relationship’ in terms of 
                                                          
293 Freud, “Unconscious”, 213. 
294 Cathexis is the association of psychical energy with a word, object, person, part of the body, etc. 
295 Freud, “Unconscious”, 210-215. 
296 Freud, “Unconscious”, 201. 
297 Lacan, ‘Seminar XI’, Chapter 12. 
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associations between signifiers. In terms of meaning, it is my view that what Lacan does, in 
defining and emphasising the importance of signifiers, is to de-emphasize the idea of mobility of 
cathected energy, and to translate this instead to loss of signifieds/meaning.298 It seems to me 
that my concern about the loss and then possible ‘replacement’ of meaning (as seen in the last 
chapter) is not what Freud is emphasizing, rather his emphasis (in this reference) is the loss and 
shifting of energy. Freud proposes that the (radical) difference between the unconscious system 
and the pre-conscious system lies in the fact that within the unconscious system the ‘thing-
presentation’ is much less likely to have a ‘word’ associated with it, while at the same time 
having a greater mobility of cathexis. Conversely, in the pre-conscious system, the likelihood of 
such a word association is much greater, while the mobility of cathexis becomes much reduced. 
Again according to Freud, the meaning of a word-presentation evolves (partly) from the thing-
presentation-association, which happens (mostly) in the preconscious. I see that Freud’s ideas 
also include more emphasis on relationships and ‘associations’ between word presentation and 
thing presentation. The importance of these ideas for the un-thought stage is that attempting to 
work at a level of mind where these associations have not been made has a value insofar as it 
involves wider parameters, more open associations, and more mobile (less bound) cathexes of 
the thing-presentations. This can be seen clearly in poetry, for instance Ted Hughes’ collection 
‘Crow’, where widely varied analogies and references are knitted together into a meaningful, yet 
surprising, collection of ‘poetic images’.299 
 
Although these observations do not invalidate Lacan’s notion of signifiers, they call into 
question Lacan’s emphasis. 
 
My question at this point evolves from a query about the (dis)placement of meaning to a 
query about the ‘attachment’ of language and rational processes to a thing-presentation. For 
Lacan, the dreamwork is seen more formally as a series of linguistically-structured operations, 
in the sense that the ‘objects’ become ‘text’ (signifiers) on which textual operations take place 
(for Lacan, as we have seen, condensation is analogous to metaphor and displacement to 
metonymy). Recall that, while he proposes that ‘the unconscious is structured like a language’, 
he insists that this does not imply that it involves meaningful discourse. In this sense he refers to 
‘objects’, but makes of them linguistic objects; he retains the dreamwork but makes of it a 
process that emphasizes linguistic-type operations. For me, as I also pointed out in Chapter 
Two, what is lost or under-stated by Lacan is both an integral connection between ‘signifiers’ as 
                                                          
298 See also the discussion in Chapter Two about signifiers and meaning. 
299 Ted Hughes, Crow – From the Life and Songs of the Crow (London, Faber and Faber, 1972). This also points up 
the co-existence of words and images in terms of modes of expression.   
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having ‘associations’ and an integral connection between signifier and affect as psychic energy. 
This unease is articulated by Lyotard as described in Section 2 below. But first I want to 
consider Lacan’s ideas about the ‘appearance’ of unconscious material, since this also involves a 
type of ‘process’. 
 
1.3      ‘Appearance’ of unconscious material 
 
 1.3.1    The stain 
 
Lacan’s concept of the stain involves the idea that the realm of the ‘real’ can affect the 
realm of the symbolic by way of a circuitous route. This route involves aspects of trauma that 
can leave traces on the psyche. These traces can in turn influence the symbolic. I see this as 
related to Lyotard’s notion of the figure and dissimulation, as they can affect particular semantic 
structures (see Chapter Two, Section 2.1). However Lacan’s notion does not concern particular 
semantic structures, but is rather a more generalized ‘influence’, perhaps seen instead as 
‘character traits’ as they affect the individual’s particularized grasp and use of the symbolic. In 
other words, Lacan’s concept of stain is a more ephemeral and non-particularized influence than 
Lyotard’s concept of dissimulation.  
 
1.3.2     The gap and ‘impediment’ 
 
At the ‘heart’ of the structure of the unconscious is a process that Lacan terms the 
‘causal gap’. This is the unplanned emergence of ‘unconscious’ material, for instance as a slip of 
the tongue, ‘accidents’ in painting, etc. This he refers to as the ‘Law of the signifier’ as seen in 
the domain of cause.300 Lacan sees that the unconscious as it appears does so as an ‘impediment’ 
to conscious mental processing.301 The unconscious, he states, has an intentionality of its own, 
and a ‘strange pulsating temporality’, with ‘something other demanding to be realized’.302 For 
Lacan: 
What occurs, what is produced, in this gap, is presented as the discovery, surprise, that by which 
the subject feels himself overcome, by which he finds both more and less than he expected – but, in any 
case, it is, in relation to what he expected, of exceptional value.303 
                                                          
300 Lacan, ‘Seminar XI’, 46-47 and 23. 
301 Lacan, ‘Seminar XI’, 24. 
302 Lacan, ‘Seminar XI’, 24. In considering this ‘strange temporality’, Lacan posits a ‘temporal pulsation’ between 
the ‘opening’ and ‘closing’ of the unconscious, the gap, which is one way that the unconscious manifests itself. 
This he terms ‘logical time’ in that it is related to ‘internal’ subjective matters, rather than day to day hours and 
minutes. 
303 Lacan, ‘Seminar XI’, 25. (My addition.)    
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This discovery, he explains, is always ready to ‘steal away again’, thereby establishing 
the ‘dimension of loss’, and leaving the conscious mind to cope with its manifestations.304 There 
are ‘thoughts’ in the unconscious, but it is impossible to represent them except as in dreams, 
because they are unrealized signifiers.305 Their common attribute as they emerge into the 
conscious mind is what Lacan calls the ‘colophon of doubt’ – an accompanying feeling of 
doubt. To me this is close to a description of what can happen in the un-thought stage – it can 
act as an impediment to the conscious mind, it has its own intentionality, and its results are very 
often subject to doubt as, and just after, they emerge. 
 
This notion of ‘impediment’ relates back to Lacan’s concept of the radical alterity 
between the unconscious mind and the conscious mind. There is a feeling that something is 
missing, or hidden, or distorted as the content of the unconscious emerges. While the signifier of 
an idea is present, the meaning (signified) has been stripped away, or left behind, causing the 
feeling of ‘impedance’ in two senses.306 One sense is that the material emerging is impeded 
(unrealized) as it emerges and the other sense is that its emergence impedes (disrupts), for that 
‘moment’, the functionality of the conscious mind. In terms of image making, this concept of 
‘impediment’ can further explain the ‘mysterious’, the inchoate, the ‘very strange indeed’ 
(Elkins). For example, see again the Beuys drawings, which include meaning-ful as well as 
apparently meaningless marks, marks that apparently appear with difficulty since one is working 
‘blind’, in the sense that one is not functioning in a conscious rational arena.307 Recall also in 
my description of the process of image making the emergence of surprise and a feeling of 
‘exceptional value’ (which is not always justified with hindsight). 
 
1.3.3    The subject: the gap and aphanisis 
 
Lacan’s notion of the unconscious is important for me because image making can be 
seen as a praxis involving the treating of the real by means of the symbolic. However, before 
proceeding to a consideration of Lacan’s wider concept of the gaze in the next chapter, I want to 
take a side-step to consider his concept of the ‘subject’ as relevant in this thesis (see also 
Introduction, Background Concepts, Section 5.5).  What is close to the heart of this thesis is the 
                                                          
304 Lacan, ‘Seminar XI’, 25. 
305 Lacan, ‘Seminar XI’, 44. 
306 There is, logically, a further aspect of the appearance of content by irruption and with impedance.  This is the 
important matter of attaching or recapturing particular associated meaning, whether in the context of a dream or an 
image.  Lacan addresses this, in one way, by use of what he calls ‘rhetoric’, which for him is the use of linguistic 
tools such as condensation and displacement in the interpretation of dreams.   
307 See also for instance J. Derrida, Memoirs of the Blind, trans. P-A Brault and M. Naas (Chicago and London, 
University of Chicago Press, 1993). 
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relationship of ‘being’ (the real) and ‘meaning’ (the symbolic). For Lacan, one way of thinking 
about ‘meaning’ is the subject seen as signifier for another signifier, because in this way the 
subject is ‘petrified’ as a signifier in the eyes of others, insofar as the signifier in the field of the 
Other ‘makes manifest’ the subject of its signification.308 In other words as the subject 
represents himself as subject, at the same moment this subject is ‘petrified’ into a signifier (for 
another subject/signifier). This means that as the subject ‘speaks’, the unconscious as desire 
‘closes’. Thus the subject manifests him/herself in this movement of disappearance, or fading, of 
his ‘being-as-subject’. Lacan terms this ‘aphanisis’. He uses an understanding of the joining of 
mathematical ‘sets’ of information to illustrate the idea of the subject as ‘being’ and its 
relationship to the concept of the Other as ‘meaning’.309 This joining of sets is one way Lacan 
explains the ‘split’ of the subject from the unconscious. He uses the mathematical idea of the 
‘vel of alienation’, the joining of two sets of elements such that in the ‘joined’ or overlap area 
(seen as two circles that overlap) neither one set of elements nor the other set is possible. If 
‘being’ is a set of elements in one circle, and ‘meaning’ is a set of elements in another circle and 
the circles overlap, then, explains Lacan, if ‘being’ is chosen, then the subject as such 
disappears, because it ‘falls into non-meaning’. If ‘meaning’ is chosen, what falls away is that 
which constitutes the realization of the subject, unconscious desire, such that meaning in a 
particular individual’s case becomes eclipsed by the ‘disappearance of being’ that is ‘induced by 
the very function of the signifier’.310  
 
From another point of view, for Lacan, as seen in Chapter One, there is a link between 
re-presentation and death insofar as the conquest of the symbolic is born of the unconscious 
acceptance of lack as lack of immortality or ‘prohibition’, with unconscious desire being the 
result of this lack.311 Lacan’s idea of the phallic function connects, within the individual, the 
conquest of the symbolic (meaning) and the force of the drive (being).312 But the radical 
difference between the two (e.g that they can never ‘meet’) is the basis for understanding his 
notion of the split and alienated subject. In undergoing what he calls aphanisis, as seen above, 
the subject fades out to allow the unconscious to ‘emerge’, and then this ‘gap’ for emergence 
closes again and the self-conscious subject returns.313 Lacan’s notion of ‘gap’ describes the 
‘locus’ of the appearance or emergence of unconscious material into speech, and/or symptoms, 
                                                          
308 Lacan, ‘Seminar XI’, 207. 
309 Lacan, ‘Seminar XI’, 211. 
310 Lacan, ‘Seminar XI’, 211. 
311 Deleuze and Guattari propose that beliefs (re-presentations) can negatively affect the workings (flow) of the 
libido. Bataille proposes that un-knowing is closely connected with the sacred, sacrifice and death.  
312 The partial drives, for Lacan, are a result of desire in search of particularlized ‘objects’, as opposed to desire 
itself, which is a result of ‘lack’. See for instance Lacan, ‘Seminar XI’, 103-4. 
313 Lacan, ‘Seminar XI’, 210-11. 
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which ‘happen’ to a person without their being aware of either wanting them, or consciously 
performing them, or even understanding them, as seen in the previous section (1.3.2).  
 
 
The important point here is that I see this fading in and out of the subject as occurring in 
the un-thought stage of image making. Whereas in Lacan’s version aphanisis happens 
‘inadvertently’ from the point of view of the conscious mind, from my point of view it can be 
encouraged, for instance in terms of a (momentary) ‘withholding’ of conscious rationality. 
Lacan refers to such fading as an irruption from the unconscious; an artist may refer to it as 
coincidence, accident, or synchronicity. What is interesting to me in the studio is to encourage 
this process as a basis for image making, as I describe in the Introduction. In this way, surprise 
and intensity can result 
             
In terms of the un-thought stage, aphanisis is an interesting description of the un-thought 
stage as it ‘emerges’ and replaces ‘meaning’ with ‘being’. This is the direct communication of 
the real – not meaning or re-presentation, but being, for instance gestures, marks, colours, 
‘wrestling with the materials’ as such. The ‘reduction of the non-meaning’, in terms of the artist, 
could be seen as operating in stages one and three of the model of the process of image making 
(as seen in the Introduction). The real can appear as ‘being’, emerging in an impeded fashion in 
the un-thought stage, but ‘intentional’ enough to enable a series of (somehow connected) 
episodes on the artistic support.314 In Section Three below, Ehrenzweig’s ideas can be 
understood to substantiate this notion, which coincides with my experience in the studio.  
 
Referring back to the description of artistic processes in my Introduction, there are a 
number of attributes that appear as a result of the un-thought stage of the process of image 
making as it is described there. The juxtapositions, conjunctions, overlaps and merging of forms 
and figures are such attributes.315 The attribute of non-completion and/or non-closure of images 
is another. In addition, images produced can have the feeling of ‘notes’, traces, fleeting thoughts 
caught hold of. There can be elements of obliteration, of traces and absence. Accidents happen. 
These are likely results, given the absence of conscious rationality concerning compositional 
factors, mimetic attributes, and the like, and given the attributes of the unrealized, the gap, 
                                                          
314 This relates to the idea of performance (see also footnote 264 considering the topic of performance) in terms of 
the bodily presence, for instance gestures of the mark maker still incorporating aspects of desire. Dissimulation of 
structures can be seen to happen here. 
315 See the reproduction of a portion of my painting ‘Silver – detail’ in the Introduction (Illustration In.2). 
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impediments and the aphanisis of the subject that are currently being considered.316 It is also 
opens the possibility of the (later) emergence/development of meaning not previously planned.  
 
Anton Ehrenzweig articulates a set of notions that help to visualize and particularize the 
processes of artistic creativity within the particular arena of the un-thought stage itself. But first 
I consider Lyotard’s relevant ideas about processes in terms of dream-work and the libido. 
 
 
 
Section 2:  Lyotard – libidinal economy 
 
As I review my dreams in the quiet of the studio, I notice an overall pattern or ‘flavour’ 
of my dreams as they relate to my day-to-day experiences. Rather than reflecting particular 
events or producing particular knowledge or discourse, there is a particular flavour of current 
events in my life concerning breaks and flows of energy. If I am at a crossroads in some 
particular area of my life, if there is a break in energy flow due to some anxiety or other, (some) 
dreams may have a break element emphasized. This might be, for instance, an anxiety dream 
where I cannot pay a bill, something is about to explode, the lights won’t go on. When I have 
resolved a situation to some extent in my life, the dreams tend to reflect a flow: there may be a 
problem in the dream, but somehow it gets resolved, the flow outweighs or resolves the break in 
energy, and the outcome of the dream no longer provokes (or reflects) a state of anxiety. In this 
case the flavour becomes quite different, more flowing than breaking.  This is in spite of the fact 
that the details of the dreams themselves may seem to have little to do with the actual events of 
the preceding days.  
It seems to me, as I ponder, that there is a related ‘effect’ in image making.  As I am 
‘catching a drawing in flight’, for instance, the process can also be seen to produce a similar 
‘flavour’. I suggest that image making may have a similar ‘feeling’ of breaks and flows. The 
breaks and/or flows can happen within the un-thought stage itself. Sometimes the drawing 
                                                          
316 This chapter relates to what I refer to as the emergence of ideas and thought onto the ‘support’ of the art work.  
There is a sense that insofar as painting and drawing are a process of image making, they are also a performance. 
This idea is developed, for instance, in G. Currie An Ontology of Art (London, Macmillan Press, 1989). He thinks 
about how the artist comes to solve various technical and conceptual problems within ‘artistic tradition and 
convention’ and develops the idea of ‘action types’.  I understand this also as including the ‘irruption’ of 
unconscious material, and how that material is ‘handled’. This idea opens the field of painting and drawing to some 
of the critical thinking within the context of performance – as for instance Peggy Phelan, Unmarked (London, 
Routledge, 1993), and H.M. Sayres, The Object of Performance (London, University of Chicago Press, 1989), 
exploring the relationship between image and desire.  However, for me, ‘performance’  implies an outline or plan of 
procedure, which takes it outside of my exact focus on the un-thought stage, where (ideally) no plan or outline is 
being ‘followed’. 
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process flows, the effort seems focused and coherent; sometimes there is more an effect of break 
than flow, with fidgets and distractions as breaks in concentration.  
 
In Chapter One, concerning the basis of the unconscious, I consider Lyotard’s 
contestation of Lacan’s notion of lack and its concomitant desire insofar as Lacan terms this the 
basis of the unconscious. In Chapter Two, concerning the content of the unconscious, I discuss a 
third set of ideas, schizoanalysis, within which both Lacan and Lyotard’s ideas can be 
accommodated. In Chapter Two, I also discuss Lyotard’s notions of figure and dissimulation 
that enable a ‘synthesis’ of ideas related to semiotics (Lacan) and expression (Lyotard), such 
that they can be seen theoretically not only to co-exist but in some measure to be co-dependant, 
since expression appears ‘within’ the structure of language and its meaning. For the purposes of 
the present chapter, Lyotard by means of elaborating Freud’s concept of the dream-work 
concerning processes of the unconscious, develops his notion of the processes taking place that 
effect this ‘instant of dissimulation.317 Whereas in dissimulation he develops the idea that the 
influence of desire is able to affect the structure of signs, in terms of the dream-work he 
develops his ideas regarding the overall processes of desire in the field of the unconscious.318 In 
this way he offers a different perspective to Lacan’s ideas about linguistic-type operations 
happening in the dream-work. 
 
Lyotard sees that the dream-work consists of processes of desire ‘working over’ the 
dream-thoughts, rather than of ‘imitating’ discourse. In other words, as in the title of his essay, 
the dream-work ‘does not think’. Lyotard’s claim is that each of the operations posited in 
Freud’s dream-work proceeds ‘according to rules which are in direct opposition to those 
governing discourse’.319 He further claims that: ‘desire does not speak; it does violence to the 
order of utterance’. Lyotard not only makes it sound like a fluid process, and non-intelligent 
(e.g. there is no ‘thinking’ or censoring entity controlling it), but also locates these fluid 
movements of desire as happening in two ‘locations’.  He explains: ‘The figure is hand in glove 
with desire on at least two counts. At the margin of discourse it is the density within what I am 
talking about retires from view; at the heart of discourse it is its ‘form’’.320 In other words 
expression and transformation/distortion can manifest in (at least) two distinct manners, image 
and form. Furthermore, his idea of dissimulation, the distortion of language by way of the 
‘violence’ of desire, applies also to the dream-work, and for me extends to image making. 
 
                                                          
317 Lyotard, “Dream-work”.  See also Freud, ‘Interpretation’, Chapter 6. 
318 Lyotard, “Tensor”. 
319 Lyotard, “Dreamwork”, 19. 
320 Lyotard, “Dreamwork”, 19. (My emphasis). See also Introduction, Section 5.1. 
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2.1   Desire, dissimulation and dream-work 
 
Regarding Lyotard’s concept of desire, he proposes that it carries its own ‘primary 
repression’. This is in the sense that it has never ‘spoken’, never been ‘put into words’, so it is 
not being disguised, but rather being transgressed.  In other words, it is the act of dreaming that 
fulfils desire, it is not the dream content that fulfils desire. It is the process, not the content, of 
the dreaming that becomes the basis for the representations of the dream.  
 
Freud states that the function of the dream is wish fulfilment and posits that the motive 
of distortion is censorship, forcing desire to disguise itself.321 But Lyotard reminds us that 
according to Freud the essence of the dream is not in the manifest content, and that the 
dreamwork is not like waking thought (e.g. discourse), but instead the importance of the dream-
work lies in the processes that diverge, transform and transgress the original dream-thoughts.322 
Thus, in extending these ideas to include image making, it is not only that desire ‘causes’ or 
influences the image to be made, but, as a process, it infiltrates the very making! In this way, 
censorship, for Lyotard as for Ehrenzweig (as seen below), is de-emphasized as a concept.323 
For Lyotard what ‘takes the place’ of censorship is the process of being ‘worked over’ by desire, 
rather than a knowing and purposeful intervention by a ‘knowing’ entity.  
 
Lyotard points out that there is an element of deception in the image, and an element of 
deception in writing, in that the objects of the text/image can be taken either for themselves or 
for what they represent. This was seen in Chapter Two with Lyotard’s notions of the theatrical 
and disreal spaces. There is a similar element of deception in the dream, where the operations of 
desire have the function of interfering with the text ‘by fabricating a manifest text’ which 
appears to be readable/understandable, but is in fact an element of ‘deception’. Lyotard explains: 
At this point we pass from the energistic to the linguistic, which is readable. But this 
readability is a pseudo-readability. As we have seen, even when it is possible to read it, we 
ought not to read it, because this ‘content’ is not a text, but an object.324   
 
This is desire as ‘pseudo-linguistic’. Again, any ‘meaning’ for Lyotard is purely 
accidental, in the sense that the transgressivity appears to leave no room for retaining any 
meaning. The implications of this for image making are complex. A pseudo-readability would 
imply that any resulting meaning would be arbitrary, or un-determined, or un-related to the 
original (dream)-thoughts. In other words, it would be arbitrary, and lodged not so much in the 
                                                          
321 Freud, ‘Interpretation’, Chapter 4, ‘Distortion’.  
322 Lyotard, “Dreamwork”, 21. 
323 Lyotard, “Dreamwork”, 25. 
324 Lyotard, “Dreamwork”, 50. 
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dreamer’s (maker’s) mind as in the narrator (viewer’s) – not so much in the dream-thoughts 
(thoughts) themselves as in the narrator’s (maker’s) subsequent interpretation. This idea 
provides a basis, for instance, for such notions as ‘the death of the author’. Lyotard says: 
We are thus discouraged from too hastily attributing secondary revision to a rational agency 
inasmuch as what results from its intervention is precisely not rational! Every translation 
passes through the signified; here it is simply an equivalence in the order of signifiers that is 
given.325  
 
In the same way, a ‘pseudo-readability’ with regard to images can be seen to involve 
seemingly realistic (readable) images that are in fact quite distorted in the sense of being an 
‘object’ rather than ‘mimetic’. 
 
2.2   Desire and art making, with caveat 
 
However, this leaves me, on evidence from the studio, rather than from dreams, as 
dissatisfied. While there may be elements of truth in dream situations, I argue that art is an 
‘intentional’ and ‘positive’ activity, as opposed to symptoms and dreams which are more 
‘passive’ – e.g. not connected directly to human will and intent. How is this important to the 
process of image making? Again we come to a juncture where making images is introduced into 
a context of dreaming. Again it is worthwhile remembering why this can be valid. It is because 
in the un-thought stage of image making I propose that there is a relaxation of rational thought 
and planning, which, as Lyotard posits, allows more freedom for desire to play its part. This was 
originally seen by Freud to happen in dreaming while relaxed in sleep, making dreaming, as he 
states, a ‘royal road to the unconscious’.  
 
In one sense, my claim becomes a reflection of that of Lyotard such that there is ‘work 
of desire’ which takes place in the production of an image in fine art, which consists of ‘doing 
violence’ to the ‘utterance’ conceived in the conscious (or pre-conscious) mind. This is an 
extension of Lyotard’s notion that ‘figure’ can be seen both in the ‘margin of discourse’ (for me, 
the margin of image making, for instance its intensities and energy) and in the ‘form of 
discourse’ (for me, the form of image, for instance as manifested in the materiality). Note that 
what is (still) not included in this notion of dreamwork is ‘subject matter’, in the sense of  
‘meaning’, or in the sense of any kind of ‘harmony’. One thought, as seen also in Chapter Two, 
is that there is a ‘quality’ of, as well as various intensities of, libido. In my view, this dual 
function can be extended to image making in that the libido introduces, by way of form (as in 
materiality) the attribute of the integral, and by way of figure (as intensities of libido), the 
                                                          
325 Lyotard, “Dreamwork”, 45-46. (See also Freud, ‘Interpretation’, Chapter 6, Secondary Revision section). 
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attribute of the ephemeral. Lyotard’s proposals as extended to the process of image making can 
reflect the interaction of image making with the underlying energy.  
 
My purpose in including these ideas is to point out that what Lyotard adds is a picture of 
the libido in action as such, in contrast to Lacan’s concept of lack-induced linguistic operations 
happening in a linguistic structure of mental material. 
 
As I have proposed, Lyotard’s argument that the dream-work is the process of desire 
‘working over’ unconscious material can be extended to the second stage of the process of 
image making, in which it can be argued that a dreamwork-like process is taking place, where 
the ‘closure’ of rational thought, as in dreaming, allows more free play to the energy/force of 
desire, producing hybrids of images from cross-fertilized and ‘worked-over’ memories, 
phantasies, learning and thoughts. Lyotard’s ideas extend this with his ideas of spatiality, and 
the ‘work’ of desire. On the other hand this still leaves open the dichotomy between the notional 
chaos of the unconscious and the notional relatedness and ‘harmony’ of an emerging art-work. 
This is addressed in detail by Anton Ehrenzweig. 
 
 
Section 3:  Ehrenzweig 
 
Anton Ehrenzweig looks at the process (he uses the word in the singular) occurring in 
the unconscious from a different point of view than either Freud or Lacan, while remaining 
within the Freudian paradigm.326 His proposal is based on the idea of a direct relationship 
between perception and the energy of the libido, in this sense more related to Lyotard. He sees 
this specifically as related to the process of making art. This idea also draws out the economic 
paradigm in Freud to recast ideas of the process that happens in unconscious perception, in the 
sense of the idea of the attachment of cathected energy to mental material.327 He emphasizes the 
results as well as the process, rather than the (static, formal) elements of the unconscious, as 
does Lacan, or the force/energy in itself, as do Deleuze and Guattari, and Lyotard. 
 
3.1   Perception, the libido and the unconscious 
                                                          
326 Taken primarily from Anton Ehrenzweig, The Hidden Order of Art, A study in the Psychology of Artistic 
Imagination (London, University of California Press, 1967). Ehrenzweig is the exception to my list of post-
Lacanian writers, and was in fact influenced by the British School. However I have included his ideas due to his 
lucid and experience-based visualizations of the unconscious process at work in exactly the arena with which this 
thesis deals. In this case his roots in Freudian theory are enough to qualify him for inclusion here.  
327 ‘Economic’ is used here in the sense of the ebb and flow and potential re-distribution of ‘libidinal’ energy, as 
seen in different aspects of perception, related to the unconscious. 
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The paradox in art, Ehrenzweig explains, results from the fact that art is constructed to 
some extent within the unconscious; for this reason, conscious perception cannot perceive all the 
complexities of the resulting structure. He argues that: 
 The classical concept of the primary process (which forms unconscious phantasy) denies it 
any structure. Unconscious phantasy does not distinguish between opposites, fails to 
articulate time and space as we know it, and allows all firm boundaries to melt in a free 
chaotic mingling of forms. Art, on the other hand, appears the embodiment of rigorous 
organization. So it has been assumed that art’s structure is exclusively shaped by conscious 
and pre-conscious functions, the so-called secondary process.328 
 
However, Ehrenzweig posits, the primary process is not unstructured and chaotic but has 
its own structure. Art, and indeed everyday consciousness, have recourse to material shaped by 
this primary process. This means that both the conscious mind and the structure of artworks 
reflect in some measure the primary process.329 The process of the unconscious is seen by 
Ehrenzweig to be integral to the making of art. In addition, for him, the study of the process of 
art making contributes to the study of the unconscious.330 He proposes that not only are 
unconscious structure and process not ‘merely chaotic’, but they can be conceived as both 
purposeful and capable of development through learning.331 Ehrenzweig argues that the seeming 
lack of structure in the unconscious components of art, for instance the scribbles of ‘artistic 
handwriting’ or background textures, is due to a superficial appearance, due to the fact that the 
conscious mind cannot grasp all the complexities involved. He shows that: 
the complexity of a creative search […] has to explore many avenues, [and] needs an 
advance on a broader front which keeps contradicting options open. In the solution of 
complex tasks the undifferentiation of unconscious vision turns into an instrument of 
rigorous precision and leads to results that are fully acceptable to conscious rationality […] 
In contrast to [mental] illness, creative work succeeds in coordinating the results of 
unconscious undifferentiation and conscious differentiation and so reveals the hidden order 
in the unconscious.332  
                                                          
328  Ehrenzweig, 3. 
329 Ehrenzweig, 268.  
330 Ehrenzweig, 253. Lacan (1960’s onward) saw the ego as existing in the realm of the imaginary, dealing with 
identity, for instance, and the subjective as being in the  realm of the symbolic. (See also Chapter Two above.) 
There is a basic difference between Ehrenzweig’s discourse and that of Lacan in that Lacan speaks of the ‘subject’, 
while Ehrenzweig speaks of the ‘ego’. For my purposes, in considering the process of making images, I have 
concluded that these two terms, as used by these two writers, are analogous enough, that is have enough of an 
overlap, to overlook the theoretical differences between the two terms.  This is because my focus is on the 
‘individual who is making’ and for whom conscious states and ‘unconscious’ states alternate. For this reason, I will 
treat the terms, for practical purposes, as  synonymous. 
331 This differs from Lyotard’s more violent and transgressive model, as I considered in the previous section of this 
chapter. 
332 Ehrenzweig, 4-5. (My emphases). This idea of contradicting options, and their relationship to image making, is 
directly related to my idea of the ‘libidinal gaze’, as elaborated in Chapter Five. The motivation for this research he 
describes as follows: ‘My concept of an undifferentiated matrix of perception arose from the need to interpret the 
long-standing failure of psychoanalytic aesthetics to find the unconscious substructure of art.  One could account 
for the failure in two ways.  It was possible to discard Freud’s approach to aesthetics altogether (this was what E. 
Kris ultimately did), or one can assume that we have failed to find art’s substructure because it defies our conscious 
powers of visualization. This is the solution proposed here.  It does, of course, expand the use of the term 
‘unconscious’ as understood by current theory. But this is only another way of saying that the term ‘primary 
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These points are integral to my developing argument of the ‘usefulness’ to, and indeed 
integrality of, the process of the unconscious with the un-thought stage of image making. This is 
because he proposes a theoretical basis for this process visualizing the ‘coordination’ and 
‘emergence’ of relevant (but sometimes surprising) material. The last sentence in the quotation 
supports my emerging view in this thesis that the study of dreams and symptoms (in 
psychoanalytic theory), while useful in emphasizing the idea that image making can result from 
coordination of conscious rationality and unconscious process/material seen as dis-similar 
psychical elements, is not wholly adequate for illuminating the un-thought stage.  
 
3.2   Basic terminology 
 
But before considering Ehrenzweig’s arguments, it is necessary to set the stage by 
reviewing his definition of basic terms. In his proposal, Ehrenzweig utilizes five basic terms that 
relate both to perception and to the unconscious, and which are linked them closely to the thetic 
interest in Lacan’s notion of the gaze. He uses ‘perception’ in the sense of perceiving the 
exterior world, and ‘phantasy’ when perceiving the interior world, such as phantasies, memories 
and affects. His five terms are: differentiation, dedifferentiation, undifferentiation, syncretistic 
scanning and re-introjection. ‘Differentiation’ is used in reference to conscious perception, 
either in a general sense or in the particular sense of looking at visual art. Differentiation is the 
result, in everyday perception, of the workings of the ‘gestalt’.333 In other words, differentiation 
can be understood to be the differentiation between the figure and the ground. In the visual field, 
the gestalt is said to ‘improve on’ what is perceived, by smoothing away glitches and 
imperfections, thereby generalizing and ‘missing out’ individual blemishes, distortions, etc.334 
An example of individuality, which is ‘smoothed away’ by the gestalt, would be a distinguishing 
mark on the face of a stranger that soon becomes ignored with familiarity and the action of the 
gestalt principle, whereas in scanning that face in a crowd, the distinguishing mark would be 
more noticeable. The point here is that ‘normal’ vision’ is what he terms ‘differentiated’, being 
                                                                                                                                                                                                     
process’ needs revision. The quality of being unconscious is not dependent on the superego’s censorship directed 
against certain contents, but automatically follows from a change in the formal structure of image making, i.e. from 
the ego’s dedifferentiation of conscious gestalt.  This implies that we cannot produce the originally undifferentiated 
structure of the primary process for conscious inspection, but only its conscious derivatives like conglomerated, 
bizarre condensations, illogical displacements and the like. This difficulty should not deter us.  It applies to any 
phenomenon of the unconscious. The concept of the unconscious is not a physical fact open to direct 
demonstration, but an explanatory concept which allows us to explain certain phenomena which otherwise could 
not be satisfactorily explained.’ 
333 This ‘gestalt’, or pattern of ordinary analytic perception, is described by Ehrenzweig as follows. ‘From the 
undifferentiated mosaic of the visual field we are compelled to select a ‘’figure’’ on which attention concentrates 
while the rest of visual data recedes and fuses into a vague background of indistinct texture.’ (Ehrenzweig, 11 and 
21.) 
334 Ehrenzweig, 11. 
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divided into ‘important’ and less important visual information for the particular moment in time, 
for whatever reason: swift recognition, habit, and so on.  
 
‘Dedifferentiation’ happens when, for various reasons, normal conscious perception gets 
put under pressure – the gestalt becomes more and more fragmented, or ‘scattered’, and 
conscious perception becomes less and less able to handle the complexifications that ensue. This 
can happen due to physical causes such as dim lighting, speed, or being in unknown 
circumstances. It can also happen, he proposes, in any problem-solving situation, from physics 
to art making. In such circumstances, involving various options, not only does the scanning 
introduce major (exterior) perceptual complications, but for instance in art making it also 
introduces various (interior) beliefs and knowledge of the artist, which, as they come forward 
for ‘consideration’, again hugely complicate the perceptual field. Ehrenzweig calls it ‘the 
dynamic process by which the ego scatters and represses surface imagery’.335 The great virtue of 
this process is that it allows an overall grasp of the details of the total object. It is a process of 
scattering of details, but consequently greater overall grasp of material. This process of 
perception moves into the unconscious because of the inability of the conscious gestalt 
processing to function adequately in these circumstances.  
 
‘Undifferentiation’ is the third term. For Ehrenzweig, the difference between 
‘undifferentiated’ and ‘dedifferentiated’ is only that the latter is initiated by the ego in a 
purposeful manner. The former, he posits, is happening to some extent much of the time. 
Undifferentiation and dedifferentiation are closely linked to the fourth notion, ‘syncretistic 
scanning’.  
 
Ehrenzweig proposes that syncretistic scanning is the basis of both dedifferentiation and 
undifferentiation in the sense that when the gestalt of conscious vision becomes overloaded (or 
before it has been learned), syncretistic scanning takes over.336 It is an unconscious process and 
thus both impossible to experience consciously and difficult to visualize (or articulate) 
consciously. To normal awareness, this scanning appears as chaotic and finally a blank. Yet, he 
points out, the ‘recognition of objects from cues rather than from the analysis of [the gestalt] 
abstract detail is the beginning of syncretistic vision’ and is exemplified in the difference of the 
human nose as triangular from the side and ‘a shapeless squiggle’ from the front. His important 
point here is the difference between perception based on ‘cues’ and that based on analysis of 
                                                          
335 Ehrenzweig, 19. 
336 Where syncretistic scanning refers to attention which is scattered to the total appearance without regard to detail, 
and where gestalt refers to focus on abstract details, as in drawing an individual nose, face, lips, which can then be 
compared one by one with objects being drawn. 
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(‘abstract’) details such as shape of nose from the side.  On the basis of cues, he says, ‘we easily 
recognize a face which we have first seen in profile when it is presented later in a frontal 
view.’337 Ehrenzweig explains: 
syncretism can be as precise, if not more so, than the analytic matching of detail. Picasso’s 
incredibly convincing portraits defeat all analytic matching by jumbling up and distorting all 
the details of a face. But we can judge the likeness of the portrait only if we have become 
attuned to this kind of representation.338  
 
In this kind of representation, the viewer learns not to judge by analysing single features, 
but rather allows an intuitive (syncretistic) grasp of the portrait as an indivisible whole. On the 
basis of the ‘results’ of syncretistic scanning, for instance in art, Ehrenzweig proposes that this 
scanning involves the primary process in the psychoanalytic sense. This is a scanning that 
encompasses hugely fragmented ‘data’ in such a way that opposites can be accommodated and 
intermingled, ‘logic’ as we know it has no place, spatial differentiation and time are not 
represented or taken into account. The important point here is that undifferentiation refers not 
only to the results of an unconscious scanning faculty, but is also reflected in the static structure 
that results from unconscious image making.339 This notion of an unconscious scanning process, 
which ‘naturally’ involves all the ‘totally illogical’ operations, which Freud found in his studies 
of the dream-work, is a basic tenet of Ehrenzweig’s thinking. The idea that ‘art’ involves a 
resultant and ‘hidden’ sub-structure on this basis is a second basic tenet. Ehrenzweig sees this 
process in a context of processing that is to a degree ‘non-chaotic’, in the sense that it retains an 
unconscious ‘structure’. As opposed to Lacan’s ‘linguistic’ combinatory structure, Ehrenzweig’s 
notion encompasses not only Freud’s conception of primary process, but cathected energy as 
well. It includes Freud’s ideas of a comprehensive definition of the content of the unconscious, 
for instance memory, affects, associations, that Lacan’s ideas appear to de-emphasize. As an 
example, condensation for Ehrenzweig involves the overlap, interjection, and intermixing of 
various ideas, perceptions, memories and affects, in a hugely complex, but not chaotic, 
manner.340 Ehrenzweig posits that undifferentiation, then, is the ability of syncretistic scanning 
to hold the ‘total structure of the work of art in a single undifferentiated view’, as a mode of 
attention that he terms syncretistic scanning on ‘scattered’ material that, as such, seems 
essentially ‘blank and empty to conscious memory’.  
 
                                                          
337 Ehrenzweig, 15. (My addition). Note the similarity to Freud’s ‘open association’ of thing-presentation as 
discussed in Chapter Three, Section 1.2. 
338 Ehrenzweig, 7. 
339 Ehrenzweig, 19. He refers to a ‘static’ structure of unconscious image making, ‘based on a mixture of images 
which to conscious introspection appear incompatible and so blot each other out’ when referring to 
undifferentiation. This is opposed to what he refers to as a ‘dynamic’ process of scattering (and thus repression) of 
surface imagery by the ego when he refers to dedifferentiation. 
340 Ehrenzweig, 7 and 19-20. 
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Ehrenzweig posits further that the results of the primary process may develop aspects of 
the material being scanned into a state of simplification to the point where the conscious mind 
can again cope. He terms this ‘re-introjection’, his fifth important term.341 For me this is a ray of 
light in the otherwise seemingly random and chaotic results of the processes of the unconscious 
in psychoanalytic descriptions. Not only does this give credence to the highly important part that 
the unconscious plays in the un-thought stage, but it makes me as subject, although I am still a 
split subject, subject to a (to some extent) non-chaotic unconscious. It returns me, as subject, to 
some semblance of a kind of intent-ful and personal input. Furthermore, it provides an 
integrated and developed notion of the creative process. In addition it ‘supports’ in some detail 
Lacan’s related notion of ‘full’ and ‘empty’ speech, and Barthes’ notion of ‘full emptiness’, in 
that there is an (invisible) ‘attachment’ or relationship of some kind between conscious and 
unconscious material in the ‘full’ end of the spectrum of speech (or images), as well as between 
affect and other elements of unconscious content. At this point in my argument I have described 
Deleuze and Guattari’s ‘passive’ machinic syntheses as well as Lacan’s ‘random’ displacement 
and condensation. Here I see that Ehrenzweig offers a clear and coherent middle way, which is 
developed in the next section.   
 
3.3   Unconscious scanning and structure 
 
Having considered Ehrenzweig’s terminology, a second area of his proposals considers 
the question of how unconscious scanning can grasp the widely scattered material in a single 
immediate act of comprehension. He posits that the broadening of focus in undifferentiation 
brings about an enormous increase in efficiency of scanning. He argues that this unconscious 
scanning is needed by the artist in order to build the complex (not necessarily overtly 
perceivable) structure of a work of art. In addition, it is required by humans in rather different 
circumstances than those in which ‘gestalt’ perceptual organization is useful, for instance ‘fight 
or flight’ situations or any problem solving circumstance. Ehrenzweig agrees (implicitly) with 
Lacan in advising that sensory data should not be taken as a secure unquestioned basis for our 
understanding of objective reality, because of the interaction of, and close relationship between, 
perception and unconscious processes. In other words, Ehrenzweig’s ideas can also be seen as a 
type of gaze, but one that includes a greater emphasis on perception than that of Lacan and one 
that adds the notion of scanning to unconscious processing. Ehrenzweig posits that a ‘rapid 
                                                          
341 Ehrenzweig, 102-105.  
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pulse of differentiation and dedifferentiation goes on continually undetected in our daily lives’– 
this he calls a ‘dynamic theory of perception’.342  
 
3.4  The ‘basis’ of the unconscious and ‘intuition’ 
 
We have now seen that Ehrenzweig proposes an important distinction in the mental 
processing that occurs between differentiated (primarily pre-conscious and conscious material) 
and undifferentiated material (primarily unconscious material, such that ‘logical’ (secondary) 
operations are used in the pre-conscious, while different (primary) operations are used in 
unconscious (as do Freud and Lacan).343 However Ehrenzweig bases his concept of the 
unconscious also on a type or form of material being processed (de-differentiated or not). In 
other words, Ehrenzweig’s argument has to do with his basic thesis that syncretistic scanning 
happens as a part of the primary process, it happens on dedifferentiated material, and 
furthermore that this process of the unconscious is not in fact chaotic, although it can seem that 
way to the conscious mind with its dependence on gestalt principles.344 In addition, it would 
seem that there are no sharp borderlines between the various processes; to a limited extent each 
type of process can take place in both unconscious and conscious situations. Ehrenzweig 
elaborates his notions: 
There is no sharp division between the conscious, preconscious and unconscious systems, 
but only a smooth transition with two or three critical thresholds. The process of 
dedifferentiation describes a dynamic process that works gradually within certain critical 
limits. From the vantage point of conscious introspection – we have no other – the transition 
first produces experiences of ‘vagueness’, then a gradual dissolution of precise space and 
time, and in the end, when the last critical limit has been overstepped, complete blankness 
occurs, still replete with intense emotional experience, the much vaunted ‘full’ emptiness of 
low-level vision.345 
 
I see this as substantiating my argument earlier, based at that time on Freud’s 
‘presentations’, that the ‘radical alterity’ between the unconscious and conscious is not only that 
different processes are involved, but what is also important is that the material being ‘worked 
over’ is different (Chapter Three, Section 1.1.2). For Freud, unconscious mental material is 
more complex with more possibilities for association as thing-presentations, while in the 
                                                          
342 Although of course Lacan’s concept of the gaze can be seen as dynamic in the sense that it is driven by, and 
dependent on, the Other looking back. This is discussed in more detail in Chapter Four, ‘The Gaze’. One can see 
that there is not such a great difference in that Ehrenzweig’s idea is that the energy effecting syncretistic scanning is 
the libido. 
343 Ehrenzweig sees ‘preconscious’ as the mental information waiting for when it is needed, as does Freud, in other 
words, not in the conscious mind, but with no ‘barriers’ to being in the conscious mind. Freud discusses this in his 
paper ‘The Unconscious’. 
344 Ehrenzweig, 268. Also: ‘The quality of being unconscious is not dependent on the superego’s censorship 
directed against certain contents, but automatically follows from a change in the formal structure of image making.’   
345 Ehrenzweig, 270. 
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conscious mind there is a ‘gestalt’ orientation and much higher percentage of word-
presentations, and thus less opportunity for association. 
 
Ehrenzweig describes true intuition as being an event where ‘the normal differentiation 
of time and space is suspended and events and objects can freely interpenetrate.’346 He sees this 
as a ‘full’ emptiness in that to the conscious mind it appears empty because the material ‘cancels 
each other out’, while in the unconscious undifferentiated state several mutually incompatible 
thoughts/images are being held at once. Note that this is a different ‘full’ from Lacan’s notion 
that ‘full’ is determined by the ‘inclusion’ of, or closeness to, his notion of desire. However it is 
not totally unrelated because ‘desire’ can be seen as one of the many ‘complexifications’ 
included in the notion of dedifferentiation. Because of its complexity and richness, 
Ehrenzweig’s notion provides a (theoretical) rationale for Georges Bataille’s call for the 
importance of ‘un-knowing’, in that much of ‘value’ can still be happening in the un-knowing 
state of mind. What this means for my developing argument is that not only is the un-thought 
stage, seen here as a complex and well articulated notion of ‘intuition’, a part of the artistic 
process, it is theoretically (in outline form) understandable and imaginatively visualize-able. To 
see intuition and un-knowing and un-thought as (to some degree) equivalent, and as the holding 
mentally of several mutually incompatible ideas/images at once, such that these operations 
become ‘invisible’ to the rational mind, elucidates both the ‘surprising’ results and the ‘mental 
anguish’ which can accompany, and linger from, the un-thought stage.  
 
According to Ehrenzweig’s ideas it is possible to go a step further. It is possible 
‘theoretically’ to relate un-thought and ‘un-knowing’ to death and the ‘death instinct’ insofar as 
Ehrenzweig refers to dedifferentiation as a kind of entropy.347 He elaborates further by saying 
that, as dedifferentiation progresses, it can be felt by the making artist as ‘an approaching danger 
and threat of total chaos’, in that the ego appears to be ‘decomposing’. He describes the artist as 
needing to be able to face this inner void openly, accepting the temporary loss of ego control 
‘which is often unconsciously experienced as the destruction of the ego’.348 As I consider in 
more depth the interactions of the idea I am working with in this thesis, specifically the 
‘connections’ for Lacan between re-presentation and death, the connections for Bataille between 
                                                          
346 Ehrenzweig, 132. 
347 Ehrenzweig, 296, where entropy can be understood in the sense of inorganic molecular structure tending to be 
uniform and un-differentiated.  
348 Ehrenzweig, 124. At this stage I am faced with the question of ego: subject. Ehrenzweig doesn’t discuss 
‘subject’, was probably unaware of Lacan’s ideas, (and indeed might have disagreed with many of them). As I 
explained in footnote 278 above, I have decided to ‘overlap’ the two concepts for the purposes of this chapter, so 
that I can read, for Ehrenzweig’s ‘ego’, instead Lacan’s concept of the subject. I feel this is justified since what 
concerns me at this juncture is the interaction between the conscious/pre-conscious and the unconscious, which is 
also what Ehrenzweig is dealing with here. 
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un-knowing and death and finally and more particularly the connections for Ehrenzweig 
between syncretistic scanning and the (perceived) ‘death’ of the ego, I now ‘remember’ the 
‘fear’ which is also a part of the ‘model of making’. Standing in front of a half finished painting, 
knowing it is time to go back into the un-thought stage as I proceed, my heart skips a beat, my 
stomach contracts: visceral signs of fear. Until now I had always put these down to ‘extraneous’ 
factors, such as being tired, being stressed for other reasons, but Ehrenzweig has provided a clue 
which ties these visceral signs of fear to the un-thought stage (and the fear of the ‘death’ of the 
ego, with its ‘rational’ but more or less ‘invisible’ control to which we are all held in thrall). 
Ehrenzweig has provided the reason for embracing the un-thought stage, as well as the reason 
for avoiding it: while it is the foundation of creativity, it can also induce a fundamental fear. By 
these means, he succeeds in furthering my idea of the creative process and the un-thought stage, 
in that what can be perceived as fear of the ‘death of the ego’ can produce strong and complex 
‘resistance’ to the un-thought stage.  
 
3.5    Unconscious processes and art making 
 
Whereas Freud uses dreams to investigate the unconscious and its processes, Ehrenzweig 
uses art and the process of art making to help understand the structure and process of the 
unconscious, and then re-investigates art with the outcome of his understanding. He approaches 
this quite differently from, for instance, Lacan’s notion of the gap (Sections 1.3.2 and 1.3.3), 
with its indirect and chaotic effect on the realm of the symbolic, or of the stain (Section 1.3) 
with its (also indirect) effect on the realm of the symbolic. For Ehrenzweig, the implications for 
art, and specifically for art making, are directly a result of the deeply unconscious process of 
syncretistic scanning, with its ability to produce new combinations of the relevant material and 
to maintain resulting ‘structures’ of material with the possibility of its consequent re-introjection 
into the consciously perceived world. This implies integral associations and ‘connections’ 
amongst the mental material, which helps alleviate concerns I expressed in earlier chapters 
about concepts of Lacan in this regard (for instance Section 1.2).  
 
Ehrenzweig proposes three stages as a basis for his ideas about creativity, for which his 
notion of pictorial space is also important. The initial stage of creativity he terms ‘schizoid’, in 
that it involves projecting fragmented parts of the ‘self’ into the work such that 
‘unacknowledged split off elements will then easily appear accidental, fragmented, unwanted 
and persecutory.’349 This is the dedifferentiation stage where the ego scatters and fragments the 
                                                          
349 Ehrenzweig, 102. 
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information, as discussed above. Here the ego is introduced as an influence on the process, in 
that it ‘forces’ the perceptual apparatus into the mode of dedifferentiation, thus rendering it 
unconscious, rather than perceiving in the conscious gestalt mode of differentiation.350 Schizoid 
anxiety is associated with this initial ‘fragmentation’ stage, at least partly due to the apparent 
‘death’ of the ego.351        
 
The second stage of creativity, termed the ‘manic’ stage, initiates unconscious 
(syncretistic) scanning of this fragmented material, which ‘integrates art’s substructure as it 
forms an unconscious substructure’. However, this may not necessarily ‘heal the fragmentation 
of the surface gestalt’352. For instance, the systematic disruption of the surface faculties in some 
trajectories of modern art remains partly unresolved in the final result.353 ‘But’, he argues, ‘the 
unconscious cross-ties still bind the single elements together, and an unbroken pictorial space 
emerges as the conscious signal of unconscious integration.’354 Thus what he terms art’s 
‘undifferentiated substructure’ is formed during this unconscious scanning. This is to say that all 
relevant material is related and inter-related (condensation, displacement, and so forth) in such a 
complex fashion that the conscious mind is unable to encompass or understand it; at this point 
all differentiation ceases. This is a very important point for this thesis, in that Ehrenzweig is 
proposing that this mental material is related in various ways. The various widely different 
associations and distortions occurring maintain (in many circumstances) a network of 
‘connections.’ These ‘connections’ become an ‘answer’ to my queries in earlier chapters 
concerning the ‘barren-ness’ of Lacan’s concept of signifiers in terms of any (perceptible long-
term) connectors or relationships between them. Although Lacan’s idea of signification does not 
extend to those ideas, for me it is useful to consider the intermixing of Lacan’s ideas of 
linguistic structure as subsumed within the complex network of interconnected information 
proposed by Ehrenzweig.355 
 
 Moving on from this point, for Ehrenzweig the third stage of creativity is referred to as 
‘depressive’. It involves the unconscious and conscious worlds beginning to merge, insofar as 
                                                          
350 Is it the ego which is fragmenting or perceptions (by the ego) which are fragmenting?  Ehrenzweig uses 
perception to include both external perception (vision, etc.) and internal perception (phantasy, memory), and as 
such it is perception that is being fragmented by the ego. 
351 Note that Ehrenzweig was writing before ‘Anti-Oedipus’ was written. 
352 Ehrenzweig, 102. 
353 His example is the Picasso portraits, in the sense that details are ambiguous, but the overall impression is lively 
and ‘coherent’. 
354 Ehrenzweig, 102. (My italics). 
355 Ehrenzweig speaks also of ‘art’ that is, for instance, copied from another source, which as such has thereby lost 
these unconscious connections and become flat and less ‘moving’ – in other words ‘empty’, used in a similar sense 
to Lacan’s notion of ‘empty speech’. 
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fragmentation begins to be resolved.356 Some material becomes re-introjected, while material 
which appears fragmented to the conscious mind can nevertheless remain integrated on an 
undifferentiated level. Ehrenzweig explains that in this stage: ‘All opposites merge, death and 
birth become one, the differences between the sexes, the differences of parent and child 
disappear. Temporarily all splitting is undone.’357 He points out that in this process, the surface 
ego must have learned the tolerance to be resilient enough to allow these phenomena, these 
fragmented and apparently chaotic structures, to remain as such, rather than calling on 
secondary revision ‘by the rational gestalt principle’ to get to work and ‘tidy up the mess’. 
Again we can, following Ehrenzweig, use the example of Picasso’s work, where he allows 
inconsistencies and illogicalities to exist within the pictorial surface and yet as one views his 
work the image ‘comes together’ with strength and power, there is a ‘hidden structure’ which 
holds together the apparent inconsistencies to the benefit of the entire painting. Ehrenzweig’s 
notion is directly important to the un-thought stage of image making, in that this powerful 
faculty for scanning fragmented and diverse material and enabling consequent newly arising 
combinations and changes provides a theoretical basis both for seeing the interaction of libidinal 
energy and mental content, and for seeing the consequent emergence of previously un-thought 
marks and images. Thus, about his ‘third stage’ of creativity, he states: 
a partial re-introjection of the oceanic imagery into consciousness occurs. Because it is only 
partial the rest remains repressed and forms art’s unconscious sub-structure. What comes 
together in ‘re-integration’ can re-emerge in the conscious mind as symbols and integrated 
‘pictorial space.’358  
 
But because narrowly focused conscious perception cannot comprehend the wider sweep 
of undifferentiated imagery, the final result of creative work can never achieve the full 
integration that is possible in the second oceanic-manic phase of creativity. In other words only 
a portion of this scanned and primary process-ed material can re-emerge in the conscious 
domain. Depressive anxiety is the inevitable consequence. This is because not only is there a 
‘chaotic’ appearance from the point of view of conscious perception and analysis, but there is 
also the feeling that ‘there is more’ which hasn’t been ‘caught’ in the current manifestation. The 
re-introjection back into the conscious ego is done by means of symbols emerging from the 
process of unconscious scanning (e.g. including primary process). The symbols formed are now 
able to be ‘understood’ in a differentiated or gestalt manner, and thus ‘perceived’ by the 
conscious mind.359  
                                                          
356 Ehrenzweig, 192-3. 
357 Ehrenzweig, 192. 
358 Ehrenzweig, 192-3. This is opposed to Lacan, who sees that ‘condensation’ and ‘displacement’ of ‘pure’ 
signifiers happens more or less by chance, with little provision for connections and associations being retained.   
359 Lacan stresses the overriding importance and autonomy of the ‘Other’, with regard to the symbolic; Ehrenzweig 
similarly includes a strong reference to the importance of the ‘social’. He says: as the child grows and matures – 
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3.6    Processing perceptual information 
 
In terms, then, of the processing of perceptual information, while Lacan posits a ‘pure’ 
signifier undergoing the primary processes seemingly randomly, Ehrenzweig posits a 
complexification of perceived material – memories, images, sensory perceptions, words, 
concepts, affect - all undergoing syncretistic scanning. As I pointed out above, there is the 
feeling of an underlying, if ephemeral, ‘connection’ of mental material that can be maintained in 
the context of an ‘intelligence’ (or at least complexity) of libido and its processes, rather than 
just random movements of desire. This is reinforced when Ehrenzweig argues that the 
unconscious process is capable of learning and developing, including for instance, as seen 
earlier, in and within the development of the ability to ‘allow’ the seeming ‘disintegration’ of 
the ego into ‘chaos’.360 Ehrenzweig terms this process of creativity the ‘poemagogic’ in order to 
‘describe its special function of inducing and symbolizing the ego’s creativity’ by way of the 
central theme of death and rebirth, for instance as it mirrors the ego’s approach to its perceived 
‘death’ and then rebirth.361  ‘The results, for me, reflect (and refract) Barthes’ notions 
(considered in Chapter One) of both diachronous and synchronous processing – in some way 
there remains within the context of dedifferentiation enough of an ‘overall story’ or relatedness 
for the resulting re-introjection to comprise some sense of relatedness and relevance for the 
conscious mind, albeit with surprises. Ehrenzweig referred to this in an earlier quote as 
‘coordinated material’. I see this as supporting Freud’s concept of the primary processes 
working on thoughts, affects, memories and so on. These ideas also add to Freud’s concepts by 
proposing the syncretistic scanning process and clarifying (and yet at the same time seen as less 
clearly demarcated) Freud’s differentiation between the conscious and unconscious systems. As 
I have stated, we can incorporate Lacan’s idea of the signifier into this system; in this sense they 
are not mutually exclusive. (But there is no indication of any need for such concepts as the 
primary signifier or lack.362) To me as a painter, Ehrenzweig’s notions appear practical, robust 
                                                                                                                                                                                                     
and ‘in order to enrich ourselves as individuals we have to re-shape and change our human relationships without 
respite by projection and introjection […]  We have to give our substance freely, project it onto other people or 
creative work for further transformation.  As in creative work we must be humble and grateful to receive back far 
more than we ourselves have put in.’ He says ‘The social aspect of creativity cannot be over-emphasized.’  This is 
in the context of a discussion of the ‘body social’ or ‘womb’ of society, including measuring the health of a society 
by its tolerance of diversity (fragmentation). (Ehrenzweig, 192-3). Note that these become symbols rather than 
memory traces in that they are formed from an ‘integration’ of various, not-always-logically-consistent memory 
traces, and are ‘backed up’ by these unconscious traces. Note also the link to Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of the 
body without organs (the socius). 
360 Ehrenzweig, 124. 
361 Ehrenzweig, 176. 
362 There is no evidence I know of to indicate that Ehrenzweig had any knowledge of Lacan’s writings, although he 
appears to have been widely read in contemporary psychoanalytic theory in Great Britain. Ehrenzweig died soon 
after the publication of ‘Hidden ’, in 1967. 
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and applicable. This is borne out not only in terms of work produced in the un-thought stage 
being (sometimes) surprising and ‘full’ for me, but in terms of the accompanying states of mind 
proposed by him. 
 
3.7   ‘Reappearance’ of processed information 
 
In terms of the re-appearance of ‘processed’ material as images, Lacan posits an 
appearance through what he terms ‘the gap’, of randomly articulated mental material, without 
‘meaning’, unrealized. Ehrenzweig posits a processing and ‘re-introjection’ into the conscious 
mind of ‘re-differentiated’ symbols. Ehrenzweig’s ideas allow me to elaborate Lyotard’s notions 
of figure and dissimulation, in the sense of visualizing one way in which this dissimulation 
might happen, that is via dedifferentiation and redifferentiation. This also enables a development 
of Lyotard’s emphasis on the energy of the libido enabling/driving the process by seeing the 
libido as the energy underlying the process of syncretistic scanning.  
 
Ehrenzweig proposes that symbol formation is closely related to the making of art.363 He 
explains his notion of the manner in which the process takes place:  
In order to symbolize another object the symbolic image must interpenetrate with it in the 
undifferentiated matrix of image making. On being re-introjected into consciousness, the 
undifferentiated linkages will contract. The symbolic image alone catches the narrow focus 
of secondary revision and the other symbolized object remains repressed. But as long as 
unconscious linkage persists the symbolizing image will not be dissociated and remain(s) 
imbued with unconscious meaning and reference. Its symbolic power wanes as soon as its 
unconscious linkage is severed. This will inevitably occur owing to secondary processes that 
tend to dissociate surface imagery from its undifferentiated matrix.364 
 
Ehrenzweig’s idea of ‘dissociation’ is related to Lacan’s notion of ‘empty’ images 
(speech). However, Ehrenzweig relates it to more than just the association/dissociation with 
‘desire’ per se. Ehrenzweig’s proposal that dissociation is encouraged by secondary processes 
of editing and intellectualisation supports my interest in relaxing rational control as much as 
possible in the un-thought stage of image making, and leaving ‘open-ended’ aspects to marks 
and images in this process. Not only are there, for Ehrenzweig, inter-connections amongst 
‘groups’ of mental material, but these inter-connections can even ‘survive’ some fraction of 
these elements ‘coalescing’ into forms the gestalt can ‘recognize’, thus potentially becoming 
conscious. My interest lies in structures and processes of image making that help to ‘retain’ 
                                                          
363 Ehrenzweig, 191. 
364 Ehrenzweig, 193-4. In one sense this could be seen to be happening on that material which Lacan describes as 
pure signifiers. In other words, here Ehrenzweig is describing a process, while Lacan is describing ‘contents’ or a 
‘text’ of the unconscious.  I am saying that in this sense they are not mutually exclusive. 
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Ehrenzweig’s idea of mental material imbued with unconscious meaning and reference.365 By 
linking Ehrenzweig’s ideas of dedifferentiation, syncretistic scanning and re-introjection, the 
visualization of mental processing is enhanced.  
 
3.8   Exemplification 
 
For this thesis, Ehrenzweig’s notion of the difference between differentiated, articulated, 
conscious perceptual and mental material, on the one hand, and fragmented, no ‘logic’, no 
negation, no ‘space/time’, dedifferentiated unconscious perception and mental material, on the 
other hand, is of particular interest. One ‘structure’ being conscious, and one being unconscious, 
the ‘event’ of art making is more readily seen as the pulsation of conscious and unconscious 
processes and the ‘emergence’ of art making from this form of exchange, transformation and 
emergence. There are (some) ‘unconscious’ structural aspects present, many being impenetrable 
to the articulations of conscious perception. The underlying harmony is related to his ideas 
about the ‘hidden structure of art’, in other words his notion of the existence of a structured 
basis of the unconscious that is more complex than what appears to the conscious mind, but is at 
the same time basic to and supportive of what appears, since this is the ‘database’ from which 
the marks/images emerge.  
 
An example of the process I am describing can be found (again) in the early drawings of 
Joseph Beuys.366 As well as being in the role of viewer of this drawing, I am encouraged to 
visualise aspects of its process of production because it leaves visible so many ‘clues’ to its 
production. In the drawing entitled ‘Kadmon’ (Illustration 3.1), there is a general pictorial space, 
and there are marks of no specific meaning, as well as marks delineating figurative elements. 
There are symbols interacting in ways that may be more concerned with energy than with form. 
In his discussion of this drawing, Dieter Koepplin relates images within the drawing to each 
other: for example, the huge figure (in relation to the ‘mountain range’) ‘sinking down’ into the 
material world; the figure itself evidently ‘creating’ this world by the emanations from its 
mouth; with the ‘spherical circling above’ being seen as the spiritual world. He makes use of the 
name given to the drawing: Adam Kadmon (an image found in Jewish cabala of the middle 
ages, and later in the work of Rudolf Steiner), such that the figure sinking down into the  
                                                          
365 Ehrenzweig’s notion of the three stages of creativity I see, based on my practice, as a believable description of 
what happens within the mysterious and absorbed stage of image making, as can be seen in the similarities between 
them. For me it is ‘believable’ both from what I know (and have described), of the absorbed  and un-thought stage 
of image making, and from the results obtained from that stage (or from skipping over that stage).     
366 This example is based on Dieter Koepplin, “Kadmon”, in the exhibition catalogue ‘Thinking is Form’  (New 
York, Museum of Modern Art, 1948). See also Bernice Rose, “Joseph Beuys and the Language of Drawing” in the 
same catalogue.  
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Section 4:   Summary and implications for the un-thought stage. 
 
In this chapter Lacan’s ideas have made a number of contributions to the understanding 
of the un-thought stage of image making, this time in terms of the processes of the unconscious. 
I recall Lacan’s re-inscription of Freud’s notion of the dream-work. For Lacan, the concept of 
‘gap’ explains an ‘appearance’ of unconscious material into the world of the conscious mind as 
absence, distortion, accident or the like, as material (unrealized signifiers) that manifests in an 
‘impeded’ manner, and can ‘impede’ conscious processes. This also involves the concepts of 
‘subject’ as subject to the unconscious, and as ‘split’. The split subject is seen in the process of 
‘aphanisis’, or fading, where the ‘opening’ and ‘closing’ of the gap involves the appearance of 
unconscious material in a manner such that the subject as such ‘disappears’ and ‘reappears’ 
respectively. These ideas are useful to me in thinking about the un-thought stage ‘appearing’ 
and ‘disappearing’, and consequent (or pre-requisite) side-lining of conscious rational processes. 
However, referring back to Freud’s notions of thing- and word-presentations, I see that Lacan’s 
ideas of signifier and primary processes, as related to Freud’s ideas, can lose some of the 
richness of resonance and association that Freud’s ideas entail.  
 
Ehrenzweig’s notions support these views and re-invigorate this area of thought by 
elaborating more fully the processes and material of the unconscious, while confirming and 
enhancing the idea of a working interaction between conscious and unconscious operations. 
 
It becomes clearer in this chapter that my interest is from a different perspective than that 
of Freud and Lacan. While they see this aphanisis as non-volitional (from the conscious-mind 
point of view), I am considering it as a process that can be encouraged and that can produce 
surprising and non-chaotic results. Therefore I see now that there is an essential difference 
between making art and dreaming, such that art is to some degree intentional, dreams are not, 
even though both are a result of relaxation of rational thought allowing more freedom for desire 
(however defined) to play a part. 
 
Lyotard’s notion of the dream-work as desire ‘working over’ dream thoughts is useful to 
my argument about direct (rather than lack-induced) action of the libido, since it results in a de-
emphasis on the notion of censorship. In this way Lyotard’s notion is closely related to that of 
Ehrenzweig, who posits that the notion of censorship is ‘replaced’ by the process of 
dedifferentiation, the play of the libido on fragmented perceptual information. Both 
dedifferentiation and dissimulation are notions concerning the process of unconscious mental 
material being worked over by desire, in a given mode of attention, even though seen from 
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different points of view.  However Lyotard, like Lacan, assumes these processes to be non-
volitional and with ‘chaotic’ results, which Ehrenzweig (implicitly) contests.  
 
This leads to consideration of Ehrenzweig’s proposals about the ‘hidden order of art’. 
Freud and Lacan think about the unconscious, its processes and material, largely from the point 
of view of psychoanalysis as praxis, and Lyotard, one can say, from a philosophical 
consideration of psychoanalytic ideas. However, Ehrenzweig’s ideas, while grounded in 
Freudian theory, see unconscious process and material from the point of view precisely of art, 
and art-making as praxis. His ideas relate directly to my thesis from the standpoint of a 
searching and to some extent intentional (although unconscious) activity (for instance image 
making), as opposed to an activity whose function is seen to ‘repress’ and to ‘obscure’ for 
reasons of fear and confusion (for instance symptoms). He proposes several new ideas to deal 
with this new orientation, for instance dedifferentiation and syncretistic scanning, which I see as 
(unwitting) examples of Lyotard’s notion of (unconscious) ‘devices’ that can focus libidinal 
energy into ‘intensities’ of energy. What Ehrenzweig also provides is a return to what I have 
referred to as Freud’s richness of resonance of material, in connection with an ‘extension’ to 
Lacan’s dependence on linguistic form, operations and ‘text’. With Ehrenzweig we can 
understand the mental material as having synchronous and diachronous associations by way of 
Freudian ideas about traces left from perception as it is effaced, and the association and layers of 
these traces (termed signifiers by Lacan) in the psyche. What this means for my developing 
argument is that not only is the un-thought stage an important part of the artistic process, it is 
theoretically and imaginatively visualize-able. To see intuition or un-knowing or un-thought as a 
result of mentally holding and manipulating several mutually incompatible ideas/images at once, 
such that they become ‘invisible’ to the rational mind, elucidates both the ‘surprising’ results 
and the ‘mental anguish’ that can accompany and result from the un-thought stage. 
 
Ehrenzweig, while beginning from, and assuming, a Freudian theoretical background for 
his ideas, does not provide his own rigorous theoretical context apart from his notions about the 
hidden order of art and the material and processes of the unconscious in this context of art-
making. He assumes a Freudian context. In this thesis a further context is being provided by way 
of an extended consideration of Lacan’s (and Deleuze and Guattari) ideas that can also be seen 
as a basis within which to understand Ehrenzweig’s ideas. Much as I was able to see an 
accommodation of Lacan’s ideas within those of Deleuze and Guattari (as they themselves 
propose), likewise I see no obstacles to a similar accommodation of Ehrenzweig’s notions. 
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Ehrenzweig’s ideas are a major pivotal point for the ideas in this thesis – encouraging a 
move from Lacan back to Freud in some areas such as associations amongst unconscious 
material, encouraging extensions of Lacan’s ideas in other areas such as primary processes 
being not (only) chaotic and by studying the ‘intentional’ activity of art-making rather than 
activities (neurosis and psychosis) whose function is to ‘protect’ the individual from fear and 
lack. His ideas of syncretistic scanning and dedifferentiation are also pivotal in joining some of 
Lacan’s (and Freud’s) ideas with the idea of the direct intervention or ‘working over’ of the 
material of the unconscious by the energy of the libido as seen by Lyotard. Lyotard’s notion of 
the ‘laxity’ in which an artist may engage as a particular mode of attention, allows further 
insight into the un-thought stage and relates directly to Ehrenzweig’s notion of ‘death of the 
ego’. In terms of the un-thought stage of image making itself, his theories provide a rationale 
(this stage is unconscious because of fragmentation and complexification), as well as a raison 
d’etre (this stage is useful in terms of manifesting the structure and content of art) for 
considering it to be of importance in the arena of image making.  
 
In terms of the thetic argument, including Lyotard’s ideas about the dream-work might 
seem a retrogressive step (in terms of the ‘chaotic’ processing of the primary process), but they 
are included in order to point out two things. The first point is that again, it seems to me possible 
to visualize both sets of ideas as being relevant in certain situations. The first set of ideas is 
Lacan’s semantic structures, wherein it is difficult to see room for expression, in combination 
with Lyotard’s ideas of figure and dissimulations, which introduce room for expression as well 
as meaning. This includes the dream-work as seen by Freud, Lacan and Lyotard – basically 
unconscious ‘random’ operations providing ‘chaotic’ results in the conscious mind. The second 
point is that these so-called irrational and chaotic results can be applicable for dreams and 
symptoms, but are not necessarily quite as relevant for intentional purposes like art and 
problem solving, when they are seen against Ehrenzweig’s ideas, and against my experience in 
the studio. My proposal now is to change the direction of focus and so to see the Lacan/Lyotard 
set of ideas as being only one standpoint from which to view unconscious operations, that of 
dream and symptom.  This standpoint does not involve any notion of conscious volition as 
‘surrounding’ the unconscious process, in other words as ‘included’ in the un-thought mode of 
attention. Against this, Ehrenzweig’s standpoint, that of the conscious intention to make art, 
provides a different context and different results in terms of quality (if not quantity) of libidinal 
influence. Ehrenzweig also proposes that it is possible for this process to be ‘learned’ and 
developed.  
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As I stated above, it seems to me that these three sets of ideas (Lacan, Lyotard and 
Ehrenzweig) all contribute essential elements of understanding to the unthought stage of image 
making. In addition, they can be seen to co-exist within a wider view of the unconscious – for 
instance that of Deleuze and Guattari as discussed in Chapter Two. In other words, put simply, 
pathways of ‘thwarted’ energy (thwarted in terms of certain beliefs in terms of lack) and of 
‘freer’ energy (in terms of Lyotard’s, Deleuze and Guattari’s (and Ehrenzweig’s) concepts of 
libido) can co-exist in the human psyche. Thus, although at first sight these writers appear to be 
proposing quite disparate sets of ideas, in fact they dovetail together in quite a useful manner for 
my purposes. They each look at the unconscious from a separate point of view – force, energy, 
type of mental material, perception (internal and external), processes – but in conjoining the 
various ideas a more detailed picture is provided than in any one set of ideas on its own. 
 
 
Section 5:   Next chapter 
 
In the next chapter, I am now prepared to consider Lacan’s overall concept of the gaze, 
in which his theory of the unconscious plays such an important part. I include extensions to his 
ideas as proposed by Bracha Lichtenberg Ettinger, in which she provides a way of considering a 
separate pathway for libidinal energy, a specific extension of the paradigm provided by Lacan. 
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Chapter Four includes a consideration of Lacan’s notion of the gaze as an overall 
concept, in particular as it relates to the second (un-thought) stage of the process of image 
making. B. Lichtenberg Ettinger’s relevant contestations and extensions of Lacan’s ideas are 
discussed, including her notion of the matrixial gaze as an ‘additional pathway’ of the libido. 
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Chapter Four: The Gaze                       
 
Having considered a number of aspects of Lacan’s concept of the unconscious as an 
important element of the concept of the gaze, now is the point at which to consider the gaze as 
an overall concept, in its relationship to the un-thought stage of image making. For Lacan the 
gaze is the influence of the unconscious on perception, in which perception is all but over-ridden 
by the influence of the unconscious. We have seen that Lacan’s concept of the unconscious 
includes his concepts of the Other, the realm of the symbolic, the signifier, and the primary 
processes seen as linguistic operations; included also, more controversially, is the concept of 
lack and the desire to which it gives rise. At this point in the thesis I have considered other 
concepts from within the psychoanalytic paradigm that provide a wider context within which to 
understand Lacan’s concept of the unconscious, with ideas of Lyotard, Ehrenzweig and Deleuze 
and Guattari. In Seminar XI, Lacan uses the notion of the gaze to exemplify implications of the 
structure and influence of the unconscious, and its basis of lack, as teaching aides in 
understanding psychoanalytic theory. As a subset of ideas, he uses painting to exemplify the 
notion of the gaze and its function. He speaks of painting from the standpoint of the viewer, and 
occasionally also from the point of view of the process of painting. In this chapter, I find 
Lacan’s concept of the gaze useful, but I also aim to further re-consider its single-track view of 
psychical functioning by means of Bracha Lichtenberg Ettinger’s proposal concerning a 
particular additional non-object-orientated ‘libidinal pathway’. This continues my chosen path 
of using, rather than discounting, Lacan’s concepts, while also re-contextualizing them. 
 
 
Section 1:  Lacan’s concept of the gaze  
 
 Now I return not only to the studio, but to regarding an  image. I am left with a page of 
marks, which has evolved through various spiralled stages into an image, having undergone 
various ‘accidents’, mistakes, impedances of all sorts. I regard the image. In being thus 
regarded, the image ‘looks back’. In fact it ‘looks’ back even when not being regarded – it is 
somehow lodged internally in me and returns to haunt my conscious mind. What does it ‘say’ as 
it looks back?  This is the question. What does it say? And where does ‘what it says’ come from?   
 
Lacan’s concept of the gaze is described briefly in Chapter One, Section 1. That serves 
the purpose of making available an overview while consideration is being given to one element 
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of that gaze, his concept of the unconscious. Here I consider the gaze as an overall concept, one 
that reflects and refracts many of Lacan’s underlying ideas and concepts.  
 
1.1  The gaze as objet a 
 
The gaze is seen by Lacan as operating in the scopic field. The scopic field is a psychical 
field, associated with the eye as it comprises the visual field. 
 
Lacan states: ‘In the scopic field the gaze is outside, I am looked at, that is to say I am a 
picture’, in other words the subject becomes a representation, a signifier.367 He says that ‘the 
institution of the subject in the visible is determined by the gaze that is outside me’.368  This 
makes me as subject other than what I am (my being). Furthermore ‘what I am shown is not 
what I desire to see.369  In this way, for Lacan, the eye functions at the level of lack, with regard 
to the desire of the Other, and within the arena of the unconscious as he understands it.  
 
Lacan sees the ‘scopic drive’ as the ‘partial drive’ associated with the scopic field.370 It 
is a question of the ‘relation to the phallus insofar as what is lacking in the real might be attained 
in the sexual goal’.371 In other words, the eye can function as an object that is a symbol for lack 
insofar as what we think we see, or what we desire to see, is a result of underlying lack. What 
we think we see is influenced not only by what is being looking at (or is ‘looking back’), but 
also by the symbolic order, the field of the Other. This is why I have stated that the gaze is the 
influence of the unconscious on perception. Because lack is involved, it engenders desire, as 
discussed in Chapter One. Scopic satisfaction, Lacan tells us, results from the ‘fall of the 
subject’, which remains unperceived, leaving the subject ‘in ignorance as to what there is 
beyond the appearance’.372 In this way, the gaze is seen as a manifestation of the divided, 
alienated, ‘split’ subject.373 
 
In this way Lacan conceptualises the gaze as objet a in the field of the visible. The 
concept of objet a, for Lacan, is that it has no being at all. The objet a is ‘the portion of 
emptiness that my demand presupposes’.374 The objet a is the object of desire, but insofar as this 
                                                          
367 Lacan, ‘Seminar XI’, 105. 
368 Lacan, ‘Seminar XI’, 106. 
369 Lacan, ‘Seminar XI’, 104. 
370 As I noted earlier, Lacan lists the partial drives as the oral, the anal, the gaze and the invocatory. See ‘Seminar 
XI’, 103-104. 
371 Lacan, ‘Seminar XI’, 102. 
372 Lacan, ‘Seminar XI’, 77. 
      373 See Chapter Three, Section 1.3, also Introduction, Section 5.5. 
374 See Introduction, Section 5.3, ‘Need, demand and desire’. 
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‘object’ has no fixity.375 This objet a ‘belongs to the symbolic order. It is the lining of the 
subjective and the double lining of the intersubjective.’376 It ‘sets desire in motion, it sets the 
drives circling around it.’377  This exemplifies the lack as engendering desire, as discussed in 
Chapter One. 
 
Not only is the gaze an objet a in the scopic field, but also we see the intertwining and 
interacting of the three orders for Lacan as he considers the gaze in his habitual ‘modus 
operandi’ of ‘defining’ terms by means of metaphor, metonymy, allusion and association. Lacan 
writes that the gaze ‘is the look I imagine in the field of the Other’ – thus it is seen as operating 
(partially) in the imaginary order. The gaze as objet a is the object of desire, alluding to the 
order of the real, and it ‘belongs to the symbolic order’ and as such is referred to above as the 
lining of the subjective. 
 
   1.2   The gaze as the gaze of the painting 
 
Lacan’s notion of the gaze of the painting is not a matter of this gaze being overt in the 
image, just as the concept of the gaze as such does not involve that which is overt in the world 
of the subject. Instead the gaze of the painting is seen as attribute(s) in the painting that could be 
said to lie behind it, or to the side of it, in the sense of being something that draws us to look at 
it, as we are driven by the scopic drive. I am considering this from the standpoint of the making 
of the image, since looking is essential to that process as well as to viewing.          
 
 For Lacan ‘the relation between the gaze and what one wishes to see involves a lure’.378 
He proposes that what is at issue in a painting is ‘deceiving’ the eye – a painting is a ‘lure’ for 
the eye, where a ‘lure’ works by ‘capturing’ the subject [as viewer] as for instance through the 
medium of masks.379 Man as subject is not entirely caught up by this ‘lure’, this capture – 
instead ‘he maps himself in it’. Another way of saying this is that ‘mimicry is that function 
which in man is exercised as painting’.380 Lacan explains that it is not at the level of the 
representations of the painting itself that he is speaking – ‘nor is it the dialectic involving the 
noumen beyond the phenomenon so to speak’.381 Instead he approaches it from the point of 
view of the ‘being’ of the subject involved, whereby this subject is ‘split’, but accommodates 
                                                          
375 Lacan, ‘Encore’, 179. 
376 Lacan, ‘Encore’, 179. 
377 Lacan, ‘Encore’, 179. 
378 Lacan, ‘Seminar XI’, 105. 
379 Lacan, ‘Seminar XI’, 107. My additions. 
380 Lacan, ‘Seminar XI’, 109. 
381 Lacan, ‘Seminar XI’, 106. 
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him/herself to this split. His proposal is that ‘the purpose of [the process of] painting is for the 
subject to be inserted in a function whose exercise grasps it’.382 This exercise is desire. Again 
we see reference to an ‘un-thought’ stage. The split is seen as between the subject itself (as its 
being) and that which it shows to another (as its re-presentation). I see this as parallel to the 
‘split’ or ‘gaze’ of the painting – between its ‘being’ and its ‘representation’. 
 
Lacan argues that there is in a painting not only a gaze of the painting, but a ‘certain 
taming of the gaze’ of the viewer, which he terms ‘dompte regard’.383 By this Lacan means ‘he 
who looks is always led by the painting to lay down his gaze’.384 I see this as an important 
concept from the point of view of this thesis – to tame the gaze would be to tame the alienation, 
the separation of being from representing. The value in the social field, Lacan points out, is that 
it is a ‘creation of desire’, which is pure at the level of the painter, and which is seen to take on 
commercial value, such that it ‘calms [people] by showing them that at least some of them can 
live from the exploitation of their desire’. But it also calms because their ‘desire to contemplate 
finds some satisfaction’ in the painting.385 However Lacan does not emphasize this idea of the 
calming of the viewer. He sees the painter working under the influence of the ‘domination’ of 
the gaze. There is always a gaze behind a painting, he says, and always has been. So the concept 
of the gaze introduces the concept of lure but also stresses the influence of the gaze as objet a.   
 
How does this gaze of the subject influence the painting? Lacan applies his idea of the 
gaze of the painting to ‘pictorial creation’, with the idea that the artist’s function does not lie in 
the act of representation, but in what can be seen as the (unconscious) mapping of him/herself 
(as aspects of desire) in and/or on the art object, with the resulting inclusion of a ‘lure’ in the 
painting. Lacan explains that this happens by means of the painter as creator, who sets up a 
dialogue with lack. The process of painting occurs such that painters’ strokes, and marks, do not 
‘fall by choice’ onto the canvas, but instead: ‘the painter’s brushstroke is that in which 
something is terminated’386 What is terminated is the element of ‘motive’, in the sense of a 
response to its own stimulus. Therefore these markings are to be thought of as being in the form 
of gestures rather than acts – the gesture is the result of what is being created (the picture) as a 
theatrical situation that allows, or calls for, the gesture. This is the gaze operating in a ‘descent 
of desire’, but with the subject (the painter) being ‘not completely aware of this – he operates by 
                                                          
382 Lacan, ‘Seminar XI’, 100. My addition. 
383 Lacan, ‘Seminar XI’, 109. 
384 Lacan, ‘Seminar XI’, 109. 
385 Lacan, ‘Seminar XI’, 111. 
386 Lacan, ‘Seminar XI’, 114. 
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remote control’.387 This is closely related to Lacan’s notion that the desire of the subject is the 
desire of the Other. Because this desire is unconsciously ‘perceived’ it would not be consciously 
noticed, but it can ‘disorganize’ the field of perception of the image maker, as subject to the 
desire of the Other. For me, this effect can be exemplified in the later sculpture of Giacommeti, 
in which he insisted he was attempting mimesis (Illustration 4.1). However, his sparse, even 
emaciated, works had other effects on viewers, for instance eliciting and reflecting resonances of 
the (then) recent war. The gaze of the artwork could then be seen as the reflection of the artist’s 
own unconscious ‘desire’ in the field of the painting or sculpture, the dissimulation of the 
symbolic in the sense of being subtle reflections and refractions of the image maker’s 
particularized lack and desire (the real) incorporated within the image. About the painter, Lacan 
claims: 
in the picture, something of the gaze is always manifested.  The painter knows this very well 
– his morality, his search, his quest, his practice is that he should sustain and vary the 
selection of a certain kind of gaze. 388 
 
I see this as the ‘gaze’ manifesting a ‘lure’ for the subject, in other words a lure manifested by 
means of desire of the painter that can ‘hook’ the desire of the subject (as both viewer and 
painter-as-viewer). The gaze of the painting, then, is the lure with which the painting is 
impregnated. 
 
     1.3  The gaze as process 
 
     Lacan proposes that the ‘remote control’ under which the painter works is ‘a desire 
on the part of the Other’, implying an exemplification of his idea that man’s desire is the desire 
of the Other. At the end of these lack/desire driven gestures is the ‘showing’. These ideas 
emphasize the ‘appetite of the eye’ (for both maker and viewer, I would argue), and take us back 
full circle to the scopic field/drive, and Lacan’s notion of the ‘profound relation between [objet] 
a and desire’.389 The gaze, then, can be seen as a process, parallel to my notion of the un-
thought stage, in both of which perception (and consciousness) are all but over-ridden by the 
influence of unconscious mental material and psychical processing. 
        
1.4     Implications 
 
Lacan’s notion of the gaze, as we have now seen, is not optical insofar as it does not 
reside in the visual field per se, but in the scopic field. The scopic field is defined such that it  
                                                          
387 Lacan, ‘Seminar XI’, 115. 
388 Lacan, ‘Seminar XI’, 101. 
389 Lacan, ‘Seminar XI’, 115. My addition. 
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comprises the psychical field associated with opticality. The gaze is also an un-thought process, 
as I pointed out above. Lacan says the state (or mode of attention) of the subject at this point is 
such that the subject as representation becomes elided and the subject as ‘being’ or ‘real’ can 
issue forth, as we saw in aphanisis.  
 
The gaze is a concept concerning the interaction of unconscious and conscious processes 
– borderlines and boundaries, reflections and refractions of individual mental processes, 
libidinal energy, and cultural material. 
 
One begins to see (and reflect – and reflect on) both the hindrances (negativity, negative 
influence, negative undertones) of the symbolic as well as the powerful excitement of the 
potential of the symbolic. Lacan’s concept of the wall of the symbolic as both the hindrance and 
the mediation of the communication of ideas shows us within ourselves reflections and 
refractions of that symbolic, the developing of the unrealized, the emphasizing of the play of, 
and the particularization of, reflections and refractions of the ‘unrealized’. 
 
  Image making is one clear example of the gaze as reflection and refraction of the 
borderlines and boundaries of the interlinking between conscious and unconscious, rational and 
un-thought mental processes, individual and culture, past and present, particularized and 
general, realized and unrealized. The particularization and realization of aspects of ideas by the 
individual adds to the fertile matrix of both realized and unrealized potential, the already fixated 
ideas/ruminations/visceral influences and the censored chapters, exemplifying concepts of truth 
and knowledge, the full and empty image. The gaze in art can ‘manifest’ as content of the 
unconscious ‘appearing’ as ‘lure’, as trace/reflection/refraction of desire. This gaze is the desire 
of the maker and the ‘desire of the Other’ impregnating the painting. It becomes a ‘lure’ for the 
viewer. It can also result in the ‘taming of the gaze’ of the viewer. There are consequent 
borderlines and boundaries to related concepts of truth and knowledge, and to the irruption of 
the unrealized unconscious with its impedances.390  
 
                                                          
390 In terms of expositing Lacan’s ideas clearly, the difficulty is in precision. What Lacan presents in one context 
may be half negated or given a different meaning in another context. He cultivates this method of communication 
because it is parallel to the way he understands the unconscious to function, and because it becomes rich in its 
meanings and connotations; it is not didactic. The ‘confusion’ can be accepted because of the overall richness of the 
picture, with its implications, connotations and potential, as well as its seriousness of purpose in his proposal ‘to 
elucidate’ the gaze. In some ways, his style of speaking resembles development of the images described in this 
thesis, and even the form and style of the thesis itself. In the images I refer to, there are juxtapositions and 
conjunctions of ideas, the frequent use of metaphor, imprecise or mysterious closure of an idea; there are ideas 
which are not clearly and thoroughly spelt out at any one time – unclosed and ‘emerging’ images such as occur in 
the work of Beuys and Twombly. This ambiguity is directly parallel both to the development of this written thesis 
and to the development of a painting in my studio practice. 
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In these ways, for me, Lacan’s ideas continue to be unquestionably useful in thinking 
about the un-thought stage of image making. My occasional unease is assuaged by the 
accommodation of Lacan’s ideas under the umbrella of those of Deleuze and Guattari, and 
additional ideas of Lyotard and Ehrenzweig. What continues to be problematic for me is that 
image making in Lacan’s sense becomes akin to symptoms, being theorized on a basis of trauma 
and loss, which I argue is an unnecessarily limited view of the process of image making. By 
now this has been ameliorated to a certain extent by seeing Lacan’s ideas as a sub-set of certain 
aspects of the concepts of schizoanalysis, seeing the human unconscious as manifesting within a 
wider (than lack) libidinal arena. I return to this in Chapter Five. Before that there is another step 
that can be taken. Bracha Lichtenberg Ettinger develops her notion of the matrixial gaze in 
parallel with Lacan’s concept of the gaze, but circumvents the ‘object-orientated’ nature of 
Lacan’s gaze by positing a separate, and specific, libidinal pathway. 
 
 
Section 2:  ‘Extending’ Lacan’s notion of the gaze – B. Lichtenberg Ettinger 
 
2.1 Another (side to the) story 
 
              ‘…beyond yet inside the visible…’391 
 
Bracha Lichtenberg Ettinger (hereafter Ettinger) develops the notion of a ‘gaze’ which is 
parallel and complementary to Lacan’s notion of the gaze, but which extends his notion in ways 
that are relevant to the un-thought stage of image making. As she explains in a number of 
notebooks and articles, Ettinger’s notions have developed in part on the basis of her practice as a 
psychoanalyst, and in part of the basis of her practice as an artist. I have included an example of 
her art work (Illustration 4.2) as an introduction to her artistic ideas, while at the same time I do 
not see her work as an ‘illustration’ of her psychoanalytic ideas. 
  
In introducing her idea of this parallel gaze, which she terms the ‘matrixial gaze’, 
Ettinger explains: 
Inasmuch as the [Lacan’s] gaze is non-visual but enters visuality to perplex it and to 
entangle the tableau from within and from outside, the matrixial gaze penetrates and alters 
the scopic field even if its origin is non-visual, because each dimension of partial sexuality 
and sensibility is inseparable from other unconscious dimensions of the psyche – other 
partial sexualities and sensibilities. […] Since sexuality delivers keys to understanding the 
 
                                                          
391 B. Lichtenberg Ettinger, “Wit(h)nessing Trauma and the Gaze”, in The Fascinating Faces of Flanders, ed. P. 
Vandenbroeck (Antwerp, Hessenhuis, 1998), p. 141. 
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[Lacan’s] gaze in the wider context of the unconscious, the matrixial sexual difference linked to another 
experience and another body, gives supplementary links between libidinal action, affect and traces, 
subject, object, Other, and desire. It therefore offers supplementary understanding of the ‘visuality’ of the 
gaze.392 
 
 
This quotation introduces a reason for including her ideas in my argument, in that her concept of 
the matrixial gaze initiates the development of an idea of a ‘gaze’ outside of but not excluding 
Lacan’s paradigm. On the other hand, her ideas incorporate some of Lacan’s assumptions, as 
seen in some aspects of her notions, that have already been contested and ‘extended’ in this 
thesis. One such assumption is (a different) lack and its consequent desire as the basis of the 
unconscious, which I have contested through the ideas of Lyotard, (Chapter One Section 3.1) 
and Deleuze and Guattari (Chapter Two, Section 2.2.1). Another is ‘sexual difference’ and the 
female body, which I can re-inscribe in that Lacan refers to sexual representation as residing not 
in the ‘being’ of the subject, but located in the Other. 
 
Inasmuch as the [Lacan’s] gaze is non-visual but enters visuality to perplex it and to entangle the 
tableau from within and from outside, the matrixial gaze penetrates and alters the scopic field even if its 
origin is non-visual, because each dimension of partial sexuality and sensibility is inseparable from other 
unconscious dimensions of the psyche – other partial sexualities and sensibilities. […] Since sexuality 
delivers keys to understanding the [Lacan’s] gaze in the wider context of the unconscious, the matrixial 
sexual difference linked to another experience and another body, gives supplementary links  
 
Deleuze and Guattari propose that these can be seen as ‘residing’ in the ‘human’ aspect 
of the unconscious (Chapter Two, Section 3), and it is this ‘human’ aspect that is precisely what 
I am ‘extending’ in the ideas being developed in this thesis. I re-interpret Ettinger’s references to 
the female body and the feminine influence as libidinal energy (as the basis of the unconscious), 
since she is speaking of an ‘alternate libidinal pathway’. In other words I translate her ‘enigma 
of femininity’ to a (non-gendered) libidinal pathway involving a desire for borderlinking, 
outside the bounds of Lacan’s ‘human unconscious’ with its object orientated lack and desire. In 
other words I am redirecting the Lacan/Ettinger idea of feminine and masculine here into a 
differently orientated notion of matrixial and phallic, where what differentiates them is not an 
issue of ‘gender’, but different libidinal pathways, different ‘locations’ in the wider notion of the 
unconscious (with Deleuze and Guattari) – one in the ‘human unconscious’ and one in a 
‘deeper’ libidinal unconscious. As will be seen as this section develops, I do not see such 
Lacanian ideas as indispensable to the basic thrust of her idea of the matrixial gaze; in fact I 
                                                          
392 Ettinger, “Wit(h)nessing”, 133. Note that an important part of Ettinger’s work is her development of a critique 
and a ‘resolution’ of Lacan’s ideas about ‘feminine jouissance’. I do not address these issues because of my focus 
on the un-thought stage of image making.  
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believe she has moved outside the Lacanian paradigm into that of libidinal energy as such. In 
this way, I see that Ettinger’s ideas can be usefully incorporated into the extended view of the 
workings of libidinal energy that is being developed here, rather than in Lacan’s ‘human 
unconscious’ of beliefs and concepts, including lack and its engendered desire as its basis. 
 
2.1.1   Ettinger and Lacan 
 
Ettinger’s understanding of Lacan’s concept of the gaze forms a model and context for 
her ideas of the matrixial gaze. She accepts Lacan’s domain of the phallic, including lack, as a 
basis of his concepts of the subject, the symbolic and the gaze. However she bases her notion of 
the matrixial gaze on a separate libidinal pathway. Ettinger sees Lacan, in his search for clues 
relating to the ‘talking cure’, as being deeply involved with his concepts of the realms of the 
symbolic and the imaginary, which are adopted as the symbolic is ‘conquered’ and the subject-
unconscious split occurs at the Oedipus complex stage. She agrees with this, as far as it goes, 
but, for her, this ignores the very early years of human experiences and learning. Lacan 
theorizes, she says, that anything ‘relating to the maternal womb and its jouissance between 
conception and birth is considered occultism and mystification’ and that ‘anything before birth 
is considered as undifferentiated welding, foreclosed to knowing’.393 By circumventing the role 
of the Oedipus complex as being the whole story, Ettinger adds to Lacan’s concept of the 
gaze.394 
 
Lacan’s notion of the stain as being a direct effect of the real (albeit a differently 
orientated ‘real’) continues to be of direct importance in Ettinger’s ideas. For Lacan (Chapter 
Three, Section 1.3.1) the stain is one of the few arenas where the real may (indirectly) influence 
the symbolic. In Ettinger’s exposition of Lacan’s concept of the relationship of the gaze and art, 
she explains that they are related by means of the notion of the stain, in that the gaze can 
contribute to the stain, and the stain can ‘affect’ the symbolic. As we have seen, Lacan sees the 
gaze as an objet a, and he posits that the real and the symbolic cannot ‘meet’. However, Ettinger 
proposes that these limitations are addressed in her ideas concerning the matrixial gaze. To 
introduce these ideas, she asks the question: ‘Does the gaze operate in the sphere of drives 
searching for objects or does it operate on the sphere of relations themselves?’395 In other words, 
                                                          
393 Ettinger, “Wit(h)nessing”, 128. 
394 As I mentioned in my Introduction, Section 5.5, while Julia Kristeva is an example of a post-Lacanian writer 
who also considers this early period of life in her discussion of pre-oedipal proximity of the mother, her notions 
emphasize a semiotics that relies on Lacan’s structuralism. Ettinger’s contribution to this discussion focuses on 
what can be seen as the non-human (Deleuze and Guattari) aspect of the real. J. Kristeva, Revolution in Poetic 
Language. 
395 Ettinger, “Wit(h)nessing”, 332. (My emphasis.) 
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can ideas concerning the paths of the libido be re-examined? A basic question, for her, then 
becomes how the ‘paths’ of the libido organize themselves: is this organization based on lost 
objects per se, the lost mother, the phallus as a symbol of loss, or could the organization in 
addition, be based on some sort of (lost) processes, linkages, relationships? Ettinger pursues this 
latter idea.   
 
2.1.2  The matrixial model 
 
Ettinger develops a ‘matrixial model’, as a basis for the notion of the matrixial gaze.396 
There are four basic elements to the model: the ‘matrixial stratum’, (of the psyche), the 
‘matrixial gaze’, ‘metramorphic change’, and ‘eroticised aerials of the psyche’. In addition, 
there are the notions of borderspace, borderlinking, and borderswerving.397 In considering the 
underlying desire in this concept, Ettinger’s argument is that:  
elevating woman to the level of “the Thing” in art does not necessarily concern the 
foreclosure of woman-m/Other-Thing behind a schize. Another desire can be formulated, 
other than desire based on lack, whose metaphor is connected to female body, where not a 
lacking object is the cause of desire, but an action – the process of border linking itself.398  
 
This ‘desire’, she proposes, would involve different libidinal pathways in parallel to 
Lacan’s model.399 This is where the value of her observations lies for my purposes. I see the 
‘other desire’ as libidinal energy, un-bound by a belief in lack. In other words, Ettinger agrees 
that the ‘becoming’ of the Lacanian subject, which enables signification and intelligibility, is a 
necessary process, and that the signifier (for Lacan) is not only a replacement for what is ‘not 
there’ anymore […] it is what founds the subject.’400 But she posits that something is missing 
from this notion that can be addressed. Ettinger’s argument is that ‘a special kind of link must be 
                                                          
396 A model may be valuable as a metaphor enabling a clearer meaning for the concepts being dealt with.  However, 
as always when dealing with a model, it is important to be clear about limitations and false trails in meaning, 
especially at the edges of the applicability of the metaphor.  In this case, it is necessary to be clear about which 
point of view is being taken – that of infant and mother, as in the model, or of relationships in ‘real’ life. Ettinger 
refers to both viewpoints at different times. 
397 These notions have been developed in answer to questions which can be summarised as follows:  - is there 
another kind of lack, or lost object, or objet a, which is not due to the castration model, but which can, among other 
things, enhance understanding of creativity; in other words another libidinal pathway within the psyche? Ettinger’s 
model gives an affirmative answer to this question by describing an alternative libidinal pathway, by way of the 
matrixial stratum of the psyche. In other words, Ettinger has been disturbed, as I have, by the paucity of explanation 
of creativity in Lacan’s models. Her explanation as being due to ‘another kind of lack’ I have placed in a wider 
notion of libidinal energy, as developed in this thesis. 
398 Ettinger, “Wit(h)nessing”, 131. (My emphases.) 
399 Ettinger, “Wit(h)nessing”, 131.  
400 Ettinger, “Wit(h)nessing”, 128-9.   This was discussed in Chapter One. 
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maintained to this world-where-desire-meets-reality’.401 I see her idea as emphasizing a 
(libidinal) desire for linking, rather than a desire raised by a lack/loss of linking.402 
 
Ettinger develops the idea of a ‘matrixial stratum of the psyche’ as a matrixial stratum of 
(partial) subjectivity, where a ‘partial subject’ is subject to links with others, but not (yet) subject 
to (Lacan’s notion of) the (object-orientated) unconscious. She maintains that: 
The matrixial unconscious sphere is a borderspace of simultaneous co-emergence and co-
fading of the I and the uncognized non-I – partial subjects, unknown others linked to a 
fragmented me, part objects – in neither fusion nor rejection. […] Co-emerging and co-
fading I(s) and non-I(s) interlace their borderlinks in metramorphosis.403  
 
She insists that by the womb experience she is precisely not intending the particular 
organ, but rather a ‘complex apparatus’ modelled on feminine-pre-natal encounter, which is also 
a model for continuing life experiences.404 The matrixial stratum, then, is an ‘originary 
unconscious’, which I see in terms of the libidinal unconscious. It’s basis is a desire for linking. 
What happens over time, in this model, is that there are traces of (necessarily) joint experiences: 
joys, traumas, pictograms, fantasies. There is not a fusion between mother and unborn child, as 
the term symbiosis in Lacanian theory implies, instead the I and the non-I are individual entities. 
Nor is there repudiation: while there is proximity, there is no feeling of threat or of rejection. 
These joint experiences are the basis of the sub-symbolic matrixial processes which permeate 
the symbolic (by means of the notion of ‘stain’) and ‘change it’ from within.405 Ettinger refers to 
the others-to-the-infant, and the effects of the matrixial gaze, as being ‘uncognized,’ in other 
words, there is no cognitive process or language (or Other) involved. For this reason it is by 
definition unconscious. This is not consistent with Lacan’s notion of the unconscious, but seen 
instead as in an ‘originary’ unconscious. Thus her use of the word ‘sub-symbolic’ is based on 
Lacan’s idea that the ‘phallic symbolic’ can be influenced or ‘swerved’ by means of traces on 
the psyche (the stain), but she refers to a different (pre-Oedipal) stratum of the psyche with 
                                                          
401 Ettinger, “Wit(h)nessing Gaze”, 128. Lacan has said that feminine jouissance can be experienced by women, but 
cannot be apprehended or represented as such, even by women. My argument below is that the notion of ‘originary 
feminine difference’ can be circumvented without compromising the value of her argument for this thesis. 
402 However she does sometimes imply a type of lack, a lack of borderlinking. 
403 Ettinger, “Wit(h)nessing”, 134. (My emphasis.)  Note the difference between the model and its application to the 
real world:  the womb involves a very close physical presence, which is not present in the life situation after birth. 
She says: the ‘womb stands for fusing symbiosis and undifferentiation that can emerge in culture as psychosis only. 
I suggest that evocations and irruptions of the feminine/prenatal encounters and emergence of matrixial cross-
scription of imprints are not psychotic. They only become psychotic-like when they have no symbolic access 
whatsoever in a culture that takes them for non-sense.  Not only [are] such cross-scriptions […] not psychotic, but 
they are a ground for thinking the enigma of the imprints of the world on the artist and of the inscriptions of the 
artist on the world’s hieroglyphs.’ (p. 135.)   
404 Ettinger, “Wit(h)nessing”, 134. She upholds this view in other places (pages 135 and 136), yet in some other 
texts she seems to be saying it is the loss of the actual experience in the womb that is important. 
405 Ettinger, The Matrixial Gaze  (Leeds, Feminist Arts and Histories Network, Department of Fine Art, the 
University of Leeds, 1995), 23. 
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‘stain’ laid down in the matrixial mode.406 I see this as a type of direct trans-personal 
communication that circumvents Lacan’s notion of the wall of the symbolic, while yet co-
existing with it. 
 
In her development of the term ‘matrix’, Ettinger explains that she put aside its original 
meaning, that is the usual connotation of the uterus as a basic passive space that is an imaginary 
‘only interior’ locus, and instead emphasizes the matrix as a:  
dynamic borderspace of active/passive co-emergence with-in and with-out the unknown [but 
non-threatening, non-subsuming] other […] a concept which accounts for a transforming 
borderspace of encounter of the co-emerging I and the neither fused and not (sic) rejected 
unknown non-I.  This concept has implications … for a broader Symbolic which includes 
sub-symbolic processes of inter-connectivity.407  
 
Her ideas of transforming borderspaces of encounter (borderlinking) and of sub-
symbolic processes are of importance to the present thesis, as seen below. 
 
Secondly within the matrixial model Ettinger develops the concept of the matrixial 
gaze.408 She proposes that the matrixial gaze (as with Lacan’s gaze), ‘is the most slippery of all 
the objects on which the subject depends in the field of desire.409 The instant the subject tries to 
tame the gaze, it slips away or fades out.’410 For Lacan this is because there is a schism between 
the seeing eye and the gaze.411  Lacan’s gaze is an enactment of the unconscious and its phallic 
lack, which involves fear of loss, the drive to recapture the ‘phallus’, this ‘object’, in the scopic 
field. The matrixial gaze ‘acts like’ the gaze, but from a different angle.412  While having (still) 
nothing (or little) to do with the eye, it infiltrates the ‘scopic’ drive by virtue of including other 
types of ‘perception’, pushed by a desire for linking and relationships. The two gazes are both 
comprised of traces and memories, influences on and by the body of the current ‘I’, even though 
the first matrixial influences arrive long before the Lacanian ‘subject’ is engendered. In spite of 
                                                          
406 It is closely related in principle to Lacan’s notion of ‘stain’, which is a result of traces laid down on the psyche, 
which can ‘influence’, or swerve, elements of the realm of the symbolic. 
407 See her footnote on page 23 of the ‘Matrixial’. (Her emphases.)   
408 In this section, a number of terminological questions arise. It seems to me that Ettinger, when using the term 
‘gaze’, is referring more to the Sartrean (that which permits the subject to realize that the Other is also a subject) 
than the late Lacanian terminology (Lacan developed the notion of the gaze as being not a drive, but the object of 
the scopic drive and thus the ‘gaze of the Other’ (See Chapter Three)). Likewise, her use of the term ‘Other’ is 
closer to the meaning of the ‘other subject’ than to the symbolic per se.  
409 Again, I see this as libidinal energy rather than desire in the Lacanian sense. 
410 Ettinger, ‘Matrixial ’, 9. This is based on Lacan’s notions. 
411 Ettinger, ‘Matrixial ’. Ettinger’s (as Lacan’s) definition of the ‘real’ is a psychic realm, not ‘nature’ or ‘the body’  
but more closely related to the real world than to the realms of the imaginary and the symbolic. She also says that 
‘the gaze is the look I imagine/desire in the field of the Other’.  This quote indicates that she is using Lacan’s late 
definition of the gaze in general. However, it is difficult to see how this definition applies to the matrixial gaze, 
which (for me) resembles more closely the earlier Lacanian definition of the gaze, in that it indicates the existence 
of another subject, rather than the existence of the field of the Other, as the Symbolic. 
412 The word ‘gaze’ on its own always refers to the Lacanian notion of the gaze in this chapter. 
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their differences, both gazes result in changes to the psyche, as seen in the notion of stain, which 
can then swerve the symbolic. The matrixial gaze is a way of apprehending and relating to other 
subjects or partial-subjects, which is more ‘archaic’ and more diffuse than that theorized in the 
gaze of Lacan, or in his concept of the relationship of subject to object. This matrixial gaze can 
be modelled by the pre-natal relationship in order to give a flavour of tendencies and processes 
in border-linking overshadowed by more ‘obvious’ ways of relating to others, but it is a (another 
un-thought) process that carries on un-apprehended throughout life. In any case she proposes 
that this ‘sub’ gaze, along with Lacan’s notion of the gaze, is what can ‘illuminate’ art works, as 
I discuss in the next sub-section. Her matrixial gaze is a ‘gaze’ because it is an influence of 
unconscious processes (the flow of libidinal energy) on various types of perception, with a 
resulting effect on the psyche. 
 
The third element of the matrixial model, metramorphosis, is for Ettinger a process of 
change that implies, or is a result of, non-phallic ways of contacting the archaic m/Other. It is ‘a 
process of intra-psychic and inter-psychic or trans-individual exchange of transformative and 
affective “communication” between/with-in several matrixial entities.’413 By ‘transform’, she 
means: ‘turn both of us into “partial-subjects”; still uncognized but unthoughtly known to each 
other’, as well as ‘transform’, or partially transform, the psyche by means of ‘traces’.414 
Metramorphosis is a result of the process that she terms borderlinking and happens via her 
notion of the ‘erotic aerials of the psyche’, an additional perceptual faculty that is discussed 
below. Metramorphosis is seen as a creative principle, in that changes to the psyche are in the 
form of ‘non-obliterating’ traces, as opposed to Lacan’s metamorphosis with obliterating 
changes. Females, she says, experience the womb both as a ‘past-site’, which is true for males as 
well, and as a ‘future-site’, ‘whether they are mothers or not’. She is quite explicit that the 
‘unconscious lanes’ of which she writes are equally available to both male and female.415 
Ettinger posits that ‘access’ to these unconscious lanes implies ‘allowing our subjectivity to 
linger in its partial dimension at the risk of regression, fragmentation and dispersal.’416 She is 
positing subjectivity as encounter at this level.417 This she refers to as a ‘fragilization’ process, 
and as one that correlates with various unconscious lanes of ‘communication’ of (traces of) 
libidinal energy (the real). In other words, in this model the non-I is unknown but is not an 
                                                          
413 Ettinger, “Wit(h)nessing”, 136. 
414 Ettinger, “Wit(h)nessing”, 136. 
415 Ettinger, “Wit(h)nessing”, 136.    
416 Ettinger, “Wit(h)nessing”, 134. 
417 She refers to this as a ‘feminine’ field, ‘beyond’ the phallus.      
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intruder, becoming instead a ‘partner-in-difference’, implying a tenuous connection. The ‘partial 
subject’ results from this borderlinking, as well as metramorphic changes in the psyche.418  
 
A fourth supporting concept for in the notion of the matrixial model is the concept of the 
‘eroticized aerials of the psyche’, which helps to explain how the matrixial gaze and 
metramorphic change in the psyche are able to take place. Ettinger conceives of the matrixial as 
a ‘subjacent sub-symbolic network’. The ‘network’ consists of  ‘the unseen, not-seeing, 
different eroticized aerials of the psyche.’419 They apprehend links occurring and mark a stain, 
via metramorphosis, on the psyche through which, and by which, imprints between subjects are 
‘interwoven’, making this aspect of the notion of the erotic aerials a linking mechanism between 
the psyches of subjects. The stain is thus the result of both ‘ordinary’ and ‘matrixial’ form(s) of 
perception. Her definition of the borderlinking process includes oscillations of touch, pressure, 
sound, light levels, shared sensorial impressions.420 Importantly for this thesis, this process 
encompasses ‘communication’ of aspects of the ‘real’, trauma and jouissance. 
   
In Ettinger’s model, the erotic antennae are direct receivers of stimuli, while the 
matrixial gaze is a product of this direct contact with the real. Thus Ettinger ‘describes’ what 
Lacan ‘denies’, an access route where (partial) subject meets trauma (the real), where ‘I’ meets 
the uncognized ‘non-I’. This is where the (partial) subject can participate in trauma and 
jouissance of another subject via (fragilizing) borderlinking, and outside of the context of 
representation and the ‘wall’ of the symbolic (as seen by Lacan). In this way she conceptualises 
not only repercussions from experiences in the womb, but results of that experience and learning 
in terms of on-going border-linking and border-swerving in adult relationships. She refers to the 
state of partial-subject as being the result of a ‘fragilizing process’. The matrixial ‘subjectivity 
as encounter’ is an important basis of the whole matrixial concept. It refers to ‘plural, partial and 
shared unconscious desire.’ This desire is for ‘linking’, which she believes becomes ‘active’ 
originally in the last trimester in the womb.421 The result is that ‘relations without relating 
transform the uncognized other and me and turn both of us into partial-subjects […] where an-
other is not an absolute separate other’, and traces of this are incorporated into the stain.422 If we 
see this desire as an innate aspect of libidinal energy, rather than due to a lack of some kind, 
then the idea of a separate libidinal pathway becomes clearer. 
 
                                                          
418 Ettinger,  “Wit(h)nessing”, 134. (My additions.) 
419 Ettinger,’Matrixial’, 44. 
420 However in the next paragraph her descriptions include sharing of affects as such, which I find more challenging 
– does this begin to touch on the telepathic? 
421 Ettinger, “Wit(h)nessing”, 138. 
422 Ettinger, “Wit(h)nessing”, 136. 
  
 
181
 In addition to positing another libidinal pathway, the matrixial gaze adds a dimension of 
trans-subjective awareness to Lacan’s concepts, by way of different libidinal pathways and 
processes, with different attributes, but it does not override or invalidate his concepts.   
 
 
2.1.3     Matrixial model and art 
 
Ettinger is also concerned with the effects of the matrixial gaze on art and the process of 
image making. The overall notion of the matrixial sphere proposes a process of potential 
psychic transformation and a resulting ‘sub-symbolic’ influence on the realm of the symbolic, 
thus ‘available’ to influence image making. However, she explains: ‘No content, no form and no 
image can guarantee that border-linking will take place via a particular artwork for particular 
viewers and that the gaze will inspire to (sic) attract a matrixial response.’423 In Ettinger’s view: 
But when artwork does carry traces of the matrixial encounter(s), traces are engraved as traces in 
the unconscious, kept alive through phantasy and, in their share-ability, can change and transform 
individuals, art and culture.424   
 
As the concepts of matrixial borderspace and metramorphic change imply, there are 
faculties (the eroticized aerials of the psyche) that, she posits, ‘register imprints that return from 
others as traces and transmit a centre-less matrixial gaze as a sieve-like veil.’425 By border-
linking in this way Ettinger posits that the artist can bear wit(h)ness to sub-knowledge of and 
from the Other (in later life), and other partial-subjects, via the ‘tableau’, or painting, which was 
until then (and possibly remains) ‘non-knowledge’. Here she refers to trans-subjectivity and 
non-symmetric border-linking within a mixed and changing borderspace. Here she also 
emphasizes what I refer to as the un-thought nature of these transactions. Thus she extends the 
faculty established in her model of the womb, in relation to the relationship of mother and child 
and based on an alternate libidinal pathway, to a faculty existing, but uncognized, in relations 
between adults and now applied to the artist, namely the borderlinking of a fragilized partial-
subject (the artist) as an influence on the making of the tableau, with implications for culture in 
general. This can happen because there is a pathway for libidinal energy which:  
is foreclosed to the phallus but emerges and fades-by-transformation in the matrix. 
Something of those co-emerg[ing] and co-fading in the Real is delivered to the Symbolic’s 
margins via covenants hidden in art.426   
                                                          
423 Ettinger, “Wit(h)nessing”, 139. 
424 Ettinger, “Wit(h)nessing”, 139. 
425 Ettinger, “Wit(h)nessing”, 139. 
426 Ettinger, “Wit(h)nessing”, 141. This quotation touches on the privileging of the feminine, which has been 
contested by others, and addressed by me above. This latter is in terms of a wider notion of libidinal energy than 
Lacan’s notion of the desire engendered by lack. In this same vein I see her notion of ‘originary’ repression of the 
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Ettinger is clear that the concept of the matrixial gaze is based on the idea of interlinking, 
the consequent transmission of affect(s) and pathic information, and the trans-scribing of 
uncognized sub-knowledge on various psychical layers, resulting in influences on image 
making. I see her proposals as another example of the inculcation of desire (now as the libido) 
into art in parallel to the discussion earlier (Section 1.2) of Lacan’s notion of the ‘lure’ being the 
inculcation of (his concept of) desire into a painting. 
 
2.1.4   Matrixial model and the un-thought stage of image making 
 
The basic question for me is how this idea of the matrixial could be seen to operate in the 
act of image making. Whatever definition of Lacan’s notion of the gaze is chosen with which to 
compare and thus better understand Ettinger’s notion, it is clear that the matrixial gaze involves 
more basic, and more subtle, sensory input, with a libidinal pathway ‘by-passing’, or under-
lying, that of the phallic-based notion. If Ettinger’s ‘gaze’ is regarded as a type of influence of 
the unconscious on perception, a hazy, diffuse, but still libidinally based element of the 
unconscious, it becomes more clearly related to the un-thought stage of the process of image 
making, in (at least) two ways. One way is that the ‘psychical’ influence on the tableau is 
swerved by the matrixial sub-symbolic as it infiltrates the symbolic by way of traces on the 
psyche, thus ‘swerving’ the symbolic to new subtleties of meaning.427 Ettinger retains Lacan’s 
idea of stain, but in her case this involves an out-of-conscious-mind ‘web’ of border- links and 
borderspaces in relation to the psyches of others. For Ettinger, the stain includes an influence of 
one’s ‘experience’ of the trauma/jouissance of relating/linking to others, i.e. the real. The second 
way is that the ‘matrixial’ emphasizes the play of directly trans-subjective communication in 
terms of the real. While the ‘phallic’ concepts emphasize social/cultural input (the symbolic), 
Ettinger introduces into the process of image making an extended idea of trans-subjectivity in 
that at least some of this unconsciously perceived material involves direct ‘contact’ with the 
‘realm of the real’ of other (partial) subjects.428 One implication of this is that, for Ettinger too, 
                                                                                                                                                                                                     
Thing, related to Freud’s ‘primal repression’, as explicable in more helpful terms in this present context by such 
notions as (with Lyotard, and Deleuze and Guattari) libidinal energy as the basis of the unconscious in conjunction 
with (Ehrenzweig) dedifferentiation, for instance of mental data that is vague, unarticulated and possibly affect-ful 
and thus very complex and very fragmented.  
427 As Lyotard’s idea that ‘libido’ swerves the symbolic, in his notion of figure. 
428 Lacan had hinted this in his ideas of social/cultural influence in the development of his notion of the Other, in 
that the Other is this influence. In 1964-65 the Other as the symbolic becomes for him an essential part of the gaze.  
The gaze is an aspect both of the make-up of the artist as he/she evolves an image and eventually an aspect of the 
image itself, both for the artist and for others, in that the libido, influenced by these two types of traces in the 
psyche, ‘plays’ within the tableau.  
  
 
183
the ‘real’ has changed ‘flavour’, from relating purely to ‘phallic’ desire, to encompassing also 
libidinal energy ‘untouched’ by Oedipal matters. 
 
This leads to a consideration of the artist per se. Specifically, from the point of view of 
image making, for Ettinger, the matrixial gaze can fragilize the artist (and the viewer), she 
argues, by enabling the artist:  
to follow it [the matrixial gaze] into a space beyond yet inside the visible, to abandon defences 
and become fragmented and fragile, to become open for sharing and absorbing and further redistributing 
fragments of trauma on condition of weaving into the artwork one’s own matrixial threads and letting the 
artwork penetrate one’s own psychic space of severalty.429  
 
To me, this statement implies that her notion of ‘fragilizing’ is related to loosening the 
grip of rational thought during the process of image making, relating it to my notion of the un-
thought stage. It hints, as well, at just what it is, as a process, that can contribute to the painting 
what wouldn’t be there if it were a ‘non-art’ sort of object, for instance a map or a sign. By this 
is meant a certain ‘forbidden’ meeting of real and symbolic by way of the matrixial gaze and the 
subsymbolic, outside of conscious control. It implies that there is, as well as stain, a more direct 
connection between partial subjects that involves the real and not the symbolic. These ideas 
side-step Lacan’s ideas of the signifier and structuralism, allowing access theoretically to an 
influence on image making (and image viewing), from an other than signifier-based notion, 
which has been difficult to conceive within the Lacanian psychoanalytic frame of thought.430   
 
This is, for me, the crucial step of the un-thought stage of the process of image making 
itself, where the results of the unconscious perception and resulting traces on the psyche are 
precariously, unknowingly, held in the mind/psyche of the artist. The libido is involved in this 
process, albeit indirectly insofar as the ‘pathway’ is opaque. But in order to ‘access’ or ‘allow’ 
these traces to appear in some way in the tableau, it is necessary, says Ettinger, for the artist to 
let go (become fragilized) of his/her conscious/rational plans, knowledge, assumptions, to 
become a ‘partial-subject’ as we saw above, perhaps a more ‘direct’ route of ‘communication’ 
than by way of the stain. This requires opening to the unknown, which may include frightening, 
horrific, traumatic material, as well as silly, joyous material – but affective information rather 
than linguistic/symbolic.  
 
 
                                                          
429 Ettinger, “Wit(h)nessing “, 141. (My addition.) 
430 For example N. Bryson, A. Ehrenzweig, J. Elkins, as was pointed out earlier, for instance in Chapter Two, 
section 1.1.10. 
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Section 3:  Implications 
 
Ettinger’s ideas provide a particularized extension of Lacan’s ideas. While upholding 
(most of) his concepts about the symbolic rotating around phallic law and the idea of the 
phallus, she introduces another, parallel, set of ideas. In Ettinger’s thinking this level of 
communication detours around Lacan’s realm of the symbolic, but can still leave ‘traces’ on the 
psyche (of all partial-subjects concerned), which can also affect the symbolic as in Lacan’s 
notion of stain. She avoids the Law, the primal scene, and Lacan’s notion of structure by 
positing another pathway for libidinal energy besides desire based on lack/castration. Her idea is 
a different level of communication based on what she terms desire with regard to links and 
relationships rather than desire based on lack of an ‘object’. I extend her idea by re-interpreting 
this as being an example of ‘non-human’ libidinal energy as discussed at the end of Chapter 
Two, insofar as there is no possibility of beliefs, concepts and the symbolic influencing desire in 
this notion of ‘archaic’ borderlinking and borderswerving. In this way, Ettinger affords me a 
particularized notion of an alternate pathway of the libido that can work alongside Lacan’s 
concept of desire. This puts more detail into what I have been proposing about Lacan’s ideas 
being ‘fitted together’ with notions of Lyotard, Ehrenzweig and Deleuze and Guattari, in that the 
action of the libido as such can be seen not only in a direct relationship to Lacan’s notion of the 
pathway of desire, but explicitly in parallel with it, co-existing. The libido doesn’t ‘run’ in only 
one pathway in the body/psyche and nor does only one belief, basic though it may be (Oedipus), 
affect every aspect of libidinal energy. The matrixial gaze now becomes an intermediate step 
towards Deleuze and Guattari’s concepts, where libido ‘continues to rumble along’ beneath the 
belief(s) that curtail (or enhance) energy.  
 
Ettinger’s notion of the matrixial gaze introduces a number of innovations important to 
this thesis, as well as providing as model a set of ideas that retains much of Lacanian theory and 
yet adds a radical element to co-exist with the rest. First, she posits the matrixial gaze as non-
visual, but still ‘perceptual’. Second, the matrixial gaze is based on the notion of a direct trans-
personal communication of the ‘real’, outside of the realm of the symbolic, on the basis of 
perceived bodily and mental ‘clues’. Third, and closely related, she also posits a ‘new’ 
perceptual ‘route’, the additional perceptual apparatus she terms erotic aerials of the psyche. The 
important point here is that the real is not ‘communicated’ through the ‘interference’ of the 
(phallic) ‘lack’ and the realm of the symbolic, but through a more direct trans-personal process 
of communication and apprehension of the ‘real’ through a differently conceived libidinal 
pathway. Fourth, she uses the term ‘partial-subject’ to indicate not being subject to Lacan’s 
notion of the (linguistic/Oedipal) unconscious, but to a libidinally based desire for linking. The 
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transmission of these ‘clues’ happens not as subject to subject in the Lacanian sense, but as 
‘partial-subject’ to ‘partial-subject’. Ettinger sees that the notion of the matrixial gaze directly 
affects art and art-making. Importantly for my purposes, there is her idea of the ‘fragilizing’ of 
artists, in allowing themselves to be open to (if not aware of, at least allow) such (unconscious) 
influences and perceived material, without tipping into psychosis. In other words the artist must 
become a partial-subject without letting go of the position of subject altogether. This is related 
(implicitly) to Lyotard’s notion of laxity in its relinquishing of rational ‘control’. Ettinger’s 
ideas are also related to Ehrenzweig’s notions of the ‘death of the ego’, and the related 
‘schizoid’ anxiety and direct (and un-thought) relationship to the processing of the libido. These 
ideas implicate the un-thought stage in the ‘non-human’ unconscious/real as well as the ‘human 
unconscious’. Pulling these ideas together leads me into a more generalized notion of the gaze 
that is developed in the next chapter. 
 
 
Section 4:  Next chapter 
 
The concluding chapter is a consolidation of the proposals presented in this thesis, 
emerging with a working notion termed the ‘libidinal gaze’ that further illuminates the un-
thought stage of image making. 
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Chapter Five summarizes and extends the ideas presented in this thesis, emphasizing 
their relationship to each other and to the illumination of the second (un-thought) stage of image 
making. In this way I am able to put forward a speculative contribution in the context of art 
practice to ideas about the process of image making with an idea termed the ‘libidinal gaze’. 
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Chapter Five  -  The Libidinal Gaze 
 
Section 1:   Introduction 
 
My aim in this thesis is to understand more clearly the stage two aspect of my ‘model of 
image making’. The model has three stages: planning (formative), absorbed (un-thought), and 
judging (reflexive) modes of attention, which can occur again and again as a spiralling process. 
‘Un-thought’ is used in the sense of mental material and processes that are not apparent to the 
conscious rational mind, of which the dream-work is an example. In this thesis I focus on this 
un-thought stage, because I feel it is important to the process of image making, but not well 
understood. It is also something I cannot ‘discover’ within my painting practice per se, by 
definition. 
 
I develop my ideas by using Lacan’s idea of the gaze as a template, where he considers 
the influence of (his concept of) the unconscious on perception. I use this idea both because of 
its emphasis on the idea of the unconscious, and because it involves the element of perception 
(as the scopic field). In addition to Lacan’s ideas, I draw on experience gained in my studio as a 
painter. In pursuing Lacan’s concept of the gaze, I find that there are a number of aspects that 
are helpful to better understanding the un-thought stage. I also find some aspects that are less 
helpful or even problematic in terms of my experience in the studio; these I re-focus with the 
help of the related thinking of certain other writers.  
 
The point is to emerge at first with a putative ‘picture’ of what might have been Lacan’s 
view of the un-thought stage of the process of image making, had he considered that to be of 
equal importance to the training of analysts and the ‘talking cure’. My aim is to end with a 
compendium of ideas that deals with the un-thought stage in such a way as to further illuminate 
that stage, to be compatible with my experience in the studio, and to develop a basis for the 
contextualization of my own practice with regard to contemporary culture.  
 
 
Section 2:   Summary of thetic argument 
 
In Chapter One I consider Lacan’s hypothesis that lack and its consequent desire 
comprise the origin and basis of the unconscious. He posits that lack is indestructible, it 
engenders desire, desire is the origin of ‘every variety of animation’, and desire is ‘irreparable’. 
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At the Oedipal complex stage lack and desire are related to fear, a figurative castration, and 
death, and the realm of the symbolic is ‘conquered’ in this context. Lack and desire form the 
basis for Lacan’s concept of the ‘realm of the real’. From this basis he develops an idea of full 
and empty speech with regard to the realm of the real, which I extend to full and empty images. 
 
Lacan understands his concepts as an integrated and ‘complete’ system of thought with 
regard to the practice of psychoanalysis. For me, these ideas provide useful illuminations of the 
un-thought stage, such as the nature of the symbolic, as well as its conquest and the motivation 
to use it. However for Lacan the real can never be embodied or assuaged by the symbolic since 
the two can never meet. In this sense, image making could be seen as a negative, even 
symptomatic, activity, which I find problematic. 
 
As a result of my unease, I consider Lyotard’s ideas that put into contention Lacan’s 
scenario of lack as the originator of desire and this desire as the animator of all action. Lyotard 
posits an alternative hypothesis, the libido as a force of energy in its own right. For him 
‘expression’ (aspects of the real) emerges as a dissimulation of the symbolic by means of this 
libidinal energy. Libidinal energy can be focused into ‘intensities’ by way of ‘devices’ of 
various sorts. For him, art is one such location of intensities. Artists’ processes include a state of 
‘laxity’ during which intensities of libidinal energy are focused, for instance by the ‘devices’ of 
primary processes. The artist can ‘enter’ (as a mode of attention) this state whereby borderlines 
and boundaries between interior and exterior material become blurred. I see his notion of 
‘laxity’ as closely related to my ‘un-thought’ stage in terms of a mode of attention during which 
mental processes not encompassed in, or by, the rational conscious mind can encourage libidinal 
intensities as ‘seen’ in art. 
 
In this way Lyotard addresses some of my concerns, particularly my concern about the 
pervasiveness and necessity of the notion of lack and its consequent desire, and the notion that 
these form the basis of the unconscious. However, there is an apparent inconsistency when 
attempting to reconcile his system of thought with that of Lacan, since Lacan’s concepts, 
including the gaze and the unconscious, are, precisely, based on the notion of lack.  
 
I leave these two ideas seemingly in opposition until the end of Chapter Two. 
 
In Chapter Two I consider Lacan’s relevant concepts concerning the content of the 
unconscious, particularly in terms of signifiers and the Other. Lacan’s notion of signifiers is 
explored from two points of view, the experiential and the linguistic. The experiential notion of 
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signifiers involves perceived material as it ‘migrates’ from perception to memory, where the ‘in-
between’ traces involved are seen as ‘signifiers’. The linguistic notion of signifiers has to do 
with signifiers as being ‘signs’, but signs that lack their ‘signified’ (meaning), and are thus 
‘unrealized’. He proposes that the content of the unconscious is signifiers that are ‘structured’ in 
terms of a ‘primary classificatory function’. By this he refers to the example of the ‘innate 
prohibition of incest’ by means of signifiers promulgated by ‘nature’ (rather than culture). For 
Lacan, the primary classificatory system is closely related, by way of combinatory organization, 
to the way in which language is structured, such that he sees the unconscious as made up of 
signifiers that are manipulated by linguistic-type operations, although not ‘realized’ as a 
discourse. Linguistic operations taking place on this mental material include, for example, 
condensation and displacement as metonymy and metaphor respectively. 
 
An implication of this is that signifiers, as ‘text’ of the unconscious, when processed in 
the un-thought stage, can produce more surprising results when in the grip of primary processes 
than can signs as text of the conscious mind when undergoing ‘rational’ processes. This is 
because signifiers are, for instance, less restricted in terms of possible combinations, since there 
are also ‘illogical’ ways in which they can be affected/combined by linguistic operations. The 
notion of signifiers is also useful when they are seen as ‘manifesting’ as marks on a surface in 
the image making process. However Lacan’s view of the unconscious as structured like a 
language causes me misgivings since it is difficult to see a basis for any lasting associations or 
relationships among the unrealized signifiers as worked over by the chaotic primary processes. 
This is an important point for image making in terms of the ‘harmony’ (opposite to chaos) that 
can accompany (or not) the emerging of marks onto a support in the un-thought stage. 
 
Lacan’s notions of truth and knowledge are useful in thinking about the influence of the 
‘real’ on the symbolic in terms of the un-thought stage of image making insofar as this stage can 
be seen to encourage the emergence of ‘truth’. My misgivings here relate to my idea that 
Lacan’s notion of ‘unrealized’ signifiers allows expression and affect to be under-theorized.  
 
Because I question Lacan’s (under-) theorization of affect as residing within and/or 
associated with signifiers, I consider the relevant ideas of Deleuze and Guattari in their concept 
of schizoanalysis. They develop a system of thought with a different basis of ideas and 
assumptions than Lacan’s (the idea of the schizophrenic rather than the idea of the neurotic), and 
one that also contests Lacan’s notion of lack and its consequent desire as the basis of the 
unconscious. For Deleuze and Guattari, like Lyotard, libidinal energy is seen as a force, or 
energy, and as the basis of the unconscious. Schizoanalysis is based on an idea of the scattering 
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of this energy into what they see as ‘desiring machines’. These libidinal flows can have effects 
in both micro and/or macro (‘molar’) levels and as such depend on and produce results ranging 
from (micro) neurological functioning to complex (molar) level beliefs and concepts (such as 
lack, the symbolic and the like). Not only desiring-production results from these desiring 
machines, but also the unconscious ‘molecular’ level code-recording on the ‘body without 
organs’. But at all levels, individual and social, desiring machines are driven by libidinal energy, 
which thus posits the real as an integral part of the material as it is processed. 
 
As the ‘recordings’ become more molar, gradually the codes approach the complexity of 
what Lacan terms signifiers, the symbolic, and the Other. Deleuze and Guattari posit that only at 
this point do Lacan’s concepts of unconscious, pre-conscious and conscious become viable. 
Lacan speaks of the pre-conscious in speaking of beliefs, social ‘exchange’, and so on. But, for 
Deleuze and Guattari, Lacan’s notion of the unconscious is also a phenomenon of the ‘deep pre-
conscious’ rather than a definition of the unconscious. This is because they see that Lacan’s 
concept of lack and its resulting desire is due to the formation/influence of a belief, not a 
physical or neurological phenomenon. Hereafter, I refer to their ‘deep preconscious’ as ‘human 
unconscious’, as they also suggest, since this keeps it firmly differentiated from (Freud’s and 
Lacan’s) concepts of the pre-conscious. For Deleuze and Guattari, beliefs and the symbolic are 
flows and break-flows of energy at the human unconscious, as well as pre-conscious and 
conscious molar levels. They see a spectrum of many levels from deep unconscious and 
molecular to the conscious mind, to the social, all based on the energy of the libido. In addition 
they visualize qualitative as well as quantitative fluctuations in libidinal energy.  
 
In this way Deleuze and Guattari have formulated a broad and complex system of 
thought, although without proposing ideas particularly related to image making. I see, within 
Deleuze and Guattari’s system of thought, the accommodation of Lacan’s concepts of the 
unconscious and the gaze, as well as the accommodation of Lyotard’s ideas about libidinal 
energy and its intensities, art, and the mode of attention of the artist, with all their implications 
for the un-thought stage. In this way, ‘expression’ can be seen to emerge from a complex of 
energy levels including unconscious libidinal energy in its various pathways, some by way of 
the human unconscious and the notion of lack, and some by other routes, personal and social. 
Rather than schizoanalysis being opposed to psychoanalytic theory and thus the gaze, it opens a 
space within which to accommodate and better understand psychoanalysis and the gaze as a 
description of the ‘human’ mental world. In this sense lack and desire, as conceived by Lacan, 
influence a subset of libidinal pathways, albeit an important subset in terms of our human-ness. 
The notion of schizoanalysis seen in this light accommodates both Lacan’s and Lyotard’s ideas. 
  
 
192
This also allows me to include other ideas of Lyotard’s that are related to art, such as intensities 
of energy, dissimulation and figure, and the mental state of laxity, alongside Lacan’s ideas. 
 
But this still leaves the particular arena of image making and its related un-thought stage 
less than thoroughly theorized, since Deleuze and Guattari are dealing with a system with more 
widely and differently focused concerns.  
 
In Chapter Three, I consider Lacan’s ideas about processes occurring in the unconscious 
that make a number of contributions to an understanding of the un-thought stage of image 
making. For instance the process of the dream-work (first theorized by Freud) illuminates the 
workings of the unconscious from the viewpoint of mental material and processes. It is helpful 
to this thesis, since the results of the dream-work (as images) and the results of the un-thought 
stage (as images) can both proceed from a relaxation/absence of rational conscious thought and 
as such both can appear ‘meaningless’, full of surprises, and as encompassing ‘more than meets 
the eye’. However, Lacan re-inscribes Freud’s ideas of the dream-work in terms of linguistic-
type operations, for instance metonymy and metaphor, taking place on linguistic-type material. 
Lacan understands the primary processes as having (mainly) chaotic effects on this material, 
even though there may be certain associations within the material. I discuss Freud’s concepts of 
‘word-presentation’ and ‘thing-presentation’ as providing a notion of the ‘mobility of energy’ I 
find de-emphasized in Lacan’s ideas, which emphasize the lack of meaning instead. Insofar as I 
am considering the un-thought stage of image making, Freud’s notion of word-presentations and 
thing-presentations allows the visualization of associations of ‘ideas’ and an association of 
energy encapsulated with these ideas, which also calls to mind Lyotard’s idea of intensities of 
energy. For me Lacan’s ideas under-theorize the subject of making art.  
 
Another relevant process proposed by Lacan is that of the ‘gap’, by means of which 
unconscious material is manifested. Unconscious material arrives as ‘absence’, distortion, or 
accident, in other words it is material (unrealized signifiers) that arrives in an ‘impeded’ manner, 
and whose arrival can ‘impede’ conscious processes. This notion of gap also involves the 
concepts of ‘subject’ as subject to the unconscious, and subject as ‘split’. The split subject is 
seen in the process of ‘aphanisis’, or fading, such that the ‘opening’ of the gap is where the 
subject as such (representation) ‘disappears’ as unconscious material (being) ‘appears’ (a slip of 
the tongue, etc.) and the ‘closing’ of the gap is where the subject, as signifier, reappears and 
unconscious material no longer appears as such. These ideas are useful to me in thinking about 
the un-thought stage ‘appearing’ and ‘disappearing’ and the consequent (or pre-requisite) side-
lining of conscious rational processes. However, to me, the notion of the gap has an air of being 
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too chaotic, limited, and ‘pushed from behind’ to be useful in illuminating image making. It may 
help to explain the field of emerging symptoms or even character traits (for Lacan), but does not 
(for me) explain the whole arena of the un-thought stage of image making. But my interest in 
the gap is highlighted due to the fact that it illustrates that my overall focus is from a different 
perspective than that of Lacan. While he sees the gap as non-volitional (from the conscious 
mind point of view), I am considering that the un-thought stage as a process that, while it is not 
conscious and/or rational, can be ‘encouraged’ (in terms of ‘relinquishing’ the conscious mind 
mode of attention) and can produce surprising and non-chaotic results in terms of consequent 
mark making that can include a ‘harmony’ and (sometimes) an underlying ‘idea’. This leads me 
to realize that symptoms and the dream-work are not in themselves sufficient as models to help 
explain unconscious ‘effects’ on the process of image making. There are differing underlying 
characteristics between the arena of the dream-work and symptoms, being born of fear and an 
effort to dissemble, and the arena of making images, as an effort of ‘intention’ and ‘search’. This 
highlights an essential difference between making art and dreaming, which is that art is to some 
degree intentional, dreams are not, even though both include an aspect of relaxation of 
conscious and rational thought, allowing more freedom for the ‘real’ to play a part. The 
difference becomes whether what Lacan terms ‘desire’ is being influenced by an underlying 
‘intent’ in terms of search, experiment, art making, or (only) by lack and its desire, which can 
also be seen as an ‘intent’, but one guided by distress and fear. 
 
At the end of this section about Lacan’s ideas of processes in the unconscious, I am left 
with queries concerning the nature and inclusion of affect, the effect of (qualities of) intent, and 
the idea of harmony (not chaos) in art making. Lacan, Deleuze and Guattari, and even Lyotard, 
leave much unexplained from the point of view of what can usefully be seen to be happening in 
the un-thought stage of the process of image making. For these reasons I include a consideration 
of the ideas of Anton Ehrenzweig, which articulate and develop a more detailed picture. He 
provides both elaboration and extension of Lacan’s and Lyotard’s ideas of primary processes. 
One elaboration is to propose a ‘replacement’ notion for repression, by positing that what is 
often seen as repression can be seen more profitably as being due to the inability of the 
conscious mind (gestalt) to comprehend the complexities of fragmented ‘dedifferentiated’ 
mental material. New ideas include dedifferentiation and syncretistic scanning, as well as a more 
distinct picture of the process of simplification and re-introjection of mental material into the 
conscious mind. His processes can be seen to be taking place in a libidinally based unconscious 
(based on Freud’s ideas of libidinal economy) and thus understood in a broader context than 
Lacan’s notion of lack engendered desire. It is a small step to see this notion of Ehrenzweig’s as 
related for instance to Lyotard’s notion of the libido ‘working over’ unconscious mental 
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material – but with one very important difference. Whereas with Lyotard we are left to assume 
(as with Lacan) that the primary processes working over the dream-thoughts have ‘chaotic’ 
results, Ehrenzweig allows, going back to Freud, more capacity within the mental material to 
enable interconnectivity and associations strong enough to maintain links even as the primary 
process and scanning work over the material. This helps to account for the ‘harmony’, or 
‘hidden structure of art’ (as opposed to utter chaos) that I find in image making in the studio.  
 
This leads to and reinforces several developments in my argument. Insofar as I have 
linked desire with ‘intent’, I effect a critique of intent as synonymous with rationality. I critique 
Lacan’s overarching ontology of lack as a corollary of desire (or intent) in that I rework desire in 
terms of a desire to produce rather than (only) a desire to signify (or assuage fears of) 
death/lack. My critique places the ‘tragic’ (aesthetic) at the heart of being (Lacan) into a wider 
context of a libidinal economy unbounded by lack. 
 
In Chapter Four I consider the gaze as an overall concept, having now considered its 
major component, the unconscious, in detail. Again my consideration continues to be driven by 
relevance to the un-thought stage of image making. My point here is that the gaze is an example 
of an ‘un-thought’ process and as such directly comparable with the un-thought stage of image 
making (except, again, for the understanding that the un-thought stage has an underlying 
intentionality of search and make, while the gaze does not). This direct comparability between 
the two ‘un-thought processes’ is what has encouraged me to use Lacan’s notion of gaze-as-
process as a template for my investigations.  
 
Lacan’s ideas are useful in that they provide a basis for seeing a connection between the 
unconscious and looking. However by now in the argument I have overturned or circumvented 
some of Lacan’s basic principles. This is not in the sense that they have no validity, but in the 
sense that there is a wider context in which to understand them, that of the libidinal economy as 
seen by Deleuze and Guattari. The idea of there being a ‘level’ of the (libidinally based) 
unconscious at which beliefs and concepts can begin to be apparent in a ‘human’ dimension 
results in Lacan’s linguistically based ideas being seen as a ‘human unconscious’, and having a 
great deal of value, but being seen also as only one subset of possible libidinal pathways 
operating at any one time. 
 
Because of this, in Chapter Four I consider the ideas of Bracha Lichtenberg Ettinger, 
who, while working closely with the paradigm of Lacan’s concepts, develops the idea of an 
additional (to the phallic) pathway for the energy of the libido. She emphasizes that she sees her 
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ideas as co-existent with those of Lacan. She terms her concept the ‘matrixial gaze’, and for me 
it is an example of a pre-Oedipal, sub-symbolic, partial-subject (to the desire for ‘encounters’ as 
links and relationships, rather than to lack as object-orientated) pathway for the libido. In other 
words, Ettinger agrees that a pathway defined by Lacan’s notion of lack and desire is valid in his 
notion of the gaze, but she is proposing an ‘extra’ pathway for the libido and a different ‘gaze’ 
as a result. In addition to the notion of the matrixial gaze, Ettinger contributes the idea of a 
‘transpersonal’ communication that circumvents Lacan’s notion of the ‘wall’ of the symbolic 
and encompasses the real. The developing argument of the thesis has included seeing that 
repression can be seen as due to ‘complexity’ of mental material, while lack can be seen as a 
‘belief’, and thus belonging to the human unconscious. In this context I depart from some 
aspects of Ettinger’s notion of the matrixial gaze (as she in any case implies in some of her 
statements), so that the matrixial gaze can now be considered without recourse to the idea of 
lack from Lacan’s paradigm. As such, the matrixial gaze becomes a different (than Lacan’s) 
example of what I term below a ‘libidinal gaze’, an extended idea of the gaze, since it can also 
be accommodated within the Deleuze and Guattari ideas of varying qualities and quantities of 
libidinal energy and also desiring machines as results of multiple libidinal pathways. The 
matrixial gaze can be seen as ‘outside’ of the ‘human unconscious’. It affords an example of the 
co-existence of different ‘types’ of gaze (as device) and energy (as intensity) within a wider 
view of the basis of the unconscious.  
 
 
Section 3:    The ‘libidinal gaze’ 
      
3.1 Definition of the libidinal gaze 
 
The notion of the gaze is notoriously difficult both to define and to exemplify, as both 
Lacan and Ettinger attest. Nevertheless I have gathered from both of them and from other 
writers some means of articulation that can be assembled into an idea I term the libidinal gaze. 
  
The gaze for Lacan is ‘a look I imagine in the field of the Other’, where the ‘look’ 
implies perception (as the scopic field), ‘I’ is the subject (to his notion of the unconscious), 
‘imagine’ is an effort at representation in order to (try to) deal with desire, and ‘the field of the 
Other’ tells us that it is in the symbolic that the result is manifested, via the closely associated 
route of Lacan’s concepts of lack and desire. The gaze is seen by Lacan as objet a, such that the 
eye (in the scopic field) is driven by lack and the Other, resulting in a belief(s) not necessarily in 
accord with the ‘reality’ of the situation.  
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Thinking about the idea of a ‘gaze’ in terms of the ideas of the other writers, Lyotard’s 
gaze would have to do with unconscious ‘devices’ resulting in intensities of libidinal energy. 
For Ehrenzweig it would be seen as the scattering and scanning of perceived information, its 
processing by the primary processes, and a resulting re-introjection to the conscious mind. 
Ettinger’s idea of the matrixial gaze is the influencing of the psyche by perceptual material 
gathered by means of ‘archaic’ and diffuse pathways of perception, including sound, movement 
and the erotic antennae of the psyche, pushed by a desire for linking and relationships. In other 
words, all these writers consider the process of a gaze in one form or another. And all also link 
their ideas to the arena of image making. 
 
The libidinal gaze is, for me, a summary of the above. It is an affect and/or frisson I 
apprehend at the edges of intuition. This is where affect and frisson are experiential matters, ‘I’ 
is a partial-subject (subject to the energy of the libido, including for example the desire for 
linking), ‘apprehend’ is (subtle forms of) perception, and ‘the edges of intuition’ can be seen to 
include both Ettinger’s unconscious perception (for instance erotic aerials of the psyche) and 
Ehrenzweig’s definition of intuition as an event where ‘the normal differentiation of time and 
space is suspended and events and objects can freely inter-penetrate’.431 As such, ‘intuition’ can 
be seen to be a result of intensities of libidinal energy with regard to mental events that are not 
always filtered through the belief/concept of lack in the ‘human unconscious’.  
 
What is the effect of the libidinal gaze relative to the (Lacanian) gaze? The effect of the 
libidinal gaze is to tame Lacan’s gaze to some extent. It can modify the alienation, the split, by 
adding aspects of individual intentionality and intensities of energy. Rather than just the 
masking and identifications resulting from lack, there is a resulting feeling of sub-perceptual 
linking to others, their joys and traumas, and of a pulsing of one’s energy and an accompanying 
optimism. Borderlines and boundaries of lack can be permeated by other aspects of one’s 
characteristics, energy and perceptions. 
 
Desire/libido from the libidinal gaze point of view accommodates a number of ‘sub-
definitions’. Libidinal energy includes desire as conceived by Lacan’s notion of ‘desire’ based 
on lack, Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of ‘desire’ as libidinal energy including desiring 
machines and ‘coding’ written on the surface of the body without organs, and ‘desire’ in 
                                                          
431 Ehrenzweig, 132. See Chapter Three, Section 3.4 where I quote Ehrenzweig’s definition of the word intuition as 
an event where ‘the normal differentiation of time and space is suspended and events and objects can freely 
interpenetrate.’ 
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Ettinger’s sense that includes a pre-phallic libidinal pathway, desiring and apprehending links 
with others. But as Ettinger points out (Chapter Four Section 2.1.4) there is no way to predict, or 
control, who, when, or how the borderlinking/gaze desire might take place, and no way to 
predict (or control) who can or will (and when) ‘respond’.432  
 
The libidinal gaze is ‘libidinal’ because the notion of the unconscious here depends on 
multiple pathways of libidinal energy in addition to that of desire as proposed by Lacan (seen 
now as ‘human’ functioning). My notion of the un-thought stage of the process of image making 
has to be partially situated in the human unconscious, insofar as it deals with signifiers, signs 
and systems of signs. However, Deleuze and Guattari’s (concept of the) unconscious is (also) 
operating, ‘rumbling along’ at a ‘level’ beneath and alongside the ‘beliefs’ level. This means 
that other devices and intensities can manifest in parallel with effects from the human 
unconscious. I see that Ehrenzweig’s notion that there is an inability of the conscious mind to 
apprehend very complex (and/or un-articulated) content and processes (because of the limits of 
the workings of the gestalt) can apply to the human unconscious and can apply also to ‘non-
human’ level mental material and libidinal processes as proposed by Deleuze and Guattari. This 
is directly applicable to my understanding of the libidinal gaze in that aspects of energy 
unrelated to lack can be understood to be operating. 
 
Within this ‘definitions’ section, it is as well to review the meaning of the ‘real’ in the 
new context. My view is that the ‘real’ is seen as libidinal energy and as ‘unobtainable’ from the 
point of view of re–presentation. Lacan’s ideas are valuable in articulating this. In this sense, the 
nature of the real has migrated from being characterized only by trauma, loss and fear to being 
characterized as including also a less thwarted productive energy. This is because the notion of 
‘real’ can now be extended from being based in lack, and its desire, to include ‘other’ energy 
and processes, although still foreclosed from the conscious mind as it functions in the realm of 
the symbolic. Examples are, for instance, Ettinger’s notions of both jouissance and trauma (as 
experienced trans-personally by means of the erotic antennae of the psyche), as well as 
Ehrenzweig’s notions of the poemagogic, and the ‘stages of creativity’, including notions of the 
perceived ‘death’ and rebirth of the ego, as well as intentionality and various affects and states 
of mind. Our symbolic re-presentations of the real are (still) unable to embody this extended 
notion of the real. I see this as ‘explained’ by Ehrenzweig’s notion of over-complexification in 
that the conscious mind, in its processing and ‘focusing’, lacks the ability to symbolize and thus 
to re-present, the complexities of emotion, affect, being and non-being, and ‘truth’ as opposed to 
                                                          
432 My own definition of desire/libido is close to the word ‘spirit’ as in a spirited horse. It is related to the idea of  
‘will’. It is easier to recognize than define. 
  
 
198
knowledge, in other words the ‘real’. The grounds for this view are laid in schizoanalysis, where 
emotions are ‘recorded as well as functions – all are “engineering”’. I see this as meaning that 
there may be no reason except for one of complexity that affects, emotions and the like are not 
‘re-presentable’ and must ‘appear’ by way of for example dissimulation and intensities, the gap, 
the stain and re-introjection of simplified mental material. 
 
3.2  Characteristics of the libidinal gaze 
 
It is important to bear in mind that any notion of the gaze being dealt with here includes 
the characteristic of being unavailable to the conscious mind of the person ‘gazing’. In Lacan’s 
notion the process of the gaze does not ‘appear’ as ‘looking’ over-shadowed by the person’s 
unconscious beliefs and affects, but rather appears in the conscious mind as an event happening 
in the outside word. Lacan’s concept of the gaze and Ettinger’s notion of the matrixial gaze are 
(different) subsets of the libidinal gaze, in that both are examples of the unconscious influencing 
perception, but with different focus, emphasis and ‘definitions’ on/of their ideas about 
perception and unconscious. The libidinal gaze is a ‘gaze’ because it consists of influence on 
perception by an extended notion of the unconscious seen as based in libidinal energy. It also 
includes an extended notion of perception by including not only sensory perception as we know 
it, but also for instance Ehrenzweig’s idea of syncretistic scanning, as well as Ettinger’s notions 
of hitherto non-articulated pathways of perception, ‘erotic aerials of the psyche’, which can pick 
up (and pass on to art work for instance) ‘jouissance and/or trauma’ pertaining to oneself and 
others, even though not apprehended by the conscious mind.  
 
A related characteristic concerns the notion of the libidinal gaze supporting the idea of 
an underlying ‘harmony’ or structure of mental material. In other words, there are associations 
and resonances amongst various ‘groupings’ of mental material, thus adding elements of 
‘harmony’ to the (Lacan/Lyotard) idea of ‘chaos’ resulting from unconscious processes and 
content. At the same time it is to be understood that this is not the ‘harmony’ of rational thought 
and logic. The basis of my idea here is what is seen clearly in Ehrenzweig’s notions of the 
poemagogic, the ‘intelligence’ manifested in the phenomena he describes. One can conclude 
that there is an ‘intelligence’ (optimizing tendencies, associations) at the molecular level, which 
carries on, even magnifies (in optimal conditions), as the macro levels develop in complexity – 
if not there initially, it is hard to see how these could be grafted on. Thus Ehrenzweig’s ideas 
play a dual role, not only describing in detail the un-thought stage, but showing us also just how 
complex, how inter-related, interactive and powerful, the human unconscious content and 
processes can be. He contributes also the notion that unconscious processes can be subject to 
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learning. In this sense, it is possible to understand more clearly Ehrenzweig’s notions of 
fragmentation to dedifferentiation, processing by various primary processes (condensation, 
displacement, figuration) on (more than) linguistic signifiers, and consequent re-introjection of 
(some of) the ‘de-fragmented’ (differentiated) material. The implication of these notions of 
Ehrenzweig’s is that there is a relevant relatedness of material that can enable a structure of 
related information to be maintained – forming a basis for what I term ‘harmony’ or relatedness 
in the ensuing emergence into consciousness (for instance as art) and what he names the ‘hidden 
order of art’. The un-thought stage is ‘un-thought’ because it is dedifferentiated, but it is also 
‘creative’ because many seemingly (that is rationally) unrelated bits of ‘information’ can be 
related in terms of not-obvious-to-rationality attributes by means of the primary processes. My 
view is that chaos is more likely to result from situations involving fear and trauma, while 
greater harmony may predominate in situations involving search and experimentation. 
Furthermore, I am proposing that it is possible to see (‘positive’) ‘intent’ associated with desire 
(libido) and that this can be related to Deleuze and Guattari’s idea of the ‘quality’ of libido. 
 
One characteristic of what I am finding in the combined descriptions of the happenings 
of the un-thought stage of image making is a way to ‘tame the gaze’. This is analogous to 
taming (Lacan’s) concept of lack as being the only basis for the unconscious and thus for the 
gaze. The process of the (Lacanian) gaze happens, but now I can see the existence of mitigating 
material and processing, with other devices and intensities taking place. 
 
3.3     Implications of the libidinal gaze in connection with the un-thought stage 
      
The focus of interest of this thesis, the ‘un-thought stage’, is seen by Lacan as 
functioning partially or predominantly in the human unconscious, where the realm of the 
symbolic exists in unrealized form, and where unconscious primary processing of this mental 
material can happen. For Deleuze and Guattari, this human unconscious is also where beliefs 
(such as the Oedipus complex) can have an overt influence, interfering with flows of libidinal 
energy. For me, this ‘unrealized’ mental material means that, since meanings are not present (as 
with Freud’s thing-presentation and Lacan’s signifiers) the conscious mind must be pre-empted 
and over-ridden to permit the ‘appearance’ of this material.  
 
In addition to Lacan’s concepts, I have proposed that various other libidinal energy 
pathways can be active in this un-thought psychical arena and some can be visualized as more 
direct and less thwarted (than by the belief in ‘lack’), or influenced in other ways by other 
beliefs. Lyotard envisages libidinal energy freely available to ‘work over’ dream material. He 
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proposes further that, for instance in art, one can see ‘intensities’ of libidinal energy formed by 
‘devices’ for channelling and manifesting these intensities. These devices can be enabled by 
entering a state of laxity, an un-thought mode of attention in which an artist may engage 
unconscious processes (devices) on unconscious mental material. In this regard Ehrenzweig 
speaks of the ‘death of the ego’ and Ettinger of ‘fragilization’ of the artist. Deleuze and Guattari 
propose not only quantitative fluctuations of libidinal energy, but qualitative fluctuations as 
well, for instance some libidinal energy can be understood to be ‘thicker, less fluid’ than others 
(for example by way of interference by (their ideas of) repression, certain beliefs, and the like). I 
see that Ettinger’s concept of the matrixial gaze and Ehrenzweig’s notions of syncretistic 
scanning (which can also be seen as a gaze), dedifferentiation and redifferentiation are examples 
of Lyotard’s notion of ‘devices’ that can influence the pathways taken, and intensities 
developed, by libidinal energy in the human unconscious. The point is that while the un-thought 
stage may be seen primarily in the human unconscious and thus influenced by ‘lack’, there are 
other libidinal influences ‘available’, happening also within the un-thought stage. 
  
One particular way of visualizing the libidinal gaze as being associated with the un-
thought stage is in the following manner. As I discussed earlier, from Lacan’s concept of the 
gaze we can visualize signifiers ‘manifesting’ as marks on the artistic support. As the signifier 
‘leaps’ from mental to material support, it can add something of ‘truth’ and ‘fullness’, in that as 
the subject becomes split, or elided, the ‘real’ can issue forth. The other writers propose similar 
ideas, based on slightly varying notions of the state of mind involved, but all relating to what I 
term the un-thought stage, where rational thought is absent, but mental processing continues. 
The important point in this ‘example’ is that from the point of view of the libidinal gaze, I can 
visualize (other) libidinal energy pathways where libido ‘works over’ the signifiers and other 
mental material, resulting in ‘dissimulation’ or distortion of a resulting system of symbols 
working hand in glove with distortions by primary processes.  
 
This is difficult to exemplify, since it is not possible to differentiate marks inspired 
specifically by the ‘human unconscious’ from other marks. Nor is it possible to differentiate 
between (or even describe) Lacan’s ‘real’ and Ehrenzweig’s ‘hidden order’ in the detail of their 
manifestation. The point is that this thesis is concerned primarily with investigating a process. 
The exact results of that process are more or less indescribable, although it is sometimes 
possible to speak about the related ‘effect’. 
 
In any case, taking the ideas in this thesis together, one can see not only the possibility of 
an un-thought stage, but the prevalence of the un-thought mode of attention in terms of overall 
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functioning and operation of the mind/body. This phenomenon is not peculiar to the process of 
image making: for instance Ehrenzweig proposes that it can apply to problem solving situations 
in general. Importantly here, these writers agree that some form of ‘access’ to the real, as 
opposed to re-presentation and the symbolic alone, is a pre-requisite in the process of making 
art. This would be the ‘extended real’ as I have described it just above. Art as such involves a 
particular mode of attention in that there is a particular (unconscious) influence within the art-
making procedure. This is facilitated by a willingness to be fragilized, to become a partial-
subject, to fade out as a subject and then be able to return to subject-hood having transmitted 
(unconsciously) something ineffable and indefinable to the art object along the way. All of 
which, by definition, is inaccessible to the conscious mind of the artist. In other words, I see 
fragilization along with the notions of laxity, aphanisis and the death of the ego, as illuminations 
of the un-thought stage seen from various points of view, but all able to accommodate particular 
processes such as primary processes, dedifferentiation, syncretistic scanning occurring on 
unconscious material in what is not a conscious/rational mode of attention, but one that is more 
‘permeable’ to influences from other libidinal energy pathways. One way of seeing this is 
Lacan’s idea of the ‘lure’, the permeation of desire (now including multiple concepts of desire) 
in an image and its consequent effect(s) on the viewer(s). 
          
With the consideration and development of the concept of the libidinal gaze, my aim is 
to visualize ‘theoretically’ something that is deeply concerned with the real, that is, to account 
for communication of passion and energy. Ettinger speaks of emphasizing the real to the point 
of over-riding the symbolic in her ‘erotic aerials of the psyche’ – wordless ‘knowing’ of others’ 
trauma and jouissance, conveyed in a non-rational, non-sequential, non-orderly, non-‘total’, 
non-representational manner. The stain (Ettinger and Lacan) is also a useful concept in this 
regard, describing an avenue of connection between the symbolic and the real. Ettinger’s notions 
open a door to the theoretical consideration of two hitherto foreclosed topics in Lacan’s 
thinking. One is that of experience and ‘learning’ in the womb. The other is the direct 
communication of the ‘real’, without the symbolic intervening as ‘wall’. In the main, direct 
communication between humans must, it seems to me, include rationalism, re-presentation and 
common codes and symbols which are understandable to ‘both subjects’. But there is more to 
the story – the sub-symbolic communication that I have been considering. In the Introduction I 
speak of my work in terms of ‘lines of desire’. These ‘lines of desire’ ‘obscure’ meaning (by 
definition) from me, but they have a ‘gaze’ for me, a look and a feeling that (seems to) comes 
off the images.433 This I relate not only to Lacan’s ideas, but to Lyotard’s idea of intensities of 
                                                          
433 This can be seen theoretically as both in the ‘look’ I desire from the drawings, and the look I desire from others 
with regard to the drawings. 
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libidinal energy and Ehrenzweig’s idea of redifferentiation and re-introjection of mental 
material. Lacan’s concept of the gaze includes the notion of the gaze of the image, as does my 
notion of the libidinal gaze, but again based on extended notions of the gaze, the unconscious 
and desire.  
 
What has been extended to great effect, for me as an artist, is the idea of the ‘availability’ 
of a wide and subtle range and variety of energy, devices and perceptions (internal and external) 
that Lacan was not able to develop owing to his conception of desire being based on lack. The 
unconscious level of complex processing of perceptual material proposed here provides for 
coherent combinations, re-combinations, variations and distortions of that material, and the 
potential ‘re-emergence’ of the modified material into the conscious mind. ‘Trust the process’, 
which is one aspect of what I am discussing, implies a ‘laying down’ of the aggressivity and 
defensiveness implicit in Lacan’s concept of the gaze, and a cessation of conscious manipulation 
and interference. This is turn implies a more freely (rather than ‘thwarted’) flowing energy, 
differently orientated modes of attention and a complex ‘processing’ of complex mental 
material.  
 
It can now be seen that the notion of the libidinal gaze extends what is already, in 
Lacan’s concept of the gaze, of importance for the image maker as the idea of the reflections 
and refractions of ‘cultural’ influence (the realm of the symbolic) as it is perceived, ‘interpreted’ 
and ‘used’ (e.g. refracted and reflected) by the individual, and then the viewer. The libidinal 
gaze encompasses an extended complexity of borderlines and boundaries in and between 
perception and the unconscious, in which reflections and refractions of perceptual and mental 
material, along with the energy and influence of the libido, its devices and intensities, are 
understood to influence, even cause, a particular stage of the process of image making, the un-
thought stage. To ‘trust the process’ of any productivity given this emphasis on complexity is 
the best advocacy and summary of this thesis. The complexity of which I speak is most 
forcefully legitimated as ‘art’ culturally. 
           
    
    Section  4:   Disadvantages and advantages   
 
Disadvantages of this notion include the ‘slippery’ and in-describable unconscious 
mental material, organization and processes in all their complexities, which makes them 
vulnerable to over-intellectualisation, (attempted) over-control, (attempted) over-observation. 
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These are matters about which we are blind, about which we can only surmise, into which we 
can only go by not trying. This is a short paragraph, but a very important point. 
 
Among the advantages of the notion of the libidinal gaze, to my mind, are the following 
points. It helps to (re-)establish, extend and re-contextualize the contributions of ‘phallic’ ideas 
to understanding the un-thought stage of image making. This is done by proposing the addition 
of certain perceptual and unconscious operations, a well as ideas extending the concept of 
desire, such that some of the perceived disadvantages/shortcomings of Lacan’s ideas are 
overcome. The notion of the libidinal gaze takes advantage of Lacan’s (and Freud’s) insights 
and rich experience with (mentally disturbed) patients, but it includes certain ideas that add a 
dimension of further possible/probable ‘devices’ leading to intensities of libidinal energy, 
especially those seen in the more positively orientated scenarios of problem solving and image 
making. The notion of the libidinal gaze makes a serious contribution to the notion of the un-
thought stage, that is to the processes, mental material and structures of mental material, of the 
not-rational (unconscious) mind, and to our ability to visualize and perhaps to encourage 
appropriately what can be understood to be occurring at these moments. Insofar as the 
usefulness of the notion of the libidinal gaze arises, in the present case, from its application to 
image-making in art, this latter is not, I have suggested, an imaginative process, in the common 
use of the word imagine, but a pulling together of ‘edges of perception’ with ‘processes of the 
unconscious’, in other words the realms of the real and the symbolic. Operations of the 
unconscious are seen now not only as a series of mechanistically driven processes with results 
driven by chance, but operations subject to a ‘hidden order’ and obliquely open to influence and 
learning, albeit in ways opaque to the conscious mind. Rational thought is not seen as the only 
useful form of mental process, even though other ‘forms’ are not controllable consciously. The 
unconscious processes are not seen as governed (solely) by the Law. 
 
This notion gives the process of the gaze a firmer basis, involving the idea of the libido 
as a driving force, and adding to, but not replacing, Lacan’s concept of desire as being based on 
lack. 
   
    
Section 5:  Reflections on my practice 
 
In conclusion I return to the painting practice with which I began. As I described in the 
Introduction, my practice in the studio includes un-planned mark-making. For example, the 
process of image making I consider in my thesis can be seen in many of my drawings and 
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paintings in terms of the basic underlying marks. Each of the basic marks laid down is 
unplanned and non-mimetic, made ‘spontaneously’, without forethought, rational planning or 
specific minute observation of some aspect of the world. This has at least two results: a) each 
mark is ‘non-descriptive’ in its own right, b) there is a vitality in the combined effect of the 
marks at this level. 
 
It is these mark making processes that provide the context for my consideration of ideas 
of the gaze and the libidinal gaze, seen as the results of the play of unconscious processes on 
perception and mental material, where perception becomes (nearly) elided. Thus the 
‘technology’ of the original process of (in this case my) image making, occurring within a 
mental state I call the un-thought stage, can be thought of in one sense as signifiers, the 
‘unrealized’, being manifested onto the artistic support. These form a palimpsest on which other 
more rationally planned marks can be laid to emphasize or encourage the emergence of more or 
less ambiguous images.  
 
There is, also, another side to the story. From the viewpoint of one who is looking at 
paintings like mine, rather than making them, it is interesting to think about how the process of 
the libidinal gaze might be seen in the painting. One approach is to look for hints and clues as to 
the ‘history’ of the making of the painting, for instance by means of looking at the order in 
which the marks may have been laid down. Another is to make a special point of looking at, and 
for, various kinds of marks that, for whatever reason, by themselves, mean or describe nothing. 
Elkins has studied these kinds of marks.434 As I stated earlier, he describes marks that contribute 
to the overall effect, but in a non-meaningful-in-themselves manner. His examples include the 
‘edge’ of a mark, where there is a choice of ‘mark and field’ or ‘mark and surface’; and further 
when an ‘orlo’ (very thin outline) is laid down such that ‘with the orlo there is no longer even a 
binary opposition from which to begin. This is the simplest and most damaging equivocation 
that stands in the way of visual semiotics’.435  
 
In other words, there are always other than ‘meaningful’ happenings within the painting 
or drawing. 
 
Elkins describes various modes of marks, each of which amounts to a distinct and yet 
non-semiotic structure, for instance 1) ontological instability of the mark (it exfoliates into 
                                                          
434 Elkins, see especially the first and last chapters. See my earlier reference to his book Paintings and the Words 
that Fail Them, in Chapter Two, Section 1.1.10. 
435 Elkins, 42. 
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surrounding fields), 2) a mark is undecideably a part of a whole, a composite rather than an 
entity, and 3) ‘when marks are swirled into washes or scumbled into larger areas, or smudged 
into continuous gradations, they lose their disjointedness, but not the idea of disjunction,’ and so 
on. He uses these examples to show that unlike written signs, drawn and painted marks are 
insecurely linked to their grounds. The same is true at the level of the figure, in that it is not 
often so distanced or differentiated from the background that it is legitimate to ‘pick it up and 
interpret it on its own’, so to speak.436   
 
Elkins proposes that these types of marks can ‘be understood as objects that are 
simultaneously signs and not signs’ and goes on to propose that these ‘outlandish and routinely 
partly incomprehensible marks both hinder and enable whatever story the picture seems to 
tell’.437 This echoes and exemplifies Lacan’s idea of the ‘wall’ of the symbolic. 
 
Elkins also considers a class of marks relating to what he terms ‘a class of things that are 
irretrievably or necessarily absent from pictures.’438 He proposes that elements of a picture, 
sometimes entire pictures, are ‘gestures in the direction of meaningless, invisibility or un-
representability, whether they aim to evade meaning or encompass it.’439 He also lists and 
discusses such ‘attributes’ as the inconceivable and the un-seeable. These are the antithesis of 
‘classic rhetoric’, where the clearer the meaning, the better in terms of harmony, balance and 
beauty. His claim is that ‘much of the project of modernism, and virtually all of postmodernism, 
is to undermine, question, abandon and otherwise tear down the clear communication of 
meaning’.440  
 
For me, this is a clear view of at least one aspect of my practice – partly a different than 
rationally planned and enveloping message to convey, partly an investigation of the effects 
marks can convey, and partly an investigation into how far marks and images can be left 
minimally ‘edited’ and yet remain interesting and energetic, i.e. retaining some measure of 
‘lure’ (Lacan). One way to see this is a dialectic between passages emphasizing a ‘re-
invigoration’ of the figure by means of an investigation into mark making, and the introduction 
of more rational, ‘meaningful’ figure-describing marks, even cartoon elements, as well as 
passages emphasizing form and colour. 
 
                                                          
436 Elkins, 42-43. ‘Figure’ here is used in the imagistic sense, not the Lyotardian sense. 
437 Elkins, 46. 
438 Elkins, 213. 
439 Elkins, 213. 
440 Elkins, 214. 
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As an example of seeing both the image from the point of view of its development, and 
also where the smears, quality and edges of lines and fabrication are ‘clues’ that tell a different 
story than that of the ‘content’ or ‘subject matter’ of the image, let us think about Illustration In. 
2, Silver, (detail), in the Introduction, Section 1.2. Some marks enhance the figurative 
(meaningful) aspect of the painting, for instance each of the heads. These heads are seen 
relatively clearly, in that there are few marks obliterating or seriously modifying them. Other 
marks, while to some extent descriptive, are ambiguous – for instance the larger figure’s right 
arm and shoulder (to our left) – there is a choice of two positions for the arm and shoulder, 
neither of which is especially fortuitous on its own, although the darker one is the less ably 
descriptive of the two. Yet from a distance (Silver, Illustration In.1), this anomaly causes only 
mild consternation, it provides a sort of ‘hook’ for the eye that wants to ‘figure it out’, as well as 
providing a sense of movement. Other marks, those between the two figures and some of the 
semi-obliterated marks ‘under’ the legs of the smaller figure indicate to us that they are part of 
the original palimpsest. Again from a distance they add energy and a kind of movement, as well 
as a sense of ‘mystery’ – how can I make sense of these marks as a viewer? On a closer look, 
the marks on the legs add a feeling of three-dimensionality as well as leading to a wondering 
about what else might be seen to be going on there. Are these marks mistakes? Were they meant 
to contribute to the three-dimensionality of the legs? Are they contributing to some sort of 
‘effect’ of haziness or movement, a quick glance with no chance to sort out details? There is 
also the idea of a cartoon like overlay of the figures on to the palimpsest of unrestful marks. 
 
These comments and queries refer back to the Introduction, where I write about my 
practice as including an interest in making minimally clarifying marks in terms of creating an 
‘effect’ but yet maintaining a fluidity of meaning and a somewhat ambiguous manifestation of 
images.441 My interest includes maintaining a degree of transparency in terms of the history of 
the making of the image. For me, these aspects of the image making process support my 
underlying dual interest in considering the affective or ‘energetic’ level of 
interaction/relationships between people, and in the ‘conversations’ possible between conscious 
and unconscious material and processes of the mind. 
 
The notion of the libidinal gaze consists of a complex group of ideas that help me as an 
image maker keep my mode of attention wide and unfocused – in the sense of edges of 
perception, intuition and affect. The libidinal gaze proposes that an awareness of an un-thought 
‘mode of attention’ of the artist is essential, but consciously un-governable. It allows a clearer 
                                                          
441 Introduction, Section 2.2.  See also Chapter Two, Section 1.1.8, related comments about a Beuys drawing. 
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visualization of what may be happening in that mode of attention, involving ‘hidden order’ and 
great complexity of process. These observations describe one aspect of my studio practice, 
which is an attempt to avoid over-reliance on the conscious mind and rationality by 
hypothesizing a helpful and useful visualization of the word ‘intuition’ as a process. This is in 
the Ehrenzweig ‘definition’ of the word ‘intuition’. My sense of the un-thought stage is closely 
related to this idea. 
 
It seems to me that a viewer aware of these ideas is in a position to ‘see’ more, to involve 
him/herself more in the fabrication and objectification of the painting, as well as whatever 
representation is presented. In other words these many combined ideas both support and clarify 
the use of (this idea of) ‘intuition’ by the viewer in viewing, as well as by the maker in making. 
 
For me as an artist, the un-thought stage, the libidinal gaze, is a way of being more fully 
involved in the manifestation of the complicated, reverberating, resonating image with pleasure, 
excitement and questioning. 
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Appendix One:    Documentation of the Practice Section of the Thesis              
 
The ‘thesis’ for this PhD degree consists of both written theory and an art practice - in 
my case painting and drawing practice. The requirement is for the writing and the painting 
practice to be related in some manner. For the final examination, the viva voce, I presented a 
series of recent paintings, as well as undergoing an oral examination on the written thesis. This 
section includes representations of these paintings (The Visit, In.3, seen in the Introduction, was 
also included). 
 
My written thesis consists of an enquiry into one aspect of a process of image making in 
painting practice, where this process is represented in a necessarily simplified model. The 
paintings, developed over five years of painting concurrently with thinking and writing about 
theory, include some aspects that are discussed and related to the written theory in the text of the 
thesis. However, my painting practice is neither circumscribed by, nor based solely on, the 
theory utilized in the written thesis. I have experienced, and maintained, a decided ‘mental 
distance’ between the writing and the painting in that I neither paint wholly about the theory nor 
write in total and specific detail about the painting process(es) I employ . 
 
Having said that, the fact that these paintings rely heavily on drawing per se is consistent 
with the interest shown in the written thesis about images in painting and drawing other than 
images resulting from the studied, careful and detailed representation of specific objects in the 
world around us. As we have seen, my intention in the written thesis is to investigate ideas about 
influences on making images that are other than conscious, rational, intentions. Many authors 
have discussed drawing/sketching as an activity where mistakes, accidents, trials, and the 
passage of time can remain apparent. Visual ambiguities are thereby incorporated and left 
evident to some degree, such that the ‘perceptual processes’ of the viewer must ‘work’ to make 
sense of the images. Some relevant authors are mentioned in the text (for instance Anton 
Ehrenzweig, Dieter Koepplin, Bernice Rose). This is discussed more fully in the Introduction to 
this thesis. 
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Ap.1  Two Figures with Watcher  (Blue), 6’ x 5’, acrylic paint on board, 2003 
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Ap. 2  Untitled (Nickel Azo Yellow), 6’ x 5’, acrylic paint on board, 2004. 
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Ap. 3  Green Gathering (Chromium Oxide Green), 4.5’ x 4’, acrylic paint on board, 
2003. 
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Ap. 4  Two Figures Pale at Dawn  (Unbleached Titanium), acrylic paint on board, 2004. 
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Ap. 5  Untitled (Small Pink), 2.5’ x 4’, acrylic paint on board, 2003. 
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Ap. 6  Cinnamon Synergy, 4.5’ x 4’, acrylic paint on board, 2004. 
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Ap. 7  The Weight of the Dream, (Lavender), 6’ x 5’, acrylic paint on board, 2004. 
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Ap. 8  Missed Encounter (Sea Green), 6’ x 5’, acrylic paint on board, 2004. 
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Ap. 9  Untitled (Green Gold, 4.5’ x 4’, acrylic paint on board, 2004. 
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Ap. 10  Untitled (Cobalt Teal), acrylic paint on board, 2004. 
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Ap. 11  Teacher in Blue Robe, Late in the Afternoon, 3.5’ x 4’, acrylic paint on board, 
2004. 
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Ap. 12  Installation Photo 1 
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Ap. 13  Installation Photo 2 
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Ap. 14  Installation Photo 3 
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